2.1.1 Stratification.

Stratification pertains to the examination of vertical social relations. It refers to the objective division of social status due to the unequal distribution of means of production and social wealth. The difference in the quantity of law resulting from stratification differences is precisely because of the inequitable distribution of social resources. Black, who concurred with Linton’s perspective [25, pp. 115–116], attributes factors such as occupation, age, gender, race, birthplace, or lineage to potential causes of distributional inequality [7, pp. 11–12]. As Black asserts, wealthier people have a legal advantage [7, p. 12]. Consequently, income serve as the most effective quantitative indicators of social stratification and are among the most frequently utilized metrics in empirical research [16,22,26]. The income indicator may also exhibit variations across different studies, such as industry income, [27] community economic conditions [20], the Gini Index [22], per capita GDP, and industrialization [14].

Variables such as age [26,28], gender [29], and occupation [27], which are correlated with income, are often employed to represent stratification differences. Generally, the elderly accumulate more wealth than the young, hence enjoying a higher social status. Black also notes that in most societies, women and children have less wealth than men, and thus also have less law [7, p. 17]. Unlike income indicators, age, gender, and occupation not only quantify stratification differences but also represent disparities in educational attainment and alternative social control.

Race or ethnicity is another commonly used indicator in existing research examining social stratification variables, apart from income [22,26,30–33]. However, it is important to note that the relationship between these variables and income can vary significantly across countries or regions.

In summary, this study quantifies stratification primarily through income and social class. Given the distinct impact of China’s reform and opening-up, generational differences in development opportunities have significantly shaped social stratification, thereby amplifying the role of age. Additionally, gender disparities in social and family roles, reinforced by traditional cultural norms, contribute to stratification differences, making age and gender key indicators for this study. However, ethnic or racial factors are excluded, as China’s ethnic composition is characterized by “diverse habitation with small concentrations” (daqunju, xiaojuju 大群居, 小聚居), and widespread ethnic-based discrimination is not prevalent. Moreover, extensive government policies supporting ethnic minorities complicate the interpretation of ethnicity as a stratification variable. Given these contextual factors, this study does not incorporate ethnicity in its measurement of social stratification. Building on the above discussion, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Elder individuals, males, those with higher incomes, and those of higher social status will possess greater access to the quantity of law and be more inclined to choose more formal dispute resolution methods.

2.1.2 Morphology.

Morphology examines horizontal relationships in social life, reflecting the distribution of interpersonal ties. Black argues that social morphology varies across different contexts, such as organizations, neighborhoods, communities, public spaces, and relationships between friends and spouses [7, p. 37]. Morphological changes are specifically manifested in the degree of separation, interaction, and interdependence among individuals. In a “differentiated” society, the finer the social division of labor and the more egalitarian the social interactions, the greater the quantity of law. Conversely, when interdependence reaches a “symbiotic” state, the quantity of law significantly decreases. Additionally, relational distance and centrifugal direction are important indicators for assessing the degree of differentiation and the strength of dependence. The closer the relationship and the higher the level of interdependence, the smaller the quantity of law. Individuals at the center of social networks often hold more power in social relationships and are more motivated to resort to legal means for dispute resolution. On the other hand, those in more peripheral positions, or more marginalized, are more likely to be subjected to litigation.

In individual-level analyses, marital status is often considered a key indicator of social integration, as married individuals typically engage in more social activities and have more relationships than single individuals [16,34]. In group-level studies, some studies compare communities in urban, suburban, and rural areas to reflect the closeness and nature of social relationships among community members [35]. The assumption is that communities closer to urban centers have lower levels of interaction and weaker horizontal connections among social groups. Lu and Miethe [14], in their study of women’s reporting behaviors across Chinese provinces, used female labor participation rates to assess the overall horizontal social morphology of women in those regions.

Building on these insights, this study operationalizes an individual’s position in horizontal social relationships by assessing their family ties, neighborly interactions, and social engagement with friends. These dimensions capture variations in interpersonal connection and social integration, allowing for a more precise examination of how morphological factors influence legal behavior. Building on the above discussion, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who have closer interactions with family members, neighbors, and friends are more likely to opt for more formal dispute resolution methods involving a greater quantity of law. Additionally, when the counterpart in a dispute is a family member, friend, colleague, or business partner—ranging from closer to more distant in terms of social circles—the likelihood of choosing a more formal dispute resolution method increases.

2.1.3 Culture.

Black posits that culture consists of the symbolic expressions of truth, goodness, and beauty in social life, and that law, in essence, is likewise an abstract symbol derived from social life [7, p. 61]. Individuals with greater cultural resources are more likely to accept, trust, and understand law as a complex, symbolic means of dispute resolution. Consequently, Black argues that higher levels of education correlate with greater cultural resources [7, pp. 66–67], and law varies directly with literacy and education [7, p. 64]. In most empirical studies applying Black’s theory, educational attainment is treated as the most typical cultural factor examined [13–19,36,37].

Black notes that the greater a community or society’s cultural development, the greater its quantity of law [7, p. 63]. On the surface, this cultural disparity may manifest as differences between coastal and inland regions, plains and mountainous areas, or urban and rural areas. However, at its core, it reflects disparities in individual educational attainment [7, p. 64]. For this reason, some studies, in addition to examining educational factors, include urban versus rural residency, coastal versus inland location, and the ease of access to information as important indicators to quantify cultural differences [14].

It is noteworthy that some studies have included race as a variable for measuring cultural differences [28,38,39]. In fact, the variation in the quantity of culture proposed by Black does not imply a value hierarchy among different races or civilizations—culture is merely an abstract symbol. The reason for the quantitative differences in culture among different ethnic groups lies not in the culture itself but in its potential non-mainstream status within a specific country or region. Therefore, while race may serve as a variable for cultural differences in certain countries or regions, this criterion is not universally applicable. In Chappell and Maggard’s research [28], factors reflecting cultural background differences included not only racial differences but also gender differences, yet gender variables are similarly insufficient for widespread application in examining cultural factors.

Consequently, this study operationalizes cultural differences solely through educational attainment. Regional differences are excluded for two main reasons. First, China’s relatively equitable compulsory education system has largely eliminated absolute cultural deprivation, and disparities in higher education levels can be more accurately captured through respondents’ educational qualifications. Second, regional differences are more reflective of social stratification or alternative social control disparities rather than cultural variation, making them unsuitable for this analysis. Similarly, ethnic or racial factors are not included, consistent with the rationale outlined in the social stratification section. In fact, minority students in China receive additional policy support in accessing high school and university education, further complicating the use of ethnicity as a reliable indicator of cultural differences. Building on the above discussion, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Individuals with higher levels of education, who possess greater cultural capital, will have a greater quantity of law and be more willing to resolve disputes through more formal methods.

2.1.4 Organization.

Organization refers to the structural composition of social life, where the quantity of organization is defined as the proportion of collective life or action within social activities [7, p. 85]. The more organizations and collective actions there are, the greater the need for law to regulate and govern them [7, p. 91]. Therefore, when social life becomes so complex that it necessitates the existence of various organizations, the development and expansion of law become inevitable. Black argues that any group is more organized than an individual, and the degree of organization between individuals can be assessed by examining their membership in organizations and the organizational strength of those groups [7, p. 86].

Existing studies often measure the degree of organization in social groups through the number of autonomous organizations or civil associations, and define an individual’s level of organization by their participation in such groups. For example, Doyle and Luckenbill’s study uses PTA membership and neighborhood club membership as criteria for quantifying organization [18], while Kuo et al. also consider the development of civic groups as an indicator of organizational strength [9]. Furthermore, Lu and Miethe’s study also quantifies the strength of organization using indicators such as social welfare services, hospital bed per capita, and entertainment outlets (the number of theaters per capita) [14].

Black posits that a group’s organizational status is defined by its degree of organization, and an individual’s by his or her memberships [7, p. 92]. Therefore, in quantifying the organizational differences among the subjects of this study, distinctions are based on the degree of organization of their respective professions. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Individuals who are unemployed or affiliated with weaker organizational structures will possess a lower quantity of law and be less inclined to pursue formal dispute resolution. By contrast, those working in organizational settings with stronger hierarchical or bureaucratic structures are more likely to seek legal remedies involving higher levels of formal intervention.

2.1.5 Alternative social control.

Social control refers to the normative aspect of social life [7, p. 105]. Black’s theory expands the traditional focus on governmental social control to include other forms of social control, thereby comparing changes in legal control with those in other styles of social control [40]. The more complex a society is, the greater the total amount of social norms or social control will be. Within this total, there is an inverse relationship between the quantity of law and other forms of social control [7, p. 107]. Social control methods other than law include etiquette, custom, ethics, religions, bureaucracy and family ties [7, p. 105].

Legal pluralism theory posits that more than one legal order exists within a single social field. Law in the broad sense should encompass the regulatory rules of numerous semi-autonomous social fields [1,2]. This theory challenges the distinction drawn in the BBL between law and other forms of social control. Particularly when examining the choices among dispute resolution mechanisms, the pervasive presence of ADR undoubtedly expands the boundaries of what constitutes “law” [41]. Therefore, when this study discusses alternative forms of social control, it is necessary to exclude various ADR mechanisms. This will significantly distinguish it from previous studies on BBL [14,15].

Black predicts that the family exerts more social control of its own than other social groups or relationships [7, p. 108], and an individual lacking family social control is more likely to become a criminal [7, p. 10]. To this end, some studies have treated the degree and nature of parental involvement in adolescent management as a manifestation of alternative social control [35]. Similar research operationalizes intact families as one of the informal social control indicators [42]. Kuo and collegues also consider family ties as an important alternative form of social control, arguing that the disorganization of traditional Chinese family structures leads to the decline of clan rituals and increases the application of law in society as a whole [15].

It is important to note that Black also views violence itself as a form of alternative social control [43], particularly among lower social strata or individuals, where violence or crime (Homicide) [22] is more readily adopted than other peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms. Black believes that the amount of social control varies depending on the setting, with private spaces always subject to more social control than public spaces [7, p. 110]. The amount of social control also changes at different times of the day, with Black suggesting that social control is generally more relaxed at night, leading to an increase in the quantity of law (crime) [7, pp. 110–111]. In their examination of criminal behavior, Kuo et al. primarily investigated two variables influencing social control: the space and time of crime occurrence [16].

In summary, this study operationalizes alternative social control through four dimensions: religious affiliation, household registration (hukou), marital status, and political affiliation. Although the extended family lifestyle has long been dismantled in modern China, the concept of family remains a crucial component of Chinese culture. This family-based social control has evolved from the clan laws of old China into emotional bonds. China’s land ownership system is public, with rural land not owned by the state but collectively by villagers, and all collective assets are owned and managed by rural collective economic organizations. This inherently creates a high degree of interdependence based on the means of production in rural Chinese society, resulting in more alternative social controls than in urban areas. While Black conceptualizes political parties as an organizational factor [7, p. 85], in discussing the relationship between organizational differences and social control, he also cites Selznick’s perspective [44, pp. 25–29], stating that “a more organized political party has more discipline, with a revolutionary party having the most of all” [7, pp. 101–102]. Furthermore, in the context of China’s national conditions, the role of political parties in alternative social control is significantly more pronounced compared to their function as merely an organizational factor. Similarly, the constraints imposed by religious beliefs also constitute an important form of social control [7, p. 105, p. 110].

Taken together, these findings indicate that alternative sources of social control, particularly those rooted in familial, political, and cultural institutions, can substitute for legal intervention in dispute resolution. Individuals embedded in such normative frameworks may experience less need to mobilize the formal legal mechanisms. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: Individuals embedded in stronger alternative social control environments, such as rural residents, married individuals, religious believers, and Communist Party members, are expected to have less access to the quantity of law and be less inclined to choose formal dispute resolution mechanisms.

Collectively, these five dimensions constitute the core independent variables of this study. Having established how Black’s theory is operationalized at the variable level, the next section turns to the empirical context, examining why dispute resolution serves as a suitable domain for testing the theory’s propositions.

2.1.6 Challenges in operationalizing social dimensions.

While the preceding discussion has clarified how each of Black’s five dimensions can be operationalized in the Chinese context, two major challenges remain when translating these theoretical concepts into measurable variables.

The first challenge concerns overlapping influences among variables. Because Black did not explicitly define his key variables [10], certain indicators in empirical social surveys may simultaneously capture multiple social dimensions. Without careful distinction, this overlap can produce discrepancies between empirical results and Black’s theoretical predictions. For example, gender not only reflects economic inequality and social status but also mirrors differences in alternative social control—women, particularly within marriage, are often subject to stronger familial constraints and thus less inclined to use formal judicial means to resolve disputes [29]. Likewise, age may serve as both a stratification and cultural indicator, while employment status can simultaneously represent stratification and morphological variation. As Kruttschnitt notes, “age as a social characteristic has more than one kind of relevance to predicting the quantity of law” [26, p. 254]. These examples underscore the importance of distinguishing clear conceptual boundaries when selecting variables for BBL-based analysis.

The second challenge pertains to cultural and institutional variation. The social meaning of a variable may differ substantially across societies. For instance, in non-secular Islamic countries, religious institutions exert stronger social control than in secular contexts; monotheistic religions tend to impose greater normative discipline than do polytheistic traditions; and in societies strongly influenced by atheism, religious control is typically much weaker [45]. Consequently, when religion is used as an indicator of alternative social control, the direction and strength of its relationship with the “quantity of law” may vary across cultural settings.

Together, these challenges highlight the need for greater conceptual precision and contextual sensitivity when operationalizing Black’s social dimensions in empirical research.

2.2.1 From legal forms to dispute resolution mechanisms.

In Black’s theoretical framework, variations in the “quantity of law” are manifested through different forms of social control, which he classifies into four types: penal, compensatory, therapeutic, and conciliatory. The penal and compensatory forms are characterized as accusatory forms of social control, as both depend on a third party to render an independent judgment or decision, typically yielding an “all-or-nothing” outcome: punishment or no punishment, compensation or no compensation [7, p. 4]. Black argues that increases in penalties or compensation denote a greater quantity of law; similarly, more elaborate legal procedures and lengthier litigation durations also indicate higher levels of legal involvement [7, p. 3]. As he elaborates, “the quantity of law is known by the number and scope of prohibitions, obligations, and other standards to which people are subject, and by the rate of legislation, litigation, and adjudication” [7, p. 3]. Building on this premise, litigation procedures entail a greater quantity of law than arbitration procedures: while both rely on third-party adjudication, they differ in procedural scope and institutional rigor.

In contrast, the therapeutic and conciliatory styles are defined as remedial forms of social control [7, p. 4]. Conciliation encompasses both negotiated settlements between parties and mediation facilitated by a neutral third party [7, p. 5; 46]. Therapeutic control, by contrast, involves unilateral assistance provided to one party to restore social or psychological normality, representing the form of social control with the least quantity of law [7, p. 4].

These four legal forms, categorized into accusatory and remedial types, collectively constitute a theoretical continuum that ranges from highly formalized, coercive interventions to more voluntary ones. When applied to empirical research, they serve as a conceptual bridge connecting Black’s abstract notion of “quantity of law” with the concrete institutional manifestations of dispute resolution across different societies. Accordingly, dispute resolution mechanisms can be understood as observable manifestations of this continuum, thereby providing a theoretically coherent framework for examining the behavioral dynamics proposed in BBL.

2.2.2 Institutional and cultural foundations in the chinese context.

Research on dispute resolution mechanisms in China has predominantly focused on qualitative analyses [47–49]. Among the limited quantitative studies, most have merely provided cursory validations of Black’s theory, relying solely on selected key findings [50,51]. To apply Black’s theory to examining Chinese citizens’ choices of dispute resolution mechanisms, a prerequisite is to first identify the dispute resolution mechanisms existing in Chinese society, along with their associated legal, social, and cultural contexts. Additionally, the operationalization of the dependent variable must be grounded in the actual development of dispute resolution mechanisms in Chinese society.

Since Confucianism rose to prominence during the Han Dynasty, social control in China has been primarily exercised through the Confucian ethical principles of the Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues (sangang wuchang 三纲五常). The prevailing societal attitude toward legal codes was epitomized by the ideology of wusong 无讼(litigation avoidance). When confronted with grievances, individuals in traditional China were more inclined to endure hardships rather than seek legal redress [52]. From the late Qing Dynasty to the pre-reform and opening-up era, a period spanning nearly a century, China’s legal landscape underwent profound turbulence under the influence of Western and Soviet legal ideologies. The planned economy period in China following the founding of the People’s Republic of China is regarded as “a system of social control based on mass participation” [53]. Following the launch of reform and opening-up, China resumed the construction of a rule-of-law framework for its society, and law once again emerged as a primary means of resolving social disputes [54]. The judicial system was built from scratch and has since been progressively refined and improved.

In the early stages of China’s judicial reform, priority was given to the courts’ role in dispute resolution [55]. This approach yielded remarkable outcomes, as evidenced by the more than twentyfold increase in civil litigation cases handled by Chinese courts in 2010 compared with 1978 [56]. However, as Chinese society has advanced, social conflicts have grown increasingly complex and diverse, and reliance on litigation alone has proven inadequate for addressing this wide array of disputes amid constrained judicial resources.

To this end, in 2014, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China formally incorporated the reform of the diversified dispute resolution mechanism into the national governance system and the modernization of governance capacity, as stipulated in The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Advancing the Rule of Law. The Decision further proposed two key initiatives: first, to effectively integrate diverse dispute resolution resources with people’s mediation as the cornerstone; second, to enhance the organic connection and coordination among mediation, arbitration, administrative adjudication, administrative reconsideration, and litigation.

Subsequently, in December 2015, the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued The Opinions on Improving the Diversified Dispute Resolution Mechanism, which formulated a comprehensive framework for advancing the reform of such mechanisms. The judicial system responded proactively to these policy initiatives. Specifically, the Supreme People’s Court issued two normative documents: The Opinions on Further Deepening the Reform of the Diversified Dispute Resolution Mechanism by People’s Courts and The Provisions on Invited Mediation by People’s Courts. These documents clarify the fundamental principles, core tasks, and implementation pathways for people’s courts to advance the reform of diversified dispute resolution mechanisms.

The development of a diversified dispute resolution mechanism is not an entirely new initiative but rather builds on and scales up effective existing practices in Chinese society. Rooted in China’s traditional cultural emphasis on wusong (litigation avoidance), various social mediation systems have thrived in the country, retaining their vitality for thousands of years [57–59]. A notable example is the Fengqiao Experience from Zhejiang Province, which advocates resolving disputes locally rather than escalating them to higher authorities [60]. These grassroots mediation methods are more aligned with the perceptions and values of ordinary people, thus boasting robust vitality [41].

The reform of China’s legal system has achieved notable progress over the past four decades [61,62]. Mediation mechanisms for labor and family disputes have significantly alleviated the burden on courts. The extensive establishment of the People’s Mediation System [63] across urban and rural grassroots self-governing organizations has resolved a large number of minor civil disputes. In recent years, the commercial mediation system developed in certain developed regions has further enriched the forms and connotations of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in China.

However, it is important to note that traditional Chinese culture continues to exert a profound influence on Chinese citizens’ dispute resolution choices: a preference for the wúsòng (litigation avoidance) ideology in handling minor disputes, and a tendency to seek recourse to a qingtian, a historical term referring to impartial judicial officials in ancient China, for major disputes. In addition, the data utilized in this study date back to 2013. During this period, Chinese citizens’ choices were not only shaped by the five core social factors outlined in Black’s theory but may also have been influenced by institutional supply and remedy costs. These factors may be reflected in the subsequent statistical results.

In summary, China’s evolving dispute resolution landscape, shaped by both deep-rooted cultural orientations and recent institutional reforms, provides a dynamic, multi-layered empirical context for the application of BBL. It embodies a complete continuum of social control, ranging from informal to formal modes, thereby enabling a systematic examination of how variations in social structure and institutional design correspond to different “quantities of law”. The next section builds on this foundation by specifying how these mechanisms can be operationalized as measurable categories for empirical analysis.

2.2.3 Risks of misapplying BBL across empirical contexts.

Before concluding this section, it is necessary to clarify an additional boundary condition for the application of Black’s theory—namely, the selection of appropriate empirical contexts. Even with well-defined variables, applying BBL to mismatched research subjects may introduce measurement bias and interpretive inconsistencies. The research subjects to be tested under Black’s theory must be clearly delineated, and the analysis should focus solely on variations in the quantity of law, rather than on respondents’ subjective interpretations of legality or moral judgments.

For instance, the findings reported by Gottfredson and Hindelang [12,64]—who tested Black’s theory using victimization survey data from the United States and Australia—were unsatisfactory. Black himself argued that their analysis constituted a misapplication of the theory: the data captured victims’ willingness to report incidents they perceived as crimes, rather than objectively measuring legal behavior [9]. In other words, the research was predicated on respondents’ subjective assessments of harm and criminality—factors that fall outside the theoretical scope of BBL. Some scholars have suggested that Black’s rejection of such data may have been overly restrictive, noting that “it may be that his theory can accommodate them” [36, p. 337]. Nonetheless, while BBL boasts broad theoretical applicability, it is not universally suited to all types of empirical data.

Similar deviations have emerged when scholars apply BBL to explain crime clearance rates [19,22]. In reality, there is no inherent difference in the “quantity of law” between solved and unsolved cases. The same level of legal input can yield diametrically opposed outcomes; in some instances—such as voluntary confessions—a smaller quantity of law may even expedite case resolution. Because clearance rates depend heavily on institutional and procedural factors that lie beyond individual behavior, they fall outside the conceptual domain of BBL.

Against this backdrop, dispute resolution stands out as a conceptually coherent and empirically tractable domain for the application of BBL. The following section therefore specifies how dispute resolution mechanisms can be operationalized as ordered categories that capture variations in the quantity of law.