Fig 1.
The logical relationships among the three–game players.
Note: This picture was drawn by the author.
Table 1.
Parameters of the tripartite evolutionary game model.
Table 2.
The payoffs matrix among the government, enterprises, and public.
Fig 2.
The evolutionary phase diagram of the evolution strategy of the government.
Fig 3.
The evolutionary phase diagram of the evolution strategy of the enterprises.
Fig 4.
The evolutionary phase diagram of the evolution strategy of the public.
Table 3.
Equilibrium point analysis.
Table 4.
The initial set of values of parameters in the numerical simulation.
Fig 5.
Robustness tests for equilibrium points.
Fig 6.
Impact of regulatory costs on tripartite evolutionary trends.
Table 5.
The set of values of parameters in the numerical simulation of regulatory costs.
Table 6.
The set of values of parameters in the numerical simulation of penalties.
Fig 7.
Impact of government fines on enterprises.
Fig 8.
The impact of the central government’s rewards and penalties on the local government.
Fig 9.
The cost of social governance to enterprises.
Fig 10.
The impact of compensation to the public for pollution caused by enterprises.
Table 7.
The set of values of parameters in the numerical simulation of subsidies.
Fig 11.
The impact of government incentives for enterprises.
Fig 12.
The impact that public monitoring receives incentives from the government.
Fig 13.
The impact of government incentives on public participation in supervision.
Table 8.
The set of values of parameters in the numerical simulation of subsidies and penalties.
Fig 14.
Impact of incentives and punishment mechanisms on tripartite evolution trend.