Fig 1.
The priming sequence and the primes.
A. Priming results in reporting the ambiguous test cylinder as having the same orientation as the stable prime cylinder. In Experiment 1 primes B to E were used and in Experiment 2 primes B to D were used. B. Structure-from-motion prime-cylinder, a non-transparent cylinder where dots are occluded by the near side of the cylinder, displayed with a long exposure showing a complete period of the motion strikes of individual dots. C. The pictorial prime-cylinder, revealed by shading due to illumination from above. D. An example of the imagery prime, with the orientation and opening of the cylinder to be imagined hinted at by the line and the circle. E. Fixation condition where only the fixation cross appeared at one of the openings of the upcoming test cylinder.
Fig 2.
Construction of the SFM cylinder.
Dots were randomly spread on the surface of an invisible cylinder. (A) Initially, dots were spread on the cylinder with its main axis oriented along the vertical y-axis. (B) To obtain the initial orientation of the cylinder it was slanting around the x-axis (C) and then tilted around the y-axis. (D) From the initial orientation, small steps of rotation around the cylinder main axis and around the vertical y-axis between each frame created the wiggling motion. (E) Adding these two oscillatory rotation components created elliptic motion paths of the individual dots, here visualised as motion strikes obtained from a long exposure.
Fig 3.
Priming in Experiment 1 and 2.
In Experiment 1, the test stimulus was located at the same position as the previously presented prime. In Experiment 2, the test stimulus was randomly located along a circle with a fixed radius around the prime.
Fig 4.
The graphs show the proportion of responses where the orientation of the ambiguous test cylinder was perceived as the same as the prime cylinder. The .5 level indicates no relation between the orientation of the prime and perceived orientation of the test stimulus. (A) The average influence of the primes from Experiment 1 where the prime and test were located at the same place, and a fixation condition where no prime was presented. In the fixation condition, before the cylinder appeared participants were instructed to direct their gaze to a location where one of the ends of the ambiguous cylinder would appear. The proportion indicates occurrences where the gaze direction coincides with the perceived near part of the ambiguous cylinder. (B) In Experiment 2 the test cylinder appeared at a random location around the previously presented prime to prevent influences of cueing to the nearest perceived part of the prime. The 95% CI’s are displayed.
Table 1.
Influence of primes and differences between primes in Experiment 1.
Table 2.
The Pearson correlations between priming conditions in Experiment 1 (two tailed tests, N = 82).
Table 3.
Influence of primes and differences between primes in Experiment 2.
Fig 5.
Influence of priming and correlations between prime conditions.
(A) The order of participants is arranged from highest to the lowest average prime-effect across the three prime conditions. The bars show the proportion of responses where the test stimulus was perceived with the same orientation as the prime (out of 52 trials, .5 indicates no influence). Horizontal lines: p < .05; dotted line BF > 2; dashed lines BF > 10; solid lines BF > 100. (B) Pearson’s r and Bayes factors are shown in each scatterplot. All p’s < .001, tests are two-tailed. The shaded areas show the 95% CI of the regression lines.
Table 4.
Correlations Tau-b, between priming (SFM, pictorial, and imagery), reversals, and mixed percepts.
Fig 6.
A. Correlations are shown between the influences of priming (SFM, still image, and imagery) and the personality traits (Pearson’s r), and number of reversals and mixed perceptions and personality traits (Kendall’s Tau-b). Tests are two tailed: * p < .05, ** p < .01, ♦BF10 > 3, ♦♦BF10>10, ♦♦♦BF10 > 100 (in support for a correlation). The sign † indicates cases where the result is 3 to 5 times more likely due to an absence of a correlation than if there was a correlation in the population. The staples between the experiential and rational cognitive styles indicate significant differences between correlations. B. Scatterplot between agreeableness scores and priming averaged across all three prime conditions. C. The scatterplots between the experiential and rational cognitive modes as scored by REI and the influence of the SFM-prime and the imagery-prime presented separately. D. The scatterplots between openness scores and the number of mixed percepts. E. Separate scatterplots are shown between reversals and neuroticism, and mixed percepts and neuroticism.