Table 1.
Manipulation of coercive and legitimate power before (Periods 1–20) and after the change in the tax authority (Periods 21–40).
Table 2.
Repeated measure regression predicting relative tax payments in Experiment 2, 3, and 4.
Fig 1.
The impact of low and high coercive power on relative tax payments before and after the change in tax authority. Note. lcp … low coercive power, hcp … high coercive power.
Fig 2.
The impact of low and high legitimate power on relative tax payments before and after the change in tax authority. Note. llp … low legitimate power, hlp … high legitimate power.
Fig 3.
The impact of coercive power and legitimate power on relative tax payments. (a) Relative tax payments in the experimental conditions and control conditions with high coercive power and high legitimate power in the second sequence. (b) Relative tax payments in the experimental conditions and control conditions with high coercive power and low legitimate power in the second sequence. (c) Relative tax payments in the experimental conditions and control conditions with low coercive power and high legitimate power in the second sequence. (d) Relative tax payments in the experimental conditions and control conditions with low coercive power and low legitimate power in the second sequence. Note. lcp … low coercive power, hcp … high coercive power, llp … low legitimate power, hlp … high legitimate power
Fig 4.
Forest Plot of regression coefficients for coercive power and legitimate power.