Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity

Open Access

Peer-reviewed

Research Article

Szabolcs Számadó ,

* E-mail: szamszab@ludens.elte.hu

Affiliations MTA-ELTE Theoretical Biology and Evolutionary Ecology Research Group, Pázmány Péter sétány, 1/c, H-1117, Budapest, Hungary, MTA, Centre for Social Sciences, Országház u. 30. 1014, Budapest, Hungary
⨯
Ferenc Szalai,

Affiliation Engame Academy, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky u. 50, 1054, Budapest, Hungary
⨯
István Scheuring

Affiliation MTA-ELTE Theoretical Biology and Evolutionary Ecology Research Group, Pázmány Péter sétány, 1/c, H-1117, Budapest, Hungary
⨯

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Deception
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Game theory
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Games
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