Fig 1.
Logical relationships among tripartite evolutionary game participants.
Table 1.
Notations of the Tripartite Evolutionary Game.
Table 2.
Payoff Matrix.
Fig 2.
Phase Diagram of Local Government Strategy Evolution.
Notes: “VA1” designates the strategy space applicable when z > z * , and the arrow extending from “0” to “1” indicates that within this strategy space, the evolutionary trajectory of x progresses from “0” to “1”; “VA2” designates the strategy space applicable when z < z * , and the arrow extending from “1” to “0” indicates that within this strategy space, the evolutionary trajectory of x progresses from “1” to “0”; and the shaded area in the figure represents the cross-sectional view of the strategy space under the condition that z = z * .
Fig 3.
Phase Diagram of Railway Transport Enterprises’ Behavior Evolution.
Note: “VB1” designates the strategy space applicable when x < x * , and the arrow extending from “1” to “0” indicates that within this strategy space, the evolutionary trajectory of y progresses from “1” to “0”; “VB2” designates the strategy space applicable when x > x * , and the arrow extending from “0” to “1” indicates that within this strategy space, the evolutionary trajectory of y progresses from “0” to “1”; and the shaded area in the figure represents the cross-sectional view of the strategy space under the condition that x = x *.
Fig 4.
Phase Diagram of Shippers’ Strategy Evolution.
Note: “VC1” designates the strategy space applicable when y < y * , and the arrow extending from “0” to “1” indicates that within this strategy space, the evolutionary trajectory of z progresses from “0” to “1”; “VC2” designates the strategy space applicable when y > y * , and the arrow extending from “1” to “0” indicates that within this strategy space, the evolutionary trajectory of z progresses from “1” to “0”; and the shaded area in the figure represents the cross-sectional view of the strategy space under the condition that y = y * .
Table 3.
Stability Analysis of Evolutionary Stable Strategy.
Fig 5.
Initial evolutionary path diagram.
Fig 6.
Evolutionary simulation graph of different initial values for x, y, and z.
Fig 7.
Sensitivity Analysis of the Parameters for Road to rail Freight Volume Ratio and
.
Fig 8.
Sensitivity Analysis of Government Subsidy Parameter for Shippers.
Fig 9.
Sensitivity Analysis of Probability δ of the Local Government Supervising Shippers Receiving Subsidies.
Fig 10.
Sensitivity Analysis of Penalty Imposed on Shippers for Noncompliant Behavior in Receiving Subsidies if they Fail to Carry Out the Related Freight Transport as Required.