Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games
Fig 4
iPD strategies in the final population.
Strategies are taken for the 109-th generation and averaged over 80 runs. This figure characterizes the final population as a whole and complements Table 1 representing specific strategies. (A) Strategy entries s1, …, s4 are close to (1001) for psee = 0.1, …, 0.3 demonstrating the dominance of WSLS. Deviations from this pattern for psee = 0.0 and psee = 0.4 indicate the presence of the GTFT (1a1b) and FbF (101b) strategies, respectively. For psee ≥ 0.4 strategy entries s1, …, s4 are quite low due to the extinction of cooperative strategies. (B) Entries s5, …, s8 are irrelevant for psee = 0.0 (resulting in random values around 0.5) and indicate the same WSLS-like pattern for psee = 0.1, …, 0.3. Note that s6, s7 > 0 indicate that in transparent settings WSLS-players tend to cooperate seeing that the partner is cooperating even when this is against the WSLS principle. The decrease of reciprocal cooperation for psee ≥ 0.4 indicates the decline of WSLS and cooperative strategies in general. (C) Entries s9, …, s12 are irrelevant for psee = 0.0 (resulting in random values around 0.5) and are quite low for psee = 0.1, …, 0.3 (s12 is irrelevant in a cooperative population). Increase of s9, …, s11 for psee ≥ 0.4 indicates that mutual cooperation in the population is replaced by unilateral defection.