Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals
Fig 5
Cycles have equalizing force that reduce wealth inequality.
A, Two example cycles of coupled changes in network positions, strategies, and ranks (dh = 0.4; dd = 0.6; f = 0.4). B, Below the critical value f < dh, ranks remain static and no cycles emerge (the grey shaded area). At f ≥ dh, a phase transition occurs and coupled cycles emerge. The cycle length varies as a function of f. Cycles are shorter when power asymmetry is higher. C, Static networks lead to low total payoff due to inefficient hawk-hawk conflict while partner choice stabilizes the convention and leads to high payoffs. D, Static networks lead to high inequality as bullies earn higher payoffs. Partner choice with static ranks reverses the pattern with low-ranking individuals earning high payoffs as they attract more visitors. Partner choice and dynamic ranks preserving perfect equality among individuals. (dh = 0.4; dd = 0.6; f = 0.6).