Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation
Fig 10
Time evolution of the system in a structured population when game B is the Stag Hunt game.
A to C: snapshots of the population during the evolution for different times, t, are presented. (d) and (e): The densities of different strategies as a function of time. Here, ν = 10−3, and game B is the Stag Hunt game. The payoff values of the games are presented in Table 1. The initial population is a uniformly distributed mixture of Cdd and Ddu. This initial condition favors the evolution of cooperation-favoring coordination norms in a mixed population. However, due to the formation of homogeneous blocks in a structured population, cooperation favoring coordination norms are unstable, and the system evolves to a defective state composed of Ddd and Dud types. The population resides on a 200 × 200 first nearest neighbor square lattice with von Neumann connectivity and periodic boundaries. The direct interaction model is used.