Fig 1.
The numbers in parenthesis are equation numbers.
Fig 2.
Density function of the triangular distribution for a generic social norm.
Fig 3.
Circular motivational continuum source: Adapted from Schwartz et al. [21].
Table 1.
Value types and attributes.
Fig 4.
Deviation from norms.
Table 2.
Probability to deviate from norms.
Fig 5.
Density functions for cooperativeness.
Fig 6.
Deviations from shirking norm in different organisational cultures.
Fig 7.
Cooperative vs. competitive reward scheme.
Table 3.
Management style, reward schemes and scenarios.
Fig 8.
Aggregate realised output per scenario.
Fig 9.
Aggregate average time—Absolute baseline.
Fig 10.
Realised output, average individual, cooperation and shirking time per value-types—Absolute baseline.
Fig 11.
Effect of lower variability on O-agents’ behaviour.
Fig 12.
Aggregate average time—No incentives.
Fig 13.
Realised output, average individual, cooperation and shirking time per value-types—No incentives.
Fig 14.
Aggregate average time—No monitoring.
Fig 15.
Realised output, average individual, cooperation and shirking time per value-types—No monitoring.
Fig 16.
Aggregate average time—PFP schemes and monitoring strategies.