Fig 1.
Graphical representations of the two models of the dictator’s giving in the dictator game and the proposer’s giving in the ultimatum game as a function of their level of cognitive control.
Fig 2.
Cumulative distribution of MAO in the UGSTD, the UGAMB and the UGNINT.
The vertical axis represents the percentage of responders whose MAO is the JPY shown on the horizontal axis or less.
Fig 3.
Cumulative distribution of giving in the three games (DG, UGSTD, and UGAMB).
The vertical axis represents the percentage of responders whose (proposed) giving to the recipient (responder) is the JPY shown on the horizontal axis or less.
Table 1.
Correlations between giving, MAO, and expected rejection probability of unfair offers within and across games.
The diagonal entries are the means.
Fig 4.
The levels of giving in the DG, the UGSTD, and the UGAMB as a function of the categorized CRT.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals in the relevant within-participant condition.
Fig 5.
The levels of MAO (Panel A) and expected rejection probability of an unfair offer (Panel B) in the UGSTD, the UGAMB, and UGNINT as functions of the categorized CRT. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals in the relevant within-participant condition.