Fig 1.
The structure of the Trust Game.
The illustration represents the decision making process during the TG. Player 1 starts the game and offers some integer number from zero to ten to player 2. Player 2 gets the offered number multiplied by three. Then player 2 returns any number of the number available.
Table 1.
Prisoner’s Dilemma payoffs.
Fig 2.
The illustration of the group formation during the Socialization stage.
Two captains are chosen as volunteers from among the participants. Other participants must choose the captain whose team they want to join and how many points they are prepared to pay for that. The four participants, who paid less than the others, continue as individual participants in Group 3; they are forbidden to communicate or even look at each other. The participants in the teams with captains form Group 1 and Group 2.
Table 2.
The average level of cooperation and the QRE parameter for all the experiments in PD before the Socialization stage.
Fig 3.
The average level of cooperation and the QRE parameter for all experiments in PD before the Socialization stage.
The λparameter (y-axis) as a function of the average level of cooperation in every experiments (x-axis).
Table 3.
The average levels of the cooperative moves in PD after Socialization.
Table 4.
Average trust and gratefulness in comparison with QRE for the TG.
Fig 4.
A set of symmetric equilibria of the Markov game on the plane tolerance-betrayal, reciprocal cooperation (theoretical result).
Reciprocal cooperation γ (y-axis) as a function of the tolerance to the defection α(x-axis) for every experiment.
Table 5.
Number of cooperative and non-cooperative moves, reciprocal cooperation and tolerance to defection in PD before and after Socialization.
Table 6.
Assessment of the parameters of reciprocal Socialization and tolerance to defection according to the results of the experiments before and after Socialization.
Fig 5.
Tolerance to defection and reciprocal cooperation: Theory and experiment.
Reciprocal cooperation γ (y-axis) as a function of the tolerance of the defection α (x-axis) for every experiments: comparison of the theoretical and experimental data.
Table 7.
The distance of tolerance to defection from the theoretical equilibria to the experimental data before and after Socialization.
Table 8.
The deviation of the winning from the theoretical equilibria to the experimental data before and after Socialization.
Fig 6.
Deviation of experiments from the equilibria on winning in percentages.
The deviation in winning in the experimental data from the theoretical equilibrium (y-axis) during the experiments in decreasing order of the deviations from the equilibria in winning (x-axis).