Figure 1.
Proportion of endowment donated to Oxfam in the dictator game.
Black bars show participants who were given money (M), grey bars participants who performed the pipette tip task (T1) and white bars participants who performed the squatting task (T2). Bars show mean percentage donation ± one standard error. The proportion of endowment donated did not differ between treatments (F2,15 = 0.02, p = 0.977), however people receiving larger endowments donated a smaller proportion to charity (F1,58 = 6.66; p = 0.012).
Figure 2.
Investment in the public goods game.
Raw data (means ± standard error) of investment by participants in the three treatment conditions in rounds 1-5 of the game.
Figure 3.
Investment in the public goods game.
a) In round 3, investment levels were constant across the three conditions among participants who had heard of game theory, but varied across conditions among participants who had not heard of game theory (F1,65 = 3.83, p = 0.027). All pairwise comparisons of conditions among participants who had heard of game theory were non-significant (p>0.6). b) Average investment in round 4 and 5. Investment did not differ between M, T1 and T2 conditions among participants who were unfamilar with game theory, nor between participants who were familiar with game theory (p>0.3). Bars show mean ± standard error; black bars show M condition, grey bars T1 and white bars T2. p-values for pairwise comparisons are from Tukey post-hoc tests.
Table 1.
Analysis of variance for individual investment in a) round 3 and b) rounds 4 and 5 of the public goods game.