Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation
Fig 6
Time evolution in the model with direct interactions.
A and B: The time evolution of different strategies resulted from the replicator-mutator dynamics A and a simulation in a finite population B. (c) and (d): The time evolution of the density of the cooperators ρC (up), and the density of the soft strategies ρd (bottom), resulted from the replicator-mutator dynamics C, and a simulation D. Cooperation favoring moral norms evolves through a rapid dynamical transition. The simulation is performed on a population of size N = 20000, and the mutation rate is ν = 0.005. The initial condition is a random assignment of strategies (for the replicator-mutator dynamics, this implies ρx = 1/8, for all strategies x). The base payoff values, presented in Table 1, are used.