3.1.1. Current policy of CWM in Xi’an.

This section is based on a systematic review of municipal documents issued in Xi’an between 2015 and 2025, relevant provincial-level policies from Shaanxi, and national guidelines and standards on CW and resource utilization issued by central ministries. Using content coding, the “incentive clauses” were categorized according to type, target groups, and implementation status, thereby laying the foundation for subsequent cross-validation with interview evidence and SWOT mapping. The detailed results are presented in Table 1, which includes not only the policies in Xi’an but also higher-level regulations directly relevant to the city.

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Table 1. Main policies implemented in Xi’an.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0339386.t001

The findings indicate that over the past decade, CWM policies have undergone notable evolution. From 2015 to 2018, national and provincial regulations, along with industry standards, were gradually refined, establishing the institutional and regulatory groundwork for quality control and supervision (see P1 and P5). Between 2017 and 2021, Xi’an introduced pilot programs and detailed implementation measures, with local policy documents explicitly defining requirements for recycled materials, their applications, and pilot subsidy mechanisms (see P2, P4, and P7). During 2022 and 2023, the policy orientation shifted from macro-level frameworks toward more practical operational guidelines, including support for urban renewal and housing renovation, incentives for prefabricated buildings, detailed green subsidy measures, and streamlined approval processes (see P8 and P9). Meanwhile, external opportunities—such as fiscal support and demonstration project channels from higher-level authorities, which provided complementary resources for local implementation (see P3 and P6).

3.1.2. Comprehension policy framework.

Based on the review of current policy content in Xi’an, the policy framework can be summarized into three main dimensions:

1. (1). Direct policy incentives.

Documents P2 and P7 explicitly demonstrate that Xi’an has established mechanisms for financial subsidies and write-offs (e.g., production-based subsidies, tax reductions, or one-time rewards for enterprises using recycled construction materials). As noted by Liu and Teng [26], such economic incentives are the most effective in the short term, as they directly reduce costs for recycling enterprises and increase their willingness to participate. However, analysis of the guidance issued by the Shaanxi Provincial Department of Ecology and Environment indicates that the timeliness and complexity of subsidy disbursement significantly affect firms’ cash flow and sustained commitment. In other words, the difference between “having subsidies” and “having subsidies delivered promptly” is critical to determining their actual motivational effect.

1. (2). Enhancement of standards.

Policies P1 and P5 emphasize the establishment of technical standards and regulatory norms. For example, standards for recycled aggregates provide strong institutional support for the marketization of recycled materials. In a study on the development of the CW recycling market, argued that clear quality benchmarks enhance buyer confidence and facilitate the entry of recycled materials into higher-end engineering projects [27]. At the same time, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may face pressure in meeting these higher standards. As identified in field investigation by Bao, Lu [5], stricter performance requirements increase the costs of product testing, technological upgrades, and certification, effectively raising market entry barriers for SMEs. In the context of SWOT analysis, this duality can be interpreted as both a strength (institutional guarantee) and a weakness (compliance costs). Strategies for addressing these issues will later consider the potential role of financial and technical support.

1. (3). Incentives in specific construction contexts.

Policies P8 and P9 highlight the government’s use of targeted incentives within specific construction scenarios. These align with national-level macro policies in the real estate sector. For instance, in 2020, MOHURD emphasized the importance of urban renewal and old housing renovation to replace indiscriminate demolition and uncontrolled urban expansion. In this context, P8 provides guidance for urban regeneration and renovation projects, while P9 focuses on green buildings. Both policies feature mechanisms such as tiered subsidies and streamlined approval processes. Incentives designed for specific contexts are more likely to achieve stronger effects and can serve as pilot projects. However, their effectiveness remains dependent on the scope of pilot programs and the scale of fiscal support. As highlighted by Wang, Jiang [6], policy measures from leading cities are often difficult to replicate nationwide. For Xi’an, its dual role as both a provincial capital and a designated pilot city for CWM creates opportunities to secure more direct and substantial financial support.

3.1.3. Preliminary policy-to-SWOT mapping.

Based on the above content coding and interpretation, a preliminary understanding of the incentive policies for CWM in Xi’an has been established. These findings allow for the initial mapping of key policy points into candidate SWOT items. As shown in Table 2, the results are divided into two parts: primary mappings and secondary mappings. The primary mappings are categorized according to policy level, distinguishing between local and higher-level policies. Following the approach suggested in Teoli, Sanvictores [28] SWOT study, conditions directly relevant to local implementation are treated as strengths (S), while conditions indirectly supportive of policy outcomes are classified as opportunities (O). This framework is also adopted in the present study. In addition, it is recognized that certain policies may generate both positive and negative effects during implementation. Accordingly, the Table also presents secondary mappings that capture these dual impacts, providing a more nuanced basis for the subsequent SWOT analysis.

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Table 2. Preliminary mapping results of incentive policies to SWOT analysis in Xi’an.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0339386.t002

Drawing on Table 2, the policy texts can be preliminarily classified and discussed as follows. Policies P2, P4, and P7 constitute the institutional foundation for current municipal-level financial incentives. At the textual level, such quantified subsidies directly enhance the short-term economic motivation of recycling enterprises and are therefore mapped as a strength. However, as indicated in the table and initial observations, delays in disbursement and the complexity of reimbursement procedures remain contested issues. These factors would be further examined in Section 3.2 through interview evidence to assess whether they undermine the intended policy effects-potentially reclassifying them as a weakness. Policies P1 and P5, which introduce provincial and national standards for recycled aggregates, provide higher-level institutional guarantees that facilitate market entry for recycled materials. This is reflected in the textual analysis as a strength. Yet, the standardization process also entails additional testing and technological upgrading costs that may suppress the participation of smaller recycling firms in the short term, suggesting a potential weakness. Policies P3, P8, and P9 focus on urban renewal, old housing renovation, and central demonstration project channels, forming a combined mechanism of incentives of specific urban renewal projects and demonstration effects. The texts suggest that such measures can directly stimulate recycling behavior in demolition-intensive areas (opportunity) while amplifying successful practices through demonstration projects (strength). Nonetheless, their overall effectiveness depends on the scale of pilot coverage and fiscal support. If financial resources or implementation reach are limited, the demonstration effect may struggle to diffuse more widely.

Overall, the policy framework can be summarized into three categories. The first consists of policies that directly embody incentive instruments, specifying concrete measures and subsidy levels. The second includes higher-level or supporting documents, which primarily function as external opportunities providing a broader policy context. The third comprises technical and standard-setting documents, whose effects are twofold—serving as institutional safeguards while potentially increasing compliance costs. Based on this preliminary categorization and textual assessment, the next section presents semi-structured interviews with nine respondents. By examining their perceptions and evaluations of the above policy elements, and drawing on their responses to the four thematic dimensions of the interview questions, the study further validates how policies operate in practice and highlights the gaps between policy texts and their implementation.

3.2.1. Main interview results content.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine respondents, and the transcripts were subsequently coded and analyzed. Based on the four categories of guiding questions, participants’ responses and corresponding viewpoints were summarized. The results in Table 3 reveal two main trajectories from the interview evidence. On the one hand, most respondents affirmed the short-term effectiveness of incentives (e.g., urban renewal pilots) and output-based subsidies, with 7 out of 9 participants highlighting their demonstrative impact in pilot projects. On the other hand, feedback was more concentrated and consistent regarding implementation challenges. In particular, delays in subsidy reimbursement or disbursement were unanimously recognized as a problem (9/9), while high compliance and testing costs, along with insufficient cross-departmental coordination, were repeatedly mentioned by the majority of respondents. External opportunities and threats were also identified, most notably the supportive role of higher-level regulations versus challenges such as weak local enforcement and market instability, which received broad agreement among participants. Overall, the findings suggest that while Xi’an’s current incentive instruments are comprehensive in design, systemic bottlenecks persist in the latter stages of the “design–implementation” chain. The high-frequency items indicate the relative priority of these bottlenecks for future policy adjustment.

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Table 3. The main results summarized from the interview.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0339386.t003

The distributed evidence in the Table 3 can be interpreted from two perspectives: policy execution and supply-demand dynamics. From the execution side, the slow disbursement of subsidies and lengthy approval procedures suggest that the timeliness and accessibility of policies are constrained. In public policy implementation theory, this phenomenon is often described as incentive erosion, whereby policies formally exist but their intended effects are weakened by obstacles in the execution process [29]. From the supply-demand side, while stricter quality standards have enhanced market confidence, the absence of sufficient public testing capacity and technical support has produced a “threshold effect”, temporarily crowding out the participation of small- and medium-sized recycling enterprises. As noted in the literature that policy evaluation should therefore go beyond assessing the mere “existence” of policies and place greater emphasis on implementation efficiency, capacity alignment, and institutional coordination as key dimensions of analysis [30].

3.2.2. Discussion based on the SWOT.

Next, the interview results were synthesized into a SWOT framework, as shown in Table 4. The coding followed an open-axial-selective procedure, grouping recurrent concepts into four major categories: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Each code represents a cluster of interview statements and then will achieve expert consensus in two Delphi rounds. And In this section, the four dimensions then been discussed in detail to provide a clearer understanding of the current policy landscape in Xi’an and to inform directions for future improvement.

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Table 4. SWOT Elements of the policy evaluation in Xi’an.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0339386.t004

1. (1). Discussion on the strength

Xi’an’s most notable policy strength lies in the combined mechanism of incentives on specific urban renewal projects and fiscal subsidies. In high-density demolition contexts such as old city renovation, this combination has proven effective in accelerating the adoption of recycled materials (corresponding policies: P2 P7 P8 P9). Interview data indicate that construction firms show significantly higher willingness to adopt recycled materials in designated demonstration zones. Government support-through streamlined approval channels and one-off project subsidies—has reduced upfront transaction costs, generating observable demonstration effects. This aligns with the classic logic of the “demonstration–replication” pathway in policy diffusion theory, where short-term fiscal incentives and administrative facilitation jointly foster replicable business models [31]. Based on this, it is recommended that successful urban renewal pilots be consolidated into “replication packages” (combining fiscal, administrative, and technical service components) and scaled up through applications to P3 (central demonstration funds), thereby transforming S1 into a city-wide institutional capacity.

The establishment of quality standards (P1/P5) provides an institutional safeguard for recycled construction materials entering public works projects. Both experts and recycling enterprises confirmed that these standards enhance purchaser confidence. While the positive effect lies in reducing information asymmetry, without adequate testing capacity and certification services, standards risk becoming restrictive thresholds [32]. To ensure the effective realization of S2, standard development should proceed in parallel with the expansion of public testing and certification capacity, potentially supported by municipal funding or provincial-level matching funds (P4).

Finally, central and provincial demonstration funding channels (P3) provide external support by supplying financial resources, introducing advanced technologies, and amplifying demonstration effects. Respondents generally agreed that demonstration funds exert a “leveraging effect,” as approved projects are more likely to attract private investment and corporate technological input. However, the competitive and one-off nature of such funds must be acknowledged. In practice, policy effectiveness would be enhanced by coupling funding with application support and follow-up mechanisms, ensuring that demonstration projects evolve into sustained drivers of change rather than isolated events [33].

1. (2). Discussion on the weakness

Respondents exhibited a high degree of consensus regarding the issue of subsidy disbursement efficiency (W1). Although municipal policy documents (P2, P7) clearly stipulate the subsidy standards and verification procedures, in practice the allocation cycle is lengthy, the documentation requirements are cumbersome, and multiple departmental reviews are involved. As a result, enterprises are often placed under financial pressure due to a “pay first, reimburse later” mechanism. According to Manheim [34], this reflects a structural problem of “insufficient immediacy of incentives,” whereby the timeliness of economic incentives determines their marginal stimulating effect. Consequently, some scholars argue that without reforms to the disbursement mechanism-such as piloting advance payments, adopting a credit-based approach, or implementing performance-linked installment disbursements-fiscal subsidies are unlikely to achieve their intended policy outcomes [35].

The issues of insufficient testing capacity and high compliance costs (W2) were repeatedly emphasized by respondents (corresponding to P1/P5). In the absence of public testing platforms and subsidies for technological upgrading, national and provincial standards risk forcing small and medium-sized recycling enterprises out of the market, as they are unable to bear the costs of testing and facility modification. This, in turn, reduces supply elasticity and weakens the diversity of regional supply. Another systemic weakness highlighted is the problem of cross-departmental coordination (W3), particularly concerning the division of responsibilities and implementation guidelines in P2 and P4. Interviews revealed that duplicated approval procedures, lack of mutual recognition of information, and ambiguous lines of accountability increase both project delays and uncertain costs. As Aaltonen and Turkulainen [36] argues, addressing these issues requires institutionalized solutions: administrative process reengineering, the establishment of data-sharing platforms, and the introduction of clear SLAs (service-level agreements) and responsibility matrices would substantially improve administrative efficiency.

1. (3). Discussion on the opportunity

In the interviews, respondents expressed strong expectations regarding green finance and carbon markets (O1), identifying them as a critical pathway to transform one-off fiscal subsidies into long-term, market-oriented incentives (P3 and P9). From an institutional innovation perspective, integrating recycled materials into green certification schemes, green credit products, and carbon credit systems could provide enterprises with sustained financing advantages and alternative revenue streams [37]. The large-scale advancement of urban renewal projects (O2) offers a stable demand scenario and represents an opportunity to scale up pilot initiatives (P8). Respondents emphasized that urban renewal contexts inherently possess the advantage of spatial proximity between producers and end-users. This aligns with the findings by Cheng, Huang [38] on promoting CW utilization, which highlight that combining fiscal incentives, technical services, and long-term procurement contracts at the design stage can generate cost advantages and produce replicable business cases. Finally, technological progress (O3)—including mobile crushing equipment, online testing, and digital monitoring—was emphasized by respondents as a “double-edged sword” capable of simultaneously addressing both cost and enforcement challenges (P5, P6, P7). Policy design should therefore prioritize the establishment of technology demonstration funds and standardized technology access requirements, making the adoption of advanced technologies a precondition for receiving subsidies or qualifying for demonstration projects [39]. Furthermore, recent empirical work has demonstrated that green technology adoption and digital transformation play critical roles in waste management innovation and carbon reduction across major economies [40]. Such an approach would achieve a dual outcome: enhancing supply-side efficiency while strengthening regulatory capacity.

1. (4). Discussion on the threat

Illegal dumping and the difficulty of law enforcement and evidence collection (T1) emerged as one of the most pressing concerns among government respondents. Evidence indicates that, in certain areas, the overall cost of illegal disposal remains lower than that of compliant practices, placing law-abiding enterprises at a competitive disadvantage. At the same time, insufficient demand for recycled materials and their weak price competitiveness (T2), together with the time-limited and unstable nature of fiscal subsidies (T3), were strongly emphasized by frontline practitioners. Respondents noted that T2 directly constrains long-term investment decisions by enterprises, and argued that short-term procurement subsidies are needed to offset market price gaps during the transition period. However, in addressing T3, policy designers should consider measures beyond direct fiscal support. For example, introducing diversified financing mechanisms-such as green finance, public-private-partnership (PPP) models, and performance-based contracting-could reduce overreliance on local annual budgets [41].

3.4.1. SO-leveraging strengths to seize opportunities.

Accelerating linkages of policy and industry to foster a scaled market: The Regulations on the Resource Utilization of CW in Xi’an (2022) explicitly stipulate requirements for disposal procedures, product standards, and market applications, reflecting the local government’s active response to the green and low-carbon development agenda. In previous studies on CW, the resource utilization rate of waste was often regarded as an indicator of the effectiveness of local CWM. The proportion of recycled aggregates, sand, bricks/blocks, regenerated building materials, and other secondary materials that re-enter the construction supply chain is defined as waste resource utilization rate [43]. According to statistics from the Xi’an Municipal Housing and Urban-Rural Development Bureau, the city generated approximately 103.96 million tons of CW in 2024, with a resource utilization rate nearly 50%. By referring to the same economic level cities like Haikou and Qingdao, their utilization rate of CW is 73.8% and 83.2% in 2024 respectively [44,45].

Interviews with recycling enterprises revealed a common concern: although policy frameworks are in place, the absence of binding mechanisms linking resource utilization to engineering projects has weakened the competitiveness of recycled products in the market. Zhang, Shi [46] suggested that the government could establish mandatory usage ratios (e.g., requiring minimum percentages of recycled aggregates in road construction or public housing projects) and incorporate such criteria into bidding processes, thereby creating stable demand. Prior research also highlights that a dual policy-market driving mechanism is essential for scaling the resource utilization industry, and that coupling recycled products with engineering procurement is an effective way to overcome market bottlenecks [47]. Such measures would not only expand market capacity but also attract private investment and technological innovation, generating a positive feedback loop across the industrial chain.

Establishing regionalized resource processing and distribution centers: Field investigations indicate that most CW treatment facilities in Xi’an are currently located in peripheral suburban areas, with average one-way transport distances often exceeding 20 km. This not only increases fuel consumption and disposal costs but also discourages enterprises from actively participating in resource recycling. Considering the spatial distribution of Xi’an’s industrial parks and logistics hubs--such as the International Port District, Jingwei New City, and Lintong Industrial Zone, the city has favorable conditions for developing distributed processing and distribution centers. Such centers could be equipped with integrated crushing, screening, washing, and grading facilities to enable proximate treatment and secondary processing, thereby reducing transport distances and improving overall cost efficiency. Comparable practices have been adopted in other contexts, for example, Tokyo has established multiple small-scale recycled aggregate plants across its 23 special wards, achieving an annual recycling rate above 90% while reducing carbon emissions through localized consumption [48]. Theoretically, this approach aligns with the “local loop principle” of circular economy, which emphasizes minimizing resource transfer distances and strengthening urban resource closed-loop systems [49]. For Xi’an, the construction of regionalized centers would not only alleviate treatment bottlenecks but also form a stable supply chain to support downstream market expansion.

Expanding application for recycled products: Xi’an is currently experiencing a peak period of urban renewal and large-scale infrastructure development. During the 14th Five-Year Plan, the city has scheduled the construction or renovation of seven metro lines and an additional 24.46 million square meters of building space, providing substantial potential demand scenarios for recycled products [50]. Interviews with recycling enterprises revealed that although low-end backfill materials account for large shipment volumes, they suffer from low profit margins and intense competition. In contrast, higher value-added products such as permeable bricks, prefabricated components, and landscaping materials are more readily accepted by design institutes and government projects, while also aligning with the policy agenda of green buildings and sponge city development. Previous studies emphasize that product diversification and the establishment of standardized testing systems are key to enhancing market acceptance of recycled materials [51]. Experiences from cities such as Guangzhou and Nanjing demonstrate that providing research subsidies for CW-derived aggregates in municipal landscape and sponge city projects can significantly increase both industrial value-added and application scope [52]. Drawing on these practices, Xi’an could channel policy funding toward technological research and foster industry collaboration to develop local standards. By encouraging design institutes and contractors to integrate recycled materials at the early stages of project planning, the city can drive a transition from “low-end disposal” to “high-value utilization.”

3.4.2. ST-leveraging strengths to address threats.

Establishing a price fluctuation buffer mechanism: Interviews with recycling enterprises revealed a recurring concern: when the price of natural aggregates drops, demand for recycled aggregates declines sharply, directly eroding profit margins and, in some cases, forcing production lines into idleness. Although Xi’an has issued the Administrative Measures for the Resource Utilization of CW, it currently lacks concrete instruments to stabilize recycled product markets during such fluctuations. Drawing on experiences like price-differential compensation mechanism, the government could establish a dedicated fund to dynamically monitor and offset price gaps between natural and recycled aggregates [53]. This approach would safeguard the price competitiveness of recycled products, thereby strengthening confidence among both recycling operators and construction enterprises while reducing the risk of industry contraction caused by short-term shocks. Moreover, as Xi’an promotes its green and low-carbon construction strategy, such a mechanism could be linked to carbon-reduction accounting, whereby energy-saving and emission-reduction performance directly influence the degree of compensation, thus reinforcing a virtuous cycle of policy incentives and market stability.

Strengthening cross-sectoral regulatory coordination: Respondents from both construction and recycling firms highlighted illegal dumping and the circulation of low-quality recycled materials as major threats to the healthy development of the industry in Xi’an. While the city has established a comprehensive urban management system involving multiple enforcement agencies, regulatory responsibilities often overlap or leave gaps--particularly among the Housing and Urban-Rural Development Bureau, Environmental Protection Bureau, and Urban Management Bureau-diminishing enforcement effectiveness. Lessons show that real-time information sharing and joint enforcement across government agencies can effectively curb illegal dumping and prevent malpractice in the recycled materials market [54]. For Xi’an, the existing “Smart Urban Management” platform offers a technical foundation. By integrating transportation monitoring, project registration, enterprise licensing, and product sales flows into a unified regulatory database, the city could enhance backend monitoring and increase the frequency of product inspections.

3.4.3. WO strategies: Seizing opportunities to overcome weaknesses.

Enhancing incentive and penalty mechanisms under the green development policy context: Since 2022, Xi’an has issued several policy frameworks, including the 14th Five-Year Comprehensive Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Plan and the Green Building Materials Promotion Action Plan. However, interviews with recycling enterprises suggest that the current incentive measures remain insufficiently detailed and lack targeted support for the production and application of recycled aggregates. As one respondent noted, “The reward standards do not differentiate by production scale or energy-saving and emission-reduction performance, so the incentive effect is limited.” Existing research demonstrates that performance-based, tiered reward mechanisms can effectively enhance enterprise motivation in green transitions [55]. Furthermore, setting differentiated subsidies based on factors such as the proportion of recycled materials used, product quality compliance rates, and carbon-reduction outcomes, while imposing strict penalties on long-term noncompliance and illegal dumping can significantly strengthen policy implementation and provide clearer guidance for industry behavior [56]. At same time, comparative analyses across the BRICS economies reveal that sustainability of environmental management depends not only on financial inputs but also their efficiency [57]. For Xi’an, refining incentive and penalty indicators within the current policy framework would not only increase policy effectiveness but also encourage enterprises to actively improve their technological processes, thereby raising the overall performance of the sector.

Advancing quality standardization through the green building materials certification system: Interview results reveal that construction enterprises remain cautious about the long-term performance and durability of recycled aggregate products, often adopting a wait-and-see attitude in procurement decisions. Since Xi’an was designated in 2018 as a national pilot city for CWM, the city has also piloted certification schemes for green building materials. However, certification frameworks covering recycled aggregates remain underdeveloped. Su, Si [58] argues that a unified and enforceable standard for recycled products is essential to improving market acceptance. For Xi’an, this could involve integrating national green building material certification with locally adapted standards to develop more detailed performance indicators and testing protocols. In parallel, accredited third-party testing platforms could be introduced to provide transparent and publicly accessible product performance data [59]. Such measures would simultaneously reduce market hesitation and foster a competitive environment in which higher-quality products prevail, thereby driving industry-wide improvement.

Reducing production costs through targeted research funding for new technologies: At present, both construction enterprises and recycling operators report that energy consumption and labor expenses in the processes of crushing, sorting, and impurity removal account for a substantial share of total costs. As one recycling enterprise manager observed, “our sorting costs are rising; to keep the company alive, product prices inevitably increase, which in turn reduces our market share.” This somehow reflects that the local recycled aggregate industry remains in a cost-sensitive stage of development. Although the Xi’an Municipal Bureau of Science and Technology and the Development and Reform Commission have prioritized green and low-carbon technological research in recent years, support specifically for CW recycling technologies has been limited. In Japan, substantial public investment has been directed toward research in waste recycling technologies, fostering collaboration between enterprises, universities, and research institutes. These efforts have yielded significant advances in crushing equipment, intelligent sorting systems, and other technological innovations, with pilot projects confirming both technical and economic feasibility [60]. For Xi’an, a similar approach could be pursued by reallocating or expanding existing green technology funding streams, with a clear preference for recycling-related equipment and process innovation. By lowering the cost differential with natural aggregates, such initiatives would provide the industry with sustainable pathways for technological upgrading and long-term competitiveness.

3.4.4. WT-minimizing weaknesses to address threats.

Optimizing interdepartmental coordination to reduce policy implementation gaps: In addition to the regulatory blind spots among government agencies discussed earlier, interviewees from recycling enterprises also reported problems such as delayed information transmission across departments and cumbersome approval procedures, which significantly hinder the timely initiation of projects and the disbursement of subsidies. These obstacles substantially weaken firms’ incentives to engage in recycling. As Hackel, Schönhals [61] argues, the establishment of a digitalized project ledger can enable end-to-end tracking from project initiation and approval to funding allocation, thereby preventing policy failure caused by administrative barriers. Building on this insight, Xi’an could adopt a “multi-plan integration” approval platform, incorporating green development policies into a unified coordination mechanism to minimize the time lag between policy issuance and actual implementation.

Establishing minimum purchase prices and stable supply-demand channels: Interviews with recycling enterprises also revealed challenges they share with transportation partners, namely unstable demand for CW and significant fluctuations in recycling prices. Although Xi’an has piloted government-led centralized recycling systems in certain districts, measures to mitigate market price volatility remain absent, and no unified minimum purchase price mechanism has been introduced. Research on market stabilization indicates that establishing guaranteed purchase schemes or minimum price mechanisms is an effective measure to enhance the sector’s resilience to external shocks [62]. For example, the local government introduced long-term procurement contracts and a unified settlement platform that integrates construction firms, recycling enterprises, and key project owners. This system conducts risk assessments at critical nodes of the supply chain, thereby reducing the likelihood of chain disruptions during market downturns [63]. Drawing on this experience, implementing a minimum purchase price mechanism in Xi’an would help secure a stable supply of raw materials for recycled aggregate producers and safeguard the basic revenues of recycling enterprises.

3.5.1. Comparison with other chinese cities.

Compared with the well-managed cities such as Shenzhen and Suzhou, Xi’an’s CWM policies show a more localized, incentive-driven approach rather than a purely regulatory one. While Shenzhen emphasizes marketization and digital traceability, Xi’an’s experience demonstrates that financial incentives and urban renewal pilots can mobilize participation even under limited fiscal capacity [5]. Unlike Suzhou, where industrial symbiosis has already formed mature recycling networks, Xi’an’s emerging model relies heavily on policy-led collaboration between contractors and recyclers, providing valuable insights for other developing cities in western China [21].

3.5.2. Transferability and lessons learned.

Findings from the SWOT–Delphi analysis suggest that Xi’an’s experience can inform medium-sized inland cities facing similar constraints. Specifically, the integration of municipal subsidies with urban renewal projects planning (S1, O2) could be replicated in urban renewal programs nationwide. The city’s cross-departmental challenges (W3) also highlight the importance of digital information platforms for data sharing-an area that could be institutionalized at the provincial level. Furthermore, promoting green finance instruments (O1) and ensuring long-term policy stability (T3) are not only local needs but also critical to national circular economy promotion.

3.5.3. Relevance to national and international agendas.

At a broader policy level, Xi’an’s experience resonates with the China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for Circular Economy Development, and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) strategy, which emphasizes sustainable infrastructure and regional green cooperation [64,65]. As Xi’an is a key node city in the OBOR corridor, its CWM framework demonstrates how local governments can balance economic development and environmental governance through policy-driven innovation. The city’s practices also offer lessons for other developing economies involved in OBOR on how localized incentives and multi-stakeholder engagement can enhance the sustainability of urban construction.