Table 1.
Payout matrix for doctors and patients in medical malpractice.
Table 2.
The specific values of A11, A12, A21 and A22 at the local equilibrium point.
Table 3.
Stability analysis of equilibrium points in case (1).
Table 4.
Stability analysis of equilibrium points in case (2).
Fig 1.
Evolutionary game theory model of doctors and patients in medical malpractice.
Fig 2.
Effect of PE1 on the physician positive strategy selection.
(current: PE1 = 0.4; current 1; PE1 = 0.6 and current 2:PE1 = 0.8).
Fig 3.
Effect of PE1 on the physician standard medical practice strategy selection.
(current: PE1 = 0.4; current 1; PE1 = 0.6 and current 2:PE1 = 0.8).
Fig 4.
Effects of S1 and S2 on physicians’ positive strategy selection.
(current: S1 = 0.1, S2 = 0.8; current 1: S1 = 0.2, S2 = 0.7and current 2:S1 = 0.3, S2 = 0.6).
Fig 5.
Effects of S1 and S2 on patients’ strategy selection.
(current: S1 = 0.1, S2 = 0.8; current 1: S1 = 0.2, S2 = 0.7and current 2:S1 = 0.3, S2 = 0.6).
Fig 6.
Effects of E and PE1 on the choice of active medical strategies for physicians.
(current: E = 0.3, PE1 = 0.5; current 1: E = 0.4, PE1 = 0.5; current 2: E = 0.4, PE1 = 0.6).
Fig 7.
Effects of E and PE1 on the choice of non-medical malpractice strategy for patients. (current: E = 0.3, PE1 = 0.5; current 1: E = 0.4, PE1 = 0.5; current 2: E = 0.4, PE1 = 0.6).