PONE-D-19-26504
Metacognition across domains: Is the association between arithmetic and metacognitive
monitoring domain-specific?
Dear Editor and Reviewers,
We thank you for your careful reading and thoughtful comments on our manuscript. We
appreciate the time and effort that you have dedicated to providing this valuable
feedback. We have taken your comments into account in our revision, which resulted
in a manuscript that is in our opinion clearer and more compelling. Please find below
our point-by-point response to your comments and queries. To ease the identification
of changes to the text in the revised manuscript, we have highlighted all changes
by using coloured text. We look forward to hearing from you in due time regarding
our submission and to respond to any further questions and comments you may have.
We hope you will consider this manuscript for publication in PLOS ONE.
Responses to the Editor
Editor, general point
Thank you for submitting your manuscript to PLOS ONE. I have sent your manuscript
to 2 expert Reviewers and have now received their feedback. As you can see from their
comments (at the bottom of this email), both Reviewers found merit in your manuscript.
Reviewer #2 notably finds your manuscript well-written and methodologically sound,
and I concur with this assessment. However, both Reviewers also point to issues that
would need to be addressed before the manuscript can be considered for publication.
Reviewer #1 points to several concerns with the theoretical framework that would need
to be addressed. Both Reviewers also raise some concerns about data analysis and interpretation.
Notably, I agree with Reviewer #2 that it would be informative to consider age in
your analyses. Considering these comments, I would invite you to revise your manuscript
and submit it for further consideration by the journal.
Author’s response: We thank the Editor and the Reviewers for their positive evaluation
of the manuscript and their constructive feedback on our theoretical framing and data-analysis.
We agree that these were areas with room for improvement and we have revised the manuscript
in accordance with these comments. Specifically, we addressed the concerns of Reviewer
1 regarding the theoretical framework (see Reviewer 1 points 1-5). We also considered
age as a variable in the analyses (Reviewer 2, point 2) revealing that age was not
correlated with any of the performance measures and that including chronological age
in the analyses did not change the interpretation of the current results. In the remainder
of this response letter, we provide a point-by-point response to all issues raised
by the two Reviewers.
Responses to Reviewer 1
Reviewer 1, point 1
Even though the study included two metacognitive monitoring measures (arithmetic and
spelling), the authors often talked about them as if they are one variable, and this
may cause confusions on which or both metacognitive monitoring predicted performance
in arithmetic vs. spelling. For example, in the abstract, the authors stated that
“Pre-registered analyses revealed that metacognitive monitoring was an important predictor
of both arithmetic and spelling at both ages.” In this case, I think the authors were
referring to the predictive relation between metacognitive monitoring and performance
within the domains of arithmetic and spelling respectively, but that’s unclear from
the sentence. An alternative interpretation is that metacognitive monitoring in general
(as one variable) predicted arithmetic and spelling performance. Similar issues were
present on page 7 line 11 (“(a) the associations between metacognitive monitoring
and arithmetic and spelling”), on page 23 in interim discussion (“metacognitive monitoring
was an important predictor of both arithmetic and spelling performance”), and on page
24 (“metacognitive monitoring was an important predictor of both arithmetic and spelling
performance….”).
Author’s response: We thank the Reviewer for highlighting this issue and apologize
for being unclear on this matter. We have added the specification “within-domain metacognitive
monitoring” in all these statements referred to by the Reviewer (i.e., abstract, pages
7, 23 and 24) to clarify that the statements indeed indicate the predictive relation
between metacognitive monitoring and performance within the domain in which metacognitive
monitoring was measured. In addition to having revised the wording of the sentences
pointed to by the Reviewer in the abstract, on pages 7, 23 and 24, we have checked
the entire manuscript for sentences which might have the same issue and adjusted these
accordingly, i.e. on pages 6, 18, 20 and 25.
Reviewer 1, point 2
In the introduction, the authors introduced two aspects of metacognition: declarative
knowledge and procedural metacognition, proposed by Flavell (page 3). However, these
two constructs were not clearly defined until page 6. Specifically, it is unclear
what declarative knowledge is, how it is different from procedural metacognition,
and which construct is studied in the cited papers. Moving the definitions and examples
of these two constructs from page 6 to page 3, and be clearer about describing the
metacognitive measures used in the cited studies would help resolve the confusions.
Author’s response: We fully agree with the Reviewer that it makes more sense to define
the different aspects of metacognition in the beginning of the introduction, when
they are first mentioned. Therefore, following the Reviewers suggestion, we moved
the definitions originally stated on page 6, to page 3 to make this more clear for
the reader. Following another point raised by the Reviewer (see Reviewer 1, point
4), we additionally focussed on the critical component that we investigated in our
manuscript, i.e., metacognitive monitoring, by defining it in more detail in the first
paragraph of the manuscript (i.e., “An important aspect of procedural metacognition
is metacognitive monitoring, which is defined as the subjective self-assessment of
how well a cognitive task will be/is/has been performed [1,2]”; see page 3). We agree
with the Reviewer that this resulted in a more clear-cut introduction. On the other
hand, we would like to point out that the distinction between declarative and procedural
metacognition is and cannot always be carefully made in the different studies we are
citing in the introduction. In an attempt to make the text as comprehensible as possible,
we have clarified and included these distinctions wherever possible.
Reviewer 1, point 3
Components of metacognition were introduced in paragraph 2 of the introduction. However,
it is difficult to imagine and differentiate these components of metacognition in
the current writing. For instance, it is unclear what “regulating knowledge (introduction,
paragraph 2, line 5)” would look like. What is an example of regulating knowledge?
It is also unclear how “knowing the limits (line 4)” is different from “monitoring
knowledge (line 5)”. In this paragraph, the authors suggested that two components
of metacognition are important for self-regulated and successful learning (lines 5-6).
However, there seems to be three different components: knowing the limits, monitoring
knowledge, and regulating knowledge. Providing examples and/or descriptions would
help clarify these confusions.
Author’s response: We entirely understand the concerns raised by the Reviewer and
apologize for this ambiguous sentence. The aim of this sentence was not to echo the
different aspects of metacognition defined earlier in the introduction, but to give
examples of possible underlying mechanisms through which metacognition may play an
important role in different (cognitive) domains. For example, the regulation of cognition
refers to metacognitive activities that help to control one’s thinking or learning.
Different regulatory skills have been described in the literature, but it typically
refers to three components: planning, monitoring, and evaluation [3]. An example of
regulating knowledge referred to in the next sentence in the manuscript is “checking
answers when one feels unsure about the correctness of the answer”. We now see that
the addition of “monitoring knowledge” on top of “regulating knowledge” in the original
manuscript is confusing, as monitoring is an integral part of regulating knowledge.
We fully agree that by adding the quantifier “two” (i.e., “two essential components”)
we made the interpretation of this sentence unnecessarily complicated. To make this
sentence more clear, we have rephrased it (see below), making the connection more
transparent between the examples of metacognitive aspects (i.e., knowing the limits
of your knowledge and regulating that knowledge), self-regulated and successful learning
in different domains and the examples given in the next sentence (e.g., allocating
study time).
“The importance of metacognition that was found in existing research in different
(cognitive) domains is not surprising, as metacognitive aspects such as knowing the
limits of your own knowledge and being able to regulate that knowledge, are essential
components of self-regulated and successful learning [4], enabling learners to improve
their cognitive achievements. For example, good metacognition allows learners to correctly
allocate study-time, check answers when they feel unsure about the correctness of
the answer or provide a learning moment when an error is detected.” (manuscript page
3-4)
Additionally, and in line with above and below mentioned comments by the Reviewer
(see Reviewer 1, point 2 and Reviewer 1, point 4), we have now included the definitions
of the different components of metacognition at the beginning of the manuscript, and
added a more detailed definition of metacognitive monitoring in the first paragraph
of the manuscript, such that these concepts are already introduced to the reader before
the abovementioned paragraph 2.
Reviewer 1, point 4
On page 6, the authors suggested that there are distinctions between metacognitive
monitoring and metacognitive control. However, it is unclear what metacognitive monitoring
and metacognitive controls are, and how they are different. Furthermore, the authors
referenced Bellon et al to support this distinction between monitoring vs. control,
but Bellon et al focused on metacognitive monitoring and declarative metacognitive
knowledge. Is declarative metacognitive knowledge an aspect of metacognitive control?
Author’s response: Following the second point of the Reviewer (see Reviewer 1, point
2), we have now revised the paragraph on the definition of metacognition and its
different aspects (i.e. paragraph 1, page 3 – see below). This rearrangement additionally
tackled the confusion concerning the reference to Bellon et al, which indeed does
not investigate metacognitive control (i.e., an aspect of procedural metacognition),
but focusses on declarative metacognition and metacognitive monitoring.
We completely agree that it causes confusion to name metacognitive control without
further explaining it, and, importantly, without this being of interest in the remainder
of the manuscript. Therefore, we have removed the sentence on the distinction between
metacognitive monitoring and control (i.e., which was originally in the first paragraph
of the introduction), and now focussed on the critical component we investigated in
our manuscript, i.e., metacognitive monitoring. Additionally, we have defined metacognitive
monitoring in more detail in the first paragraph of the manuscript. This resulted,
in our opinion, in a more clear-cut introduction in which the focus is on the critical
components of the current study. These are now also explained in more detail compared
to the original manuscript.
Manuscript page 3, paragraph 1:
“… Noticing your mistakes, an example of monitoring your cognition, is a facet of
metacognition, a concept first introduced by Flavell [5] as a broader concept that
encompasses on the one hand declarative, metacognitive knowledge (i.e., the ability
to assess one’s own cognitive knowledge and ability, knowledge about cognition and
learning) and on the other hand, procedural metacognition (i.e., self-reflecting,
higher-order cognitive processes, in other words, how people monitor and control their
cognition during ongoing cognitive processes) [1,6]. An important aspect of procedural
metacognition is metacognitive monitoring, which is defined as the subjective self-assessment
of how well a cognitive task will be/is/has been performed [1,2].”
Reviewer 1, point 5
On page 7, the authors listed four points for research questions. However, it seemed
that there were only two explicit predictions (i and ii) mapping onto research question
(b) and (c). Research questions (a) and (d) did not have clear predictions associated
with them. Aligning the research questions with their corresponding predictions would
help make the paper easy to follow.
Author’s response: We thank the Reviewer of pointing to this important issue. The
current manuscript indeed investigated whether metacognitive monitoring is domain-specific,
by means of four research questions, namely:
“investigating (a) the associations between within-domain metacognitive monitoring
and arithmetic and spelling; (b) whether metacognitive monitoring in one domain is
associated with and/or predicted by metacognitive monitoring in the other domain;
(c) whether performance in one domain is associated with and/or predicted by metacognitive
monitoring in the other domain, and (d) these questions in two different age groups
in primary school to fully grasp potential transitional periods in the domain-specificity
of metacognitive monitoring” (manuscript page 7).
However, we have wrongly stated in the paragraph following these research questions
(i.e., manuscript page 7) that predictions would be made. The statements under (i)
and (ii) are not predictions in itself, but are meant to provide theoretical background
or interpretation guidelines for the reader, as in these statements we describe which
outcome would point to which interpretation (i.e., domain-specificity vs. domain-generality
of metacognitive monitoring). We apologize for being unclear in the original manuscript.
We have rephrased this paragraph (see below; manuscript page 7), removing the reference
to prediction.
“If, on the one hand, metacognition is highly domain-general, then metacognitive monitoring
in the arithmetic and spelling tasks will be correlated and predictive of each other,
even when controlled for academic performance – as arithmetic and spelling are highly
related domains; and metacognitive monitoring in one domain will be associated with
and predicts academic performance in the other domain. If, on the other hand, metacognition
is highly domain-specific, then the associations described above will be non-significant
(frequentist statistics) and Bayes factors will be close to zero (Bayesian statistics;
see below).”
Reviewer 1, point 6
Authors predicted that metacognitive monitoring would be domain general in 8-9-year-olds
and domain specific in 7-8-year-olds (page 8). Based on the introduction, it seemed
that there is evidence supporting the first prediction (Geurten et al), but it is
less clear why the authors believed metacognitive monitoring would be domain specific
in the younger age group. Even though Vo et al provided preliminary support for the
second prediction in 5- to 8-year-olds, the study was on two very different domains
(numerical vs. emotion), thus it is unclear why the authors would think the same pattern
of domain specificity would emerge in comparable academic domains (arithmetic vs.
spelling).
Author’s response: Both predictions formulated in this paragraph are explicitly based
on Geurten, Meulemans, and Lemaire (2018), who predicted that starting around the
age of 8 there would be a shift from domain-specific to domain-general metacognition,
and who observed in their data that while metacognition is first domain-specific,
a gradual development from domain-specific to domain-general metacognition occurs
in children when they are between 8 and 13 years old. To investigate this proposed
development from domain-specificity before the age of 8 to the gradual transition
to domain-generality between the age of 8 and 13 years, we specifically selected two
age groups. Namely, one group was specifically chosen just under this age-range, i.e.,
7-8-year-old group. In this age-group, based on the suggestion of Geurten et al.,
it is predicted that children’s metacognitive monitoring is domain-specific. The other
age group, i.e. 8-9-year-olds, is exactly at the beginning of the age range for which,
based on the predictions and results of Geurten et al. (2018), domain-generality is
starting to emerge.
We specifically recruited two age-groups that only differed in one grade, such that
the same arithmetic, spelling and metacognitive monitoring paradigm could be used,
in order to maximize comparability between age-groups. Moreover, two highly related
academic domains were chosen, to ensure a stringent empirical test of the possible
limits of domain-specificity of metacognitive monitoring. Indeed, as the Reviewer
suggests, it is plausible that domain-specificity in children is much harder to ascertain
in related domains, in contrast to Vo, Li, Kornell, Pouget, and Cantlon (2014), who
demonstrated this in very different domains, for which such specificity might on a
surface level be more easily observed. However, a very stringent empirical investigation
of the domain-specificity of metacognitive monitoring was exactly the aim of the current
study, for which reason we specifically selected two very closely related domains.
As a result, we contend that our data provide a stronger test of domain-specificity
compared to previously reported work.
Reviewer 1, point 7
The authors mentioned that there were four practice trials for each of the computer
tasks (page 10 line 8), but it is unclear whether there were four practice trials
for addition problems and four practice trials for multiplication problems, or there
was a total of four practice trials in the arithmetic computer task. Were the practice
trials in block 1, block 2, or both? Were the practice trials included in the accuracy
and response time measures of task performance? Similar questions need to be addressed
for the spelling task.
Author’s response: Thank you for highlighting this ambiguity and we apologize for
being unclear about this. Following the Reviewers suggestion, we have specified for
both the arithmetic (manuscript page 9-10 – see below) and spelling (manuscript page
11 – see below) task that four practice items were presented before each block of
the arithmetic task and six practice items before each block of the spelling task.
Additionally, we clarified that performance on the practice items was not included
in the performance measures (manuscript page 10 for arithmetic and 11 for spelling).
Manuscript page 10 – arithmetic task:
“Each block was preceded by four practice trials to familiarize the child with the
task requirements. Performance on the practice items was not included in the performance
measures.”
Manuscript page 11 – spelling task:
“Each block was preceded by six practice trials to familiarize the child with the
task requirements. Performance on the practice items was not included in the performance
measures.”
Reviewer 1, point 8
The BF cutoffs for the alternative hypothesis (page 14) were extremely helpful in
guiding interpretations of the findings. Perhaps it would be helpful to provide BF
cutoffs for null hypothesis as well. Based on the BF descriptions, BF seems to be
the ratio of the evidence for alternative vs. null hypotheses, so is it correct to
infer that a BF value between 1/10 and 1/3 suggests moderate support for null hypothesis
(because 3<bf).
Author’s response: We thank the Reviewer for the appreciation of the described Bayes
Factor interpretation guidelines. The assumption made by the Reviewer is correct:
a BF10 value between 1/10 and 1/3 indeed suggests moderate support for the null hypothesis.
In accordance with the suggestion by the Reviewer, we have now added the interpretation
guidelines for interpreting evidence in favour of the null hypothesis in the manuscript
on page 14.
Manuscript page 14:
“Although Bayes factors provide a continuous measure of degree of evidence, there
are some conventional approximate guidelines for interpretation ([9] for a classification
scheme): BF10 = 1 provides no evidence either way, BF10 > 1 anecdotal, BF10 > 3 moderate,
BF10 > 10 strong, BF10 > 30 very strong and BF10 >100 decisive evidence for the alternative
hypothesis; BF10 < 1 anecdotal, BF10 < 0.33 moderate, BF10 < 0.10 strong, BF10 < 0.03
very strong and BF10 < 0.01 decisive evidence for the null hypothesis.”
Reviewer 1, point 9
The authors stated that they investigated the unique role of metacognitive monitoring
in academic performance in the results section (page 17). Although this seemed to
be related to the research question 3: whether performance in one domain is associated
with and/or predicted by metacognitive monitoring in the other domain, the statement
in the result section did not suggest cross domain prediction as stated in the introduction.
Furthermore, the two models including both MMarith and MMspell as predictors of arithmetic
and spelling performance respectively (page 19) were not mentioned prior to the reporting
of the results. It may be helpful to outline the specific models in the methods or
the beginning of the results section to help guide readers’ expectation.
Author’s response: Thank you for highlighting this need for clarification. The statement
on page 17 to which the Reviewer refers (i.e., “investigated the unique role of metacognitive
monitoring in academic performance”), indeed pointed to the third research question
discussed on page 7 in the manuscript. We now see that this wording might have been
confusing for the reader as the points described under (b) and (c) on page 17 of the
manuscript point to the same research question, namely “whether performance in one
domain is associated with and/or predicted by metacognitive monitoring in the other
domain”. To better align the research questions described in the introduction with
our results section, we have rephrased this paragraph (manuscript page 17-18). Following
the Reviewers suggestion, we have made the use of cross domain prediction (as stated
in the introduction on page 7) more explicit in the result section (manuscript page
17-18). To avoid further confusion, we have removed the enumerations in the result
section, as they did not map the enumerations of the research questions presented
in the introduction.
As the Reviewer suggested, in order to further guide the readers’ attention, we specified
an outline of the different models that were used in the beginning of the results
section on the domain-specificity of the role of metacognition (manuscript page 17-18).
This all results in the following paragraph (manuscript page 17-18):
“To examine domain-specificity of the role of metacognition, we first investigated
the association between MMarith and MMspell with correlation and regression analyses.
Specifically, we investigated whether MMarith and MMspell were correlated, even when
controlling for intellectual ability and academic performance in both domains. Controlling
for intellectual ability and performance in both standardized academic tasks was necessary,
to make sure the observed associations between MMarith and MMspell were not (entirely)
driven by their shared reliance on intellectual ability or by the high correlation
between both academic domains.
Secondly, we studied the role of MMspell in arithmetic performance and MMarith in
spelling performance with correlation and regression analyses. In other words, cross-domain
correlations between academic performance in one domain and metacognitive monitoring
in the other domain were calculated. As performance in the arithmetic and spelling
tasks was highly correlated, the cross-domain associations of metacognitive monitoring
and academic performance might rely on the correlation between the academic tasks.
Therefore, we used regression models to investigate whether metacognitive monitoring
in arithmetic uniquely predicted spelling performance on top of arithmetic performance,
and vice versa.
In a final step, we investigated the unique contribution of cross-domain metacognitive
monitoring to performance over within-domain metacognitive monitoring using regression
models including metacognitive monitoring in both domains as predictors for academic
performance.”
Reviewer 1, point 10
The authors utilized regressions to control for Intelligence, Dictation, and TTA when
examining the association between MMarith and MMspell. I wonder why the accuracy on
the two computer tasks were not controlled for in these regression models. Is it because
of the high correlations between MM and accuracy on the computer tasks (rs>.89), and
the concern of collinearity in predictors? I think the high correlations between MM
and accuracy raises another question on whether metacognitive monitoring is really
different from performance. While I understand that the two constructs were measured
differently, I wonder how much between-item variations there were on the MM questions
within an individual. Because it seems that participants could take as long as they
needed to choose their answer on the computer tasks, they could be highly accurate
on the computer tasks (as suggested by accuracy especially for the arithmetic task),
and responded “correct” on all MM questions. In this case, there were little to no
variation in the MM questions so did the participants really calibrate their confidence
based on their performance/knowledge or did they just blindly select “correct” on
all MM questions?
Author’s response: In our preregistered analyses, we indeed did not include accuracy
on the custom tasks when examining the association between MMartih and MMspell. While
we understand the Reviewers question regarding the inclusion of the accuracy in the
custom tasks, we a priori specifically selected the standardized tasks to control
for academic performance because these tasks were the most (ecologically) valid and
reliable measures of academic performance more broadly construed. Importantly, these
standardized tests were administered independently from the metacognitive monitoring
measures, which was not the case for academic performance in the custom tasks. Additionally,
based on the results of the current study and as the Reviewer suggested, the high
correlation between accuracy in the custom task and metacognitive monitoring make
these custom tasks less suitable for simultaneous consideration in a regression model.
Although we think that, based on the different abovementioned arguments, these analyses
are not eligible to be included in the manuscript, we have examined whether or not
including accuracy on the custom tasks in the regression models instead of performance
on the standardized academic tasks changed the interpretation of the results. As can
be seen below (Table R1), this was not the case.
Table R1. Regression analyses of MMarith and MMspell performance with metacognitive
monitoring in the other domain and accuracy on the custom academic tasks in both domains
as predictors.
MMarith
β t p BFinclusion
Intellectual ability .07 1.43 .15 .67
Custom task Arithmetic – Accuracy .76 15.41 <.001 >100
Custom task Spelling – Accuracy -.27 -2.44 .02 2.32
MMspell .41 3.63 <.001 40.68
MMspell
β t p BFinclusion
Intellectual ability -.003 -.08 .91 0.12
Custom task Spelling – Accuracy -.10 -1.65 .10 0.34
Custom task Arithmetic – Accuracy .87 23.24 <.001 >100
MMarith .22 3.63 <.001 41.63
Because the results of the analyses including academic achievement as measured with
the standardized academic tasks and the results including academic achievement as
measured with accuracy in the computerized academic tasks were the same, and because
controlling for the standardized tasks is more suitable from a theoretical point of
view (see arguments above), we decided to adhere to our original pre-registered analyses
which include the standardized academic tasks. However, to be fully transparent in
the manuscript, we added the following statement on page 18: “Additional post-hoc
analyses that were not preregistered indicated that the results were the same when
including academic achievement as measured with accuracy in the computerized academic
tasks instead of academic achievement as measured with the standardized academic tasks.”
Turning to the Reviewers concern regarding the difference between metacognitive monitoring
and performance, which we understand, there are several arguments and observations
that confirm that there is most certainly a difference between monitoring and performance.
A first indication that these are indeed two different variables can be found in the
abovementioned regression analyses, in which it is shown that metacognitive monitoring
is predictive of metacognitive monitoring in the other domain, even in addition to
accuracy in that task. This indicates that the metacognitive monitoring measure explains
unique variance that is not accounted for by accuracy in either arithmetic or spelling.
Secondly, within the existing literature (e.g., [10,11], it has been consistently
shown that performance on a cognitive task can be distinguished from metacognitive
monitoring in that task. This was specifically found for retrospective confidence
judgements (e.g., [10,12]), which is how metacognitive monitoring was operationalised
in the current study. For example, fMRI studies comparing activity during task performance
versus retrospective metacognitive judgements found important brain activation differences
between task performance and metacognitive monitoring (e.g., Chua, Schacter, Rand-Giovannetti,
& Sperling, 2006; Chua, Schacter, & Sperling, 2009). Lesion studies also confirm the
difference between task performance and metacognitive performance by showing, for
example, that patients with parietal lesions may have impairments in retrospective
metacognitive performance despite little or no impairment in accompanied task performance
(e.g., Berryhill, 2012; Davidson et al., 2008; Simons, Peers, Mazuz, Berryhill, &
Olson, 2010).
As correctly inferred by the Reviewer, there was indeed no time limit on providing
an answer in the arithmetic and spelling tasks. However, it is critical to emphasize
that children were specifically instructed to answer as quickly as possible. Moreover,
the participating children were all used to providing academic answers as fast and
accurate as possible, due to a curricular focus on fluency. Additionally, as preregistered,
items in which response time for academic answers was more than three standard deviations
from the mean on both subject level and item level, were excluded from the data-analysis.
Data on general task performance of children for who this task performance was more
than three standard deviations from the mean of the task, were also excluded from
the data-analysis, as preregistered. These preregistered exclusion criteria further
ensure that items on which children took excessively long to provide an academic answer
and task performance of children who in general took excessively long to provide an
academic answer, were discarded.
It is indeed important to note, as the Reviewer pointed to, that while children were
highly accurate on the academic tasks, there still was between-item variation in the
answers to the metacognitive monitoring question. As also outlined in our Response
to Reviewer 2, point 3, regardless of performance, in both the arithmetic and the
spelling task, children indeed most often, but not exclusively, indicated that they
thought they were correct in Grade 3 (Study 1; i.e., 93% of responses in arithmetic
task, 77% in spelling task) and in Grade 2 (Study 2; i.e., 84% of responses in arithmetic
task, 75% in spelling task). This result is in line with the high task performance
Grade 3 (i.e., 94% accuracy in arithmetic task; 78% in spelling task) and in Grade
2 (i.e., 89% accuracy in arithmetic task; 70% in spelling task). Thus, children did
indeed not just blindly select ‘correct’ on all metacognitive monitoring questions.
This is also exemplified in the fact that average absolute metacognitive judgment
(i.e., a judgment score of 3 when children indicated “Correct”, a score of 2 for “I
don’t know” and a score of 1 for “Wrong”) were higher for correct academic answers
than for incorrect academic answers in Grade 3 for arithmetic (Mcorrect = 2.95, SDcorrect
= 0.07; Mincorrect = 2.24, SDincorrect = 0.62; t(124) = -12.73, p < .001, BF10 > 100)
and spelling (Mcorrect = 2.80, SDcorrect = 0.20; Mincorrect = 2.47, SDincorrect =
0.32; t(145) = , p < .001, BF10 > 100); and in Grade 2 for arithmetic (Mcorrect =
2.86, SDcorrect = 0.20; Mincorrect = 2.22 , SDincorrect = 0.66; t(57) = -7.48, p <
.001, BF10 > 100) and spelling (Mcorrect = 2.76, SDcorrect = 0.21 ; Mincorrect = 2.53,
SDincorrect = 0.37 ; t(75) = , p < .001, BF10 > 100). These results demonstrate that
children indicated higher confidence in their academic answer when that answer was
indeed correct, and lower confidence when that answer was incorrect. As such, these
results demonstrate that children did differentiate in their metacognitive judgments
between correct and incorrect academic answers.
Reviewer 1, point 11
The authors controlled for IQ, and the scores on TTA and Dictation when examining
the correlation between MMarith and MMspell in 8-9-year olds, but only controlled
for IQ when examining the correlation between MMarith and MMspell in 7-8-year olds.
While I understand that the correlation between MMarith and MMspell in 7-8-year olds
was already not significant when only controlling for IQ, it may still be helpful
to be more explicit and consistent on the different analytic approaches for the two
age groups.
Author’s response: As the Reviewer indicated, we indeed did not control for scores
on TTA and Dictation when examining the correlation between MMarith and MMspell in
7-8-year olds because this correlation was already not significant when only controlling
for intellectual ability. We agree with the Reviewer that explicitly including this
in the manuscript would increase transparency. Therefore, we added the following statement
to the manuscript on page 25 : “Hence, further control analyses (i.e., in line with
Study 1 in which the correlation between MMarith and MMspell was also controlled for
performance on the TTA and Dictation) were not performed.”
Although we would contend that these analyses are not eligible to be included in the
manuscript, to be fully transparent, we also calculated in the 7-8-year-olds the correlation
between MMarith and MMspell with the scores on TTA and Dictation additionally included
as control variables. As expected, metacognitive monitoring in one domain was not
correlated to metacognitive monitoring in the other domain (r = .08, p = .54), nor
were they predictive of each other (see Table R2).
Table R2. Regression analyses of MMarith and MMspell performance with metacognitive
monitoring in the other domain and standardized task performance in both domains as
predictors (Grade 2).
MMarith
� t p BFinclusion
Intellectual ability .35 3.34 .001 92.61
TTA .41 4.05 <.001 >100
Dictation .11 1.04 .30 1.14
MMspell .07 .62 .54 0.89
MMspell
� t p BFinclusion
Intellectual ability .21 1.57 .12 1.69
Dictation .32 2.58 .01 0.55
TTA -.05 -.34 .73 7.00
MMarith .09 .62 .54 0.72
Reviewer 1, point 12
“On one hand” should precede the phrase “On the other hand”. If the first hand is
not present, the second hand is not really “the other hand”. The authors frequently
use “on the other hand” without its preceding partner, “on one hand”. (e.g., page
4 line 8, page 5 line 16, page 27 line 1, page 28 line 15) Please review the paper
and adjust the phrasing.
Author’s response: Thank you for drawing our attention to this phrasing issue. We
have carefully adjusted this in the revised manuscript, such that “on the other hand”
is always preceded by “on the one hand” or other indications of contrasting statements,
such as “one possibility is that … . On the other hand, it is possible that …” (page
21). In paragraphs where this was not the case, other linking words were used (e.g.,
“furthermore”). All adjustments are indicated in colour throughout the manuscript.
Reviewer 1, point 13
The sentence “Materials consisted of standardized tests, paper-and-pencil tasks, and
computer tasks…. (Page 9, Materials)” seemed to suggest that there were three types
of tasks, and standardized tests were different from paper and pencil tasks. However,
the standardized tests seemed to be the paper-and-pencil tasks. I would suggest rephrasing
the sentence to “Materials consisted of standardized written tests and custom computer
tasks….”
Author’s response: We fully agree with the Reviewer that this statement may confuse
the reader. We have adjusted this sentence following the Reviewers suggestion (manuscript
page 9): “Materials consisted of written standardized tests and computer tasks designed
with Open Sesame [17].”
Reviewer 1, point 14
Although the authors stated that the computer tasks were arithmetic or spelling verification
(page 9 line 8), the task descriptions suggested that the children were choosing the
right answer (8+2 is 10 or 16) rather than verifying the answer (8+2=16, is the answer
correct?). It would help avoid confusions by not characterizing them as verification
tasks.
Author’s response: We thank the Reviewer for pointing to this ambiguity and apologize
for being unclear. The arithmetic and spelling task should indeed not be categorized
as verification tasks, as within these tasks, children had to select the correct of
two response alternatives. The tasks were thus multiple choice tasks in nature. We
have corrected this in the materials section on page 9 (i.e., “Namely, both tasks
were multiple choice tasks with specifically selected age-appropriate items”) and
we have removed the reference to verification tasks in the manuscript on page 9 (arithmetic
task) and page 11 (spelling task).
Reviewer 1, point 15
In tables 2 and 3, some ts and ps are in uppercase. I think they should all be lowercase.
Author’s response: Thank you for highlighting this issue. We apologize for this mistake
and have adjusted this in the manuscript.
Responses to Reviewer 2
The reported paper has many strengths, including the use of two samples of different
ages, monitoring data in multiple domains (arithmetic and spelling), and two different
skills tests in each domain (one on which monitoring was also measured and one that
was standardized). The analyses answer a critical question in the literature and make
a novel contribution. The design is technically sound, the writing is clear, and the
claims appear supported by the data.
I have several comments for the authors to consider.
Reviewer 2, point 1
First, the conclusions will be better supported if the authors provide additional
potential explanations for the different results across ages. The current discussion
highlights how their results are consistent with previous work. For example, they
write, “we are able to confirm the theoretically assumed development of metacognition
from highly domain- and situation specific to more flexible and domain-general with
practice and experience.” However, the current results suggest this may be tied to
a fairly narrow time frame (between the ages of 7 and 9). Why does metacognition shift
to being more domain-general? Why does this occur around ages 8 and 9? What kinds
of practice and experience are theorized to be related to this shift? Additional insights
into why this shift occurs around this age would help situate the novel empirical
findings into the broader theoretical landscape of metacognition.
Author’s response: We agree with the Reviewer that adding potential explanations for
the different results across ages would further our understanding of the development
of metacognitive monitoring, yet we contend that such explanations are not so easy
to make and are at best speculative. Based on the results of the current study, driving
mechanisms for this gradual development from domain-specificity to domain-generality
of metacognitive monitoring cannot be determined. In the existing literature, there
is a lack of research that empirically investigates this issue. The current study
provides a first step towards an understanding of the domain-specificity or –generality
of metacognition by focusing on a narrow age range in which this development could
occur, in related and highly relevant domains for children’s (academic) development.
Future research should build on these results to reveal driving mechanisms behind
this development towards domain-general metacognitive monitoring. Determining the
developmental trajectory of whether and how metacognition generalizes across domains
is crucial, not only form a theoretical perspective (i.e., as it sheds light on how
metacognition develops throughout childhood and thus furthers our understanding of
the functioning and cognitive architecture of metacognition), but also from a practical
perspective, as determining, on the one hand, when metacognition becomes domain-general,
and on the other hand, which conditions drive such a generalization, could have important
influences on, for example, how metacognition is stimulated through educational practice.
As indicated below, we speculate that both cognition and education may play a role
in the development from domain-specificity towards domain-generality of metacognitive
monitoring. Therefore, we added the following extensive discussion on this issue in
the manuscript on pages 30-31, and indicated these are essential areas for future
research. We thank the Reviewer for pointing us to this possibility.
“Although the driving mechanisms for the gradual development from domain-specificity
to domain-generality of metacognitive monitoring cannot be determined on the basis
of the current study, it is important to reflect on why metacognition shifts to being
more domain-general around the ages 8-9. The existing literature offers some theoretical
possibilities, albeit speculatively, that should be investigated in future research.
The development from more domain-specificity of metacognitive monitoring towards more
domain-generality in this age group is likely reflective of a gradual transition that
occurs in the development of primary school children (e.g., [18]). In early stages
of this development, children’s metacognitive monitoring might still be highly dependent
on the (characteristics of the) specific stimuli, while over development, through
experiences of failure and success, and with practice in assessing one’s performance
as well as in (academic) tasks (such as arithmetic and spelling), monitoring might
become more generic. These hypotheses and our results can be further interpreted within
the dual-process framework of metacognition (e.g., [19–21]), which Geurten et al.
[7] also used to interpret their findings. According to this dual-process framework
of metacognition [19–21], metacognitive judgments can, on the one hand, be experience-based,
i.e., based on fast and automatic inferences made from a variety of cues that reside
from immediate feedback from the task and that are then heuristically used to guide
decisions. As such, these metacognitive judgments are task-dependent and probably
difficult to generalize across domains. On the other hand, metacognitive judgments
can be information-based, i.e., based on conscious and deliberate inferences, in which
various pieces of information retrieved from memory are consulted and weighted in
order to reach an advised judgment. These conscious and effortful judgments are more
likely to generalize to other domains. Taken together with the current results, this
dual-processing model of metacognition may suggest that in second grade, children
preferentially rely on automatic inferences when making judgments, while improvements
of metacognitive abilities may enable children in third grade to rely more often on
conscious and deliberate information-based processes.
Another explanation for the gradual shift from domain-specificity to domain-generality
of metacognition could be that this development might be associated with the development
in other general cognitive functions, such as working memory capacity or intellectual
ability. For example, Veenman and colleagues [22] found that metacognitive skills
develop alongside, but not entirely as part of intellectual ability. Growth in these
other, general cognitive functions might enable a shift from domain-specificity to
domain-generality of metacognition.
Finally, the development from domain-specificity towards domain-generality might also
be driven by education, as teachers instruct children on assessing their own performance,
which is at first very focussed on specific tasks. Over development, children might
internalise this into a semantic network of their own abilities, which in turn might
generalise to other tasks and thus become more general.
It is essential to note that none of the above-mentioned hypotheses can be empirically
evaluated within the current study. The focus of the current study was on whether
a development toward domain-generality in metacognitive monitoring occurs in primary
school children, in related academic domains, and, secondly when this occurs. The
question on how, i.e., what mechanisms lie behind this, and why this is the case at
this age, are important questions for future research.”
Reviewer 2, point 2
Second, I was a bit surprised that age was not featured in the analyses at all. For
example, within each study, children’s ages spanned a full year (e.g., ranging from
8 years, 4 months to 9 years, 4 months in Study 1). It seems reasonable to investigate
whether age is correlated with the other metrics (e.g., arithmetic skills, metacognitive
monitoring) and potentially control for any shared variance across them related to
age. Also, an interesting aspect of the studies is that there is an overlap in children’s
ages across the studies, despite the children being in different grades. Specifically,
it appears that some children in Study 1 and some children in Study 2 are between
8 years, 4 months and 8 years, 8 months. The authors may be able to provide additional
insight into this metacognitive “shift” by potentially performing supplemental analyses
on 8s vs. 9s in Study 1 and 7s vs. 8s in Study 2. I realize the authors pre-registered
their analyses, which is 100% desirable and laudable, but also means any analyses
with age would be considered exploratory or supplemental. I would encourage the authors
to consider additional analyses with age in the models. At the very least, the authors
should provide a justification in the paper for the reasons they opted not to include
age in their tables and models.
Author’s response: We thank the reviewer for highlighting this concern. Following
the Reviewers suggestion, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between
age and academic and metacognitive performance measures in both grades (see table
R3 below). The associations between age and the other metrics were not statistically
significant, and Bayes factors were all below 0.43, consequently pointing to evidence
for the null hypotheses of no association between age and the variables under investigation.
In line with the lack of significant correlations with age, post-hoc defined partial
correlations and regression models to control for shared variance across age and the
other metrics (see Tables R4-R8) indicate that including age in the analyses does
not change the interpretation of the current results. However, to be fully transparent
to the reader, and as the Reviewer suggested, we added the following statement on
this issue in the manuscript on page 16 and 23 for Study 1 and Study 2 respectively
and added these post-hoc analyses including age in appendix.
“Although not originally pre-registered, we additionally re-calculated all analyses
below with chronological age as an additional control variable. Considering chronological
age within grade in the analyses reported below did not change the interpretation
of the results (Appendix C).” (Study 1 - manuscript page 16; Study 2 – manuscript
page 23).
It is true that there is a small overlap between the age range of Study 1 and Study
2, as the Reviewer indicated. It is, however, important to note that this overlap
was only due to two children in Study 2 that were in the age range of Study 1. We
therefore re-calculated all analyses with the exclusion of these two children, but
excluding the children from the analyses did not change the results. It is also important
to note that, while the age of these two children from Study 2 overlapped with the
age of the children from Study 1, all children in Study 1 were third graders and all
children in Study 2 were second graders. There was no overlap in grades between the
studies.
The analyses to compare groups within each study (i.e., 8 vs 9-year-olds in Study
1; 7 vs 8-year-olds in Study 2) suggested by the Reviewer to further investigate the
development from domain-specificity to domain-generality were indeed not preregistered.
One possibility could be to present such analyses as exploratory, as suggested by
the Reviewer. However, there are two reasons that prevented us from calculating these
analyses. Firstly, dividing the samples within each study into two groups based on
age (e.g., 7 vs 8 year olds in Study 2) results in very small groups (e.g., only twelve
8-year-olds in Study 2) that are not suitable for reliable statistical analyses. Also,
we did a priori not specifically sample children to have an equal number of 7/8 or
8/9 year-olds in this study. Secondly, and as indicated above, age was not correlated
– with Bayes Factors indicating evidence for the null hypothesis - with performance
(i.e., academic performance and metacognitive skills) in each of the studies, indicating
that it is rather grade than chronological age that is determining performance. We
therefore decided to not split the samples of Study 1 and 2 into specific age groups.
Table R3. Correlation analyses of age and academic and metacognitive performance measures
in both grades.
Study 1 - Grade 3 Study 2 - Grade 2
Age Age
Arithmetic performance
Custom task
Accuracy
r -.07 .15
p .44 .22
BF10 0.14 0.31
Response time
r -.09 -.09
p .28 .46
BF10 0.19 0.19
Standardized task
r .06 .18
p .46 .15
BF10 0.13 0.42
Spelling performance
Custom task
Accuracy .07 -.14
r .43 .26
p 0.15 0.28
BF10
Response time
r -.13 -.13
p .12 .29
BF10 0.36 0.25
Standardized task
r .06 .01
p .46 .94
BF10 0.14 0.15
Metacognitive Monitoring
Arithmetic
r -.14 .07
p .11 .59
BF10 0.37 0.17
Spelling
r -.01 -.13
p .87 .28
BF10 0.11 0.26
Table R4. Partial correlations of metacognitive monitoring and academic performance
measures in 8-9-year-olds (Grade 3).
Arithmetic Spelling
Custom task – Accuracya Custom task - RT b Standardized task (TTA) a Custom task
- Accuracya Custom task -RT b Standardized task (dictation) a
Metacognitive Monitoring
Arithmetic
r .86 -.05 .43 .53 .11 .35
p <.001 .53 <.001 <.001 .22 <.001
BF10 >100 0.13 >100 >100 0.23 >100
Spelling
r .53 -.15 .38 .93 -.04 .71
p <.001 .09 <.001 <.001 .68 <.001
BF10 >100 0.45 >100 >100 0.12 >100
Note. All correlations are additionally controlled for age.
a Controlled for intellectual ability.
b Controlled for intellectual ability and motor speed on the keyboard.
Table R5. Partial correlations of metacognitive monitoring and academic performance
measures in 7-8-year-olds (Grade 2).
Arithmetic Spelling
Custom task – Accuracya Custom task - RT b Standardized task (TTA) a Custom task
- Accuracya Custom task -RT b Standardized task (dictation) a
Metacognitive Monitoring
Arithmetic
r .80 .37 .46 .16 .08 .17
p <.001 .001 <.001 .23 .52 .18
BF10 >100 20.31 >100 0.32 0.20 0.38
Spelling
r .06 .11 .11 .89 -.01 .36
p .66 .42 .39 <.001 .92 .003
BF10 0.17 0.22 0.22 >100 0.16 11.93
Note. All correlations are additionally controlled for age.
a Controlled for intellectual ability.
b Controlled for intellectual ability and motor speed on the keyboard.
Table R6. Partial correlations of metacognitive monitoring measures.
Study 1 – Grade 3 Study 2 – Grade 2
Metacognitive monitoring Spelling Metacognitive monitoring Spelling
Metacognitive monitoring Arithmetic
r .41 a .17 b
p <.001 .19
BF10 >100 0.37
Note. a Partial correlation controlled for intellectual ability, arithmetic and spelling
performance on the standardized tasks and age; b Partial correlation controlled for
intellectual ability and age.
Table R7. Regression analyses of MMarith and MMspell performance with metacognitive
monitoring in the other domain, standardized task performance in both domains and
age as predictors (Grade 3).
MMarith
β t p BFinclusion
Age -.12 -1.77 .08 2.04
Intellectual ability .14 1.91 .06 2.12
TTA .27 3.68 <.001 84.62
Dictation -.12 -1.18 .24 1.06
MMspell .49 4.93 <.001 >100
MMspell
β t p BFinclusion
Age .01 .21 .84 0.19
Intellectual ability .08 1.28 .20 0.36
Dictation .55 8.49 <.001 >100
TTA -.001 -.01 .99 0.19
MMarith .34 4.93 <.001 >100
Table R8. Regression analyses of arithmetic performance (i.e., arithmeticacc and TTA)
and spelling performance (i.e., spellingacc and dictation) with metacognitive monitoring
in the other domain, standardized task performance in the other domain and age as
predictors (Grade 3).
Arithmetic
Arithmeticacc TTA
β t p BFinclusion β t p BFinclusion
Age -.04 -.52 .61 .29 .04 .48 .63 0.42
MMspell .53 4.99 <.001 >100 .22 1.95 .05 3.19
Dictation -.07 -.64 .53 .30 .19 1.68 .10 1.83
Spelling
Spellingacc Dictation
β t p BFinclusion β t p BFinclusion
Age .13 1.75 .08 1.24 .10 1.18 .24 1.14
MMarith .50 6.06 <.001 >100 .25 2.80 .006 10.16
TTA .09 1.15 .25 0.68 .23 2.63 .01 11.67
Reviewer 2, point 3
Third, I was also a bit surprised by the lack of attention to characterizing children’s
metacognition more broadly at these ages. The authors provide basic descriptive statistics
(means, standard deviation, and range) in the supplemental materials. In general,
children’s metacognitive monitoring seems to be quite good, with average calibration
scores around 1.4 to 1.8 (out of 2). However, additional information could help shed
light on how children are performing on this task. For example, regardless of their
performance, how often do children think that they are correct vs. how often do children
select that they do not know? Similarly, are average calibration scores higher on
correct responses or incorrect responses? When children are “uncalibrated,” is it
more often because they are overconfident (thinking they are correct when actually
wrong) or because they are underestimating their skills (thinking they are incorrect
when actually right). Do these metrics vary by discipline? These findings would not
change current conclusions about domain-specificity, but would provide additional
contributions by better characterizing children’s metacognitive monitoring on these
tasks.
Author’s response:
We thank the Reviewer for the interest in the specific characterisation of the children’s
metacognitive monitoring performance. We have provided the requested information below.
Because these analyses were not preregistered, because the results of these analyses
are in line with results on metacognitive monitoring reported in the existing literature
(e.g., overconfidence in children of this age, see Destan & Roebers, 2015), because
these analyses do not answer any of our original research questions, and, as the Reviewer
indicated, because they do not change the conclusions of the current study, these
results were not discussed in detail in the manuscript. In the remainder of this response,
we provide the details that the Reviewer is asking for. We contend that adding this
information to the manuscript would make it unnecessarily complicated and therefore
decided not to include it. However, if the editor and Reviewer think that this is
absolutely critical, we are willing to reconsider this, bearing in mind that these
analyses were not preregistered and should be represented as such.
The additional results are as follows. General performance on the metacognitive monitoring
task was indeed, as the Reviewer indicated, quite good, although there were both inter-
and intra-individual differences in performance. As also outlined in our Response
to Reviewer 1, point 10, regardless of performance, in both the arithmetic and the
spelling task, children most often indicated that they thought they were correct in
Grade 3 (Study 1; i.e., 93% of responses in arithmetic task, 77% in spelling task)
and in Grade 2 (Study 2; i.e., 84% of responses in arithmetic task, 75% in spelling
task). This result is in line with the high task performance Grade 3 (i.e., 94% accuracy
in arithmetic task; 78% in spelling task) and in Grade 2 (i.e., 89% accuracy in arithmetic
task; 70% in spelling task). Average absolute metacognitive judgment (i.e., a judgment
score of 3 when children indicated “Correct”, a score of 2 for “I don’t know” and
a score of 1 for “Wrong”) was higher for correct academic answers than for incorrect
academic answers in Grade 3 for arithmetic (Mcorrect = 2.95, SDcorrect = 0.07; Mincorrect
= 2.24, SDincorrect = 0.62; t(124) = -12.73, p < .001, BF10 > 100) and spelling (Mcorrect
= 2.80, SDcorrect = 0.20; Mincorrect = 2.47, SDincorrect = 0.32; t(145) = , p < .001,
BF10 > 100); and in Grade 2 for arithmetic (Mcorrect = 2.86, SDcorrect = 0.20; Mincorrect
= 2.22 , SDincorrect = 0.66; t(57) = -7.48, p < .001, BF10 > 100) and spelling (Mcorrect
= 2.76, SDcorrect = 0.21 ; Mincorrect = 2.53, SDincorrect = 0.37 ; t(75) = , p < .001,
BF10 > 100). When children are “uncalibrated”, it is mostly, in line with the existing
literature (e.g., Destan & Roebers, 2015), because they are overconfident in both
Grade 3 (i.e., 90% of uncalibrated answers in arithmetic task; 92% in spelling task)
and Grade 2 (i.e., 84% of uncalibrated answers in arithmetic task; 75% in spelling
task).
Reviewer 2, point 4a
Fourth, on a very minor note, I found two pieces of the method section to be a bit
confusing. First, when describing the procedure, the authors write, “The participants
completed all tasks in the same order in an individual session, two sessions in small
groups of eight children and a group session in the classroom.” I assume this means
each child participated in four sessions. Is this because some tasks needed to be
assessed one-on-one and other tasks did not? I think it would help to clarify which
tasks were administered in which sessions and to clarify the timing of these sessions
(e.g., after the individual session, how many days later was the small group session?
What time of the school year were these sessions? Etc.). [Second, (see point 4b)].
Author’s response: We thank the Reviewer for bringing this need for further clarification
to our attention. Following the Reviewers suggestion, we have rephrased the procedure
section (see below) to include information on which tasks were administered in the
different sessions and included information on the timing of the sessions. The tasks
were indeed distributed over different sessions due to practical reasons and task
characteristics (i.e. some tasks needed to be administered one-on-one and others did
not). By doing so, we also aimed to minimize effects of fatigue due to long testing
sessions.
“All participants participated in four test sessions, which took place at their own
school during regular school hours, and all completed the tasks in the same order.
In the context of a larger project, all children first participated in an individual
session of which the data are not included in the current manuscript. Second, a session
in small groups of eight children took place, including the computerized spelling
task and motor speed task; Third, a second session in small groups took place, including
the computerized arithmetic task and motor speed tasks; Fourth, in a group session
in the classroom the standardized arithmetic and spelling tests and the test of intellectual
ability were administered. Sessions were separated by one to three days on average;
they were never adjacent.” (manuscript page 8-9).
Reviewer 2, point 4b
[Fourth, on a very minor note, I found two pieces of the method section to be a bit
confusing. First, (see point 4a)] Second, the authors describe the computerized arithmetic
and computerized spelling tasks as “verification” tasks. This made me assume that
a single problem/word was presented and the child had to verify (click yes or no)
as to whether it was correct. However, in reality, the task included two simultaneous
presentations of a problem/word, one that was correct and one that was incorrect.
The child had to select the correct one. This is super minor, but it might be more
appropriate to call it a selection task or recognition task rather than a verification
task for ease of interpretation.
Author’s response: We apologize for the incorrect naming of the custom arithmetic
and spelling task. The arithmetic and spelling task should indeed not be categorized
as verification tasks, as within these tasks, children had to select the correct of
two response alternatives. As outlined in our response to point 14 by Reviewer 1,
we have corrected this in the materials section on page 9 (i.e., “Namely, both tasks
were multiple choice tasks with specifically selected age-appropriate items”) and
we have removed the reference to verification tasks in the manuscript on page 9 (arithmetic
task) and page 11 (spelling task).
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