Fig 1.
A framework for understanding players’ decision-making.
Table 1.
Parameters of the dissemination and evolutionary game models.
Fig 2.
The SIR dissemination model of green retrofit intention among residents.
Table 2.
Payoffs matrix for green retrofitting of traditional residential buildings.
Table 3.
Eigenvalues of equilibrium points.
Fig 3.
The impact of h on the government’s strategic choices.
Fig 4.
The impact of h on the investment retrofitting enterprises’ strategic choices.
Fig 5.
The impact of h on residents’ strategic choices.
Fig 6.
The impact of u on the government’s strategic choices.
Fig 7.
The impact of u on the investment retrofitting enterprises’ strategic choices.
Fig 8.
The impact of u on residents’ strategic choices.
Fig 9.
The impact of q on the government’s strategic choices.
Fig 10.
The impact of q on the investment retrofitting enterprises’ strategic choices.
Fig 11.
The impact of q on residents’ strategic choices.
Fig 12.
The impact of n on the government’s strategic choices.
Fig 13.
The impact of n on the investment retrofitting enterprises’ strategic choices.
Fig 14.
The impact of n on residents’ strategic choices.
Fig 15.
The impact of l on the government’s strategic choices.
Fig 16.
The impact of l on the investment retrofitting enterprises’ strategic choices.
Fig 17.
The impact of l on residents’ strategic choices.
Fig 18.
The impact of k on the government’s strategic choices.
Fig 19.
The impact of k on the investment retrofitting enterprises’ strategic choices.
Fig 20.
The impact of k on residents’ strategic choices.
Fig 21.
The impact of E4 on the government’s strategic choices.
Fig 22.
The impact of E4 on the investment retrofitting enterprises’ strategic choices.
Fig 23.
The impact of E4 on residents’ strategic choices.