Fig 1.
Block diagram of a participant’s flow through one experimental setup.
The participant goes through three stages: the first stage contains the pre-game module with preliminary instructions about the experiment and surveys, the second stage contains the core game mechanics (which implements the suite of decision-making and behavioral games), and the third stage consists of the post-game module with the final feedback of the experiment and surveys about the experience and the topic of the experiment. Not all these modules and interfaces are present in all the experimental setups.
Fig 2.
Interaction types included in the platform.
The platform currently implements four different types of interaction that cover individual-computer (a), individual-individual (b, c) and individual-collective (d) types of coordination. The numbers on the arrow indicate the order of when each interaction takes place, black arrows are interactions from individuals to the computer, and red arrows are interactions from the computer to the participants.
Fig 3.
Example of the platform infrastructure.
This is the basic technological infrastructure used in the majority of experiments. It is designed to be rapidly deployed in any environment.
Table 1.
Summary of experiments performed thus far.
The suit of games is formed by: Decision-Making Game (DM), Harmony Game (HG), Snowdrift Game (SG), Stag-Hunt Game (SH), Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Trust Game (TG), Dictator’s Game (DG) and Collective-Risk Dilemma (CRD). The number of participants and decisions are the valid ones.
Fig 4.
Diversity of the participants pool.
(Left) The proportion of participants in all the experiments (n = 2821) regarding gender is 54.27% males and 45.73% females. (Center) Distribution of participants according to their ages in all the experiments (n = 2821). (Right) Educational level of participants in all the experiments except “urGENTestimar”, which didn’t ask this question to participants (n = 1993).
Fig 5.
Time of response in different games.
(Left) Time response evolution across rounds in Mr. Banks experiments for the main performance in DAU (n = 283) and the two replicas CAPS (n = 37) and Sonar+D (n = 20). (Right) Time response evolution across rounds in The Climate Game experiment in both performances, DAU (n = 320) and City (n = 100).
Fig 6.
Robustness of generalization in mental health experiments.
Levels of cooperation, cooperation expectation, trust and reciprocity in the four experiments: Lleida (n = 120), Girona (n = 60), Sabadell (n = 48) and Valls (n = 42). It is represented the average level with 0.95 CI in each case. The dashed line represents the total average levels. There are no significant variation in the level of cooperation (Kruskal-Wallis, H = 2.38, p = 0.50), cooperation expectations (Kruskal-Wallis, H = 0.38, p = 0.94), trust (Kruskal-Wallis, H = 2.67, p = 0.45) and reciprocity (H = 3.02, p = 0.39). See Ref. [63] for further details.
Fig 7.
Stability of strategies in Mr. Banks replication experiments.
Ratio to follow strategies of Market Imitation and Win-Stay Lose-Shift in the experiments: DAU (n = 283), CAPS (n = 37) and Sonar+D (n = 20). There are no significant differences in Market Imitation strategies except the probability to Up/Up between the experiments of DAU and Sonar+D in (-2.53 SD). There are no significant differences in Win-Stay except in the last case (Lose-Switch) between the experiments of DAU and CAPS (2.35 SD). See S1 and S2 Tables for further details.
Fig 8.
Experience of participation in Mr. Banks, Dr. Brain and The Climate Change (n = 1178). The most of participants (82.77%) had a positive experience and a small group (9.51%) had a negative experience, the rest (7.72%) has an indifferent experience.