Table 1.
Parameters in Model 1.
Fig 1.
Time series showing changes in FST over time for (A) a low migration rate m = 0.01, (B) a typical migration rate m = 0.1, and (C) a high migration rate m = 0.3, at varying strengths of acculturation, a. Other parameters: s = 5, n = 5, r = 0.
Fig 2.
Equilibrium FST as a function of acculturation strength, a, at three different migration rates, m (panels A-C), and different numbers of demonstrators, n (colored lines). Other parameters: s = 5, r = 0; plotted are values after 500 timesteps.
Fig 3.
Heatmaps showing equilibrium FST for varying acculturation rates, a, and migration rates, m, separately for different values of n, the number of demonstrators, and r, the probability of assortation.
Other parameters: s = 5; plotted are values after 500 timesteps.
Table 2.
Additional parameters in Model 2.
Fig 4.
Time series showing changes in p over time in the face of payoff-biased migration (m = 0.1), (A) in the absence of acculturation (a = 0) and payoff-biased social learning (L = 0); (B) at varying strengths of acculturation, a, and (C) at varying strengths of payoff-biased social learning, L. Other parameters: n = 5, r = 0, b = 1, c = 0.2, u = 0.1, v = 0.5.
Fig 5.
Heatmaps showing equilibrium p for varying acculturation rates, a, and migration rates, m, separately for different values of L, the strength of payoff-biased social learning.
Other parameters: n = 5, r = 0, b = 1, c = 0.2, u = 0.1, v = 0.5; plotted are values after 1000 timesteps.
Fig 6.
Heatmaps showing how different values of v, the punishment costs to defectors, affects the relationship between the migration rate, m, and (A-C) the strength of payoff-biased within-group social learning, L, and (D-F) acculturation, a, in determining equilibrium cooperation level p. Other parameters: r = 0, b = 1, c = 0.2, u = 0.1; in A-C, a = 0 and in D-E, L = 0. Plotted are values after 1000 timesteps.