Figure 1.
Set of bargaining alternatives for two players whereby the Nash equilibrium corresponds to optimal utility gains.
Figure 2.
Geometrical distribution of items whose cross-links represent their distances to every person in an n-player game.
Figure 3.
Spatial positions of items presented in x-direction and magnitudes of their utilities and utility-distance products in y-direction for two players.
Figure 4.
Determination of equilibrium based on distribution of utility-distance product vectors about a pivot point for two players.
Table 1.
Utility of goods for Villages (i {1, 2}).
Table 2.
Utility-distance product of goods for Villages (i{1, 2}).
Table 3.
Cumulative utility-distance products of goods for Villages (i{1, 2}).
Table 4.
Utility of goods for Villages (i{1, 2}).
Table 5.
Cumulative utilities of goods for Villages (i{1,2}).
Table 6.
Cumulative utility-distance products of unassigned goods.
Figure 5.
Geometrical distribution of goods for Villages (i{1,2,3}).
Figure 6.
Geometrical distribution of goods presented with magnitudes of utility and utility-distance product for Villages (i{1,2,3}).
Table 7.
Utility-distance product of goods for Villages (i{1,2,3}).
Table 8.
Cumulative utility-distance products of goods for Villages (i{1,2,3}).
Table 9.
Goods assignment for Villages (i{1,2,3}).