Skip to main content
Advertisement
Browse Subject Areas
?

Click through the PLOS taxonomy to find articles in your field.

For more information about PLOS Subject Areas, click here.

< Back to Article

Fig 1.

Stimuli used in the study.

(a) Avatars that represented (from left to right) Indian female, Indian male, US American female, US American male partners in the Dictator Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma, as well as presented during the Affect Misattribution Procedure. (b) The Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix that participants saw as instructions. The participant, Player A, had two options: they could transfer $2.00 to Player B or keep $2.00 for themselves. Payoffs on the left (italicized) are participant payoffs, while payoffs on the right are Player B payoffs.

More »

Fig 1 Expand

Fig 2.

Participants explicitly identified with both their nationality and gender, and implicitly preferred their nationality.

Females also have an implicit own-gender bias, while males have a female bias. (a) Nationality identification by participant nationality on the left, (b) gender identification by participant gender on the right. (c) Nationality difference scores in the AMP plotted against participant nationality (left), (d) and gender difference scores in the AMP plotted against participant gender (right). AMP difference scores (c, d) above 0 indicate ingroup bias in our implicit measure, while scores below 0 indicate outgroup bias. All error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

More »

Fig 2 Expand

Fig 3.

Participant and partner nationality is overall more predictive of cooperation than participant and partner gender.

Donations in the Dictator Game (a, b), the proportions of decisions to cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (c, d) and the proportions of beliefs that partners will cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (e, f) shown by nationality (left column) and gender (right column). All error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

More »

Fig 3 Expand

Table 1.

Models for category dominance across the Dictator Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma Decisions, and Prisoner’s Dilemma Beliefs.

More »

Table 1 Expand