Fig 1.
Schematic diagram ofschool-community collaboration mechanism under government incentives and sanctions.
Table 1.
Model parameters and descriptions.
Table 2.
Game theory payoffmatrix for universities and society.
Table 3.
Characterization of evolutionary stability in social and school game systems.
Table 4.
Local stability of the equilibrium point in case (1).
Table 5.
Local stability of the equilibrium point in case (2).
Table 6.
Local stability of the equilibrium point in case (3).
Table 7.
Local Stability of the Equilibrium Point in Case (4).
Fig 2.
The impact of initial conditions in higher education institutions on evolutionary pathways.
Fig 3.
The impact of initial conditions on evolutionary trajectories in society.
Fig 4.
The impact of initial values in higher education on evolutionary.
Fig 5.
The impact of government funding on the probability of universities taking the Initiative.
Fig 6.
The impact of government funding on the probability of social openness.
Table 8.
Local Stability of the Equilibrium Point.
Fig 7.
Evolutionary processes under dynamic reward and static punishment mechanisms.
Fig 8.
The impact of initial conditions on evolutionary outcomes.
Fig 9.
The impact of government funding on universities’ probability of taking the initiative when cooperation willingness is low.
Fig 10.
The impact of low cooperation willingness on the probability of government funding being open to society.
Fig 11.
The effect of reputation subsidies on the probability of universities taking the initiative when cooperation willingness is low.
Fig 12.
The effect of reputation subsidies on the probability of social openness when cooperation willingness is low.
Fig 13.
The effect of reputation rewards on the probability of universities taking the initiative under moderate cooperation willingness.
Fig 14.
The effect of reputation rewards on the probability of social openness under moderate cooperation willingness.
Fig 15.
The impact of initial conditions in higher education institutions on evolutionary outcomes.
Fig 16.
Evolutionary processes under different dynamic reward coefficient combinations.
Fig 17.
Effect of different reward coefficient combinations on evolutionary outcomes when λ + ζ = 0.7.
Fig 18.
Effect of different reward coefficient combinations on evolutionary outcomes when λ + ζ = 0.8.
Table 9.
Local Stability of the Equilibrium Point.
Fig 19.
Evolutionary processes under static reward and dynamic punishment mechanisms.
Fig 20.
The impact of initial conditions in higher education institutions on evolutionary outcomes.
Fig 21.
The impact of initial conditions on evolutionary outcomes.
Table 10.
Local Stability of the Equilibrium Point.
Fig 22.
Evolutionary processes under a dual-dynamic mechanism.
Fig 23.
The impact of initial social values on evolutionary outcomes.
Fig 24.
The impact of 22initial values in higher.