Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation
Fig 13
Strategic response to cooperators and defectors in game B, in the reputation-based model with three archetypal games in the structured population.
The density of strategies who play up with cooperators u(C), down with cooperators d(C), up with defectors, u(D), and down with defectors, d(D), as a function of the probability of error in inferring the PD strategy of the opponent, η, are plotted. The payoff values used for the games are presented in Table 1. Simulations are performed in a population of size 40000 individuals residing on a 200 × 200 square lattice with first nearest neighbor von Neumann connectivity and periodic boundaries. The simulations are performed for 6000 time steps, and averages and standard deviations are calculated based on the last 4000 time steps. The simulations start from random initial conditions. Here, ν = 0.005.