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Open Access

Essay

Climate change-induced emergencies and inequity: The role of emergency management governance in Canada

Abstract

Climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of emergencies such as floods and fires, worldwide. These events disproportionally affect equity deserving groups and are becoming a growing driver of social inequity. Emergency management (EM) governance shapes how these groups experience emergencies and their aftermath. In this perspective paper, we examine the relationship between social inequity and EM governance in Canada with the objective of outlining how the devolution of EM governance can impact local resilience and social equity. We show how the devolution of EM responsibilities has created a system where local governments have little decision-making authority despite being responsible for implementing EM policy and programs. We argue that providing reliable funding and greater local autonomy can improve EM outcomes for equity deserving groups and strengthen community resilience overall. Findings and recommendations are intended to help decision makers navigate complexities associated with devolution and the design of EM governance structures.

Citation: Goulet R, Birchall J (2026) Climate change-induced emergencies and inequity: The role of emergency management governance in Canada. PLOS Clim 5(4): e0000887. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000887

Editor: Maria Manez Costa, Helmholtz Centre Hereon Climate Service Center Germany: Helmholtz-Zentrum Hereon GERICS - Deutsches Institut fur Klimaservices, GERMANY

Published: April 1, 2026

Copyright: © 2026 Goulet, Birchall. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Funding: The author(s) received no specific funding for this work.

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

1. Introduction

Emergency events are growing drivers of inequity around the world [1,2]. Equity deserving groups, meaning any group that experiences systemic marginalization, such as racial, cultural, and linguistic minority groups, people with disabilities, rural communities, and people who experience discrimination based on their gender or socioeconomic status [3], are likely to receive fewer resources to prepare for [4,5], face higher risks leading up to [6,7,8], and experience worse outcomes during [9,10] and following an emergency event [11,12,13]. As a result, as the frequency and intensity of emergency events continue to increase, equity deserving groups bear a disproportionate amount of the costs of emergencies.

Local governments are increasingly at the forefront of EM governance, whether or not they have the necessary resources to manage the policy area. The growing global consensus that EM is better led at the local level has encouraged national and regional governments to devolve responsibility for EM [14,15,16]. Across the political spectrum, arguments supporting EM devolution include both cutting administrative costs and reducing inequity [17], but not all devolutionary processes are created equal. Devolution usually involves two elements: authority, meaning the power to make and carry out decisions, and the resources, often financial, needed to implement them [18]. These two elements are often unevenly shared between higher and lower levels of government, which shapes how communities benefit from devolved programs [19]. How authority and resources are actually devolved depends on what Rodríguez-Pose and Gill [18] refer to as “the legitimacy” of both the higher and lower governments; over time, whichever government is perceived as more competent by the public will be able to accrue more resources and authority, and in some cases hold fewer responsibilities for the devolved policy area [20,21,22]. Overall, power imbalance between levels of government strongly influence the outcomes of devolution.

When local governments, such as municipalities, regional districts, and local Indigenous governments, have authority over EM program design and implementation, the programs generally provide more benefits than those led by national or multinational organizations [15,21]. In the context of EM, it has been shown that having community level organizations help direct funds for EM work can significantly improve the impact that the funding has on local and regional resilience [23]. Even when funding is directed by national organizations, having local stakeholders involved in selecting EM projects to be funded has been shown to improve recognitional, distributive, procedural, and restorative justice outcomes [24].

Yet, the uneven devolution of EM can deepen inequity that is already exacerbated by emergency events. Unfortunately, despite the trend towards devolution in EM governance, the resources needed to manage these policy areas are still generally held at the national or even multinational level [1,25,26]. Worryingly, it has been shown that EM related funding directed by higher-level institutions, without sufficient input from local governments, reinforces pre-existing social, political, and economic inequities, regardless of the domestic context [27–29,30]. When EM is unevenly devolved, application-based funding regimes coordinated by higher levels of government often directly dictate the EM programming of local governments because local governments do not have their own funds to administer the policy area [30–33]. This means that centralized funding regimes can inhibit the ability of local governments to address the EM needs of their community. Additionally, because experiencing an emergency event has been observed to increase centralization across all policy areas, uneven devolution of EM is likely to become increasingly common across all jurisdictions and to further entrench itself where it already exists [34]. As uneven devolution of EM becomes the norm, EM governance will continue to drive inequity.

Canada’s multilevel EM governance framework is a clear example of how uneven devolution can impact local and regional resilience. The federal government directly administers the largest funding programs available to support local emergency management efforts [35,36]. In practice, provincial and territorial emergency management legislation is generally based on the federal Emergency Management Act and the funding guidelines of federal programs [37,38]. Thus, regardless of how EM is devolved, federal policy and programs dictate how and what resources are available to local communities.

Canada has two major federal EM funding programs, the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) program and the Emergency Management Assistance Program (EMAP). The DFAA is the federal program that reimburses provinces and territories for costs incurred during emergency response and recovery activities, and EMAP is the federal program that provides funding for EM in First Nations communities. Reviews of these two programs show that the federal government is restricting the autonomy of local governments, and recommend various improvements to how EM is devolved across the country [36,38,24]. Both reports provide clear strategic and tactical recommendations to improve the federal government’s contribution to EM governance and outcomes. Although both the DFAA and EMAP have been updated since their review, neither program has fully implemented recommendations to improve local autonomy or prioritise local disaster risk reduction efforts [39,40].

In 2023 and 2025, Canada experienced its worst and second worst wildfire seasons on record - over 250,000 square kilometers of land burned, causing billions of dollars in damage and forcing thousands of people to evacuate from their communities [41]. As the country experiences the devastating impacts of climate change, EM is top of mind for citizens and politicians. However, even as attention turns to EM governance, updates to federal funding programs have fallen short of recommendations collected during public consultations on how to distribute funding and enable local decision makers to exert their authority [38,36]. In this vein, the objective of this short paper is to outline how uneven devolution of EM can potentially exacerbate inequity in the Canadian context.

2. Context: fragmented EM governance in Canada

The way EM has been devolved in Canada has resulted in a highly fragmented governance landscape. EM is a legislated responsibility of provincial and territorial governments (Government of Canada, 2007). Many provinces and territories have further devolved responsibility for EM to local governments and the private sector to some degree [35]. Additionally, the federal government partially funds some provincial emergency response and recovery efforts through the DFAA program, occasionally deploys the Canadian Armed Forces to support emergency response and recovery efforts, and is wholly responsible for ensuring EM services are available to First Nations living on reserve [35,38]. Lacking standardization and clear roles and responsibilities, the current EM governance landscape in Canada consists of dozens of disparate approaches to EM across the country where rules and procedures of neighboring communities can often contradict each other. Furthermore, as is common in multilevel governance contexts, Canadian federal, provincial, and territorial governments often under resource local governments, further challenging their ability to effectively exercise what little authority they do have over EM [8,35].

Depending on the circumstances, there can be one, many, or no government responsible for ensuring EM services are available in Canada. The circumstances that define who is responsible for EM change based on the stage of EM. In Canada, EM activities are generally organized under four stages, or pillars: mitigation; preparedness; response; and, recovery [42]. Mitigation can span from non-structural interventions, such as public awareness programs, to physical interventions like dikes and fire breaks. Due to the diversity and complexity of mitigation activities, this pillar often has no clear single government who is responsible for coordination and implementation of projects [43]. Preparedness, including carrying out hazard mapping exercises and developing emergency response plans, generally fall under the responsibility of local governments [35]. In terms of emergency response, in Canada this starts at the local level and escalates to include higher levels of government when local resources are overwhelmed [36]. Provincial and territorial governments are more likely to be called upon by lower capacity communities, and the Canadian Armed Forces are more likely to be requested by lower capacity provinces and territories or provinces and territories managing multiple complex emergencies at once. The final pillar, recovery, almost always involves a collaboration between local, provincial, territorial, and federal governments, as well as private insurance [36].

3. Emergencies, EM governance, and inequity

Equity deserving communities and individuals have access to fewer resources across the four pillars of EM, and therefore inevitably experience worse outcomes during and after an emergency event. In Canada, this structural equity issue is partially due to how EM has been devolved. National and multinational funding programs generally reinforce existing social inequities [28], as does underfunding climate change adaptation related programming [23]. The following section elaborates on this structural issue across the four pillars of EM.

3.1. Mitigation

The uneven devolution of EM by federal, provincial, and territorial governments has contributed to a structural mitigation infrastructure deficit in equity deserving communities in Canada. Local governments, particularly rural and remote communities, rarely have the resources to implement mitigation projects themselves, despite having the responsibility to do so [25]. Additionally, many forms of risk mitigation infrastructure, such as dykes, can span multiple local government jurisdictions and require coordination that becomes significantly more difficult when EM is unevenly devolved [43]. The combination of insufficient resources and overly complex governance requirements means that equity deserving communities are more likely to have serious mitigation infrastructure deficits [44]. In First Nations reservation communities, this challenge is exacerbated as they must rely on federal programs that are entirely application based to fund mitigation projects, and receive no long-term guaranteed funding for disaster risk reduction [38]. According to the Office of the Auditor General of Canada [38], the underfunding of federal application-based programs resulted in 112 structural mitigation projects that were eligible for funding remaining unfunded in First Nations reservation communities across Canada [38]. This has left some First Nations communities unnecessarily vulnerable to identified hazards.

Additionally, federal funding for mitigation projects through the DFAA program is only available to communities after they have been impacted by an emergency event [39]. In most jurisdictions, there is some funding available through provincial and territorial governments for hazard identification work and emergency plan development, however there is insufficient corresponding funding available to address identified hazards or implement emergency plans [43]. Unfortunately, communities who already have fewer resources are less likely to win the little funding that is available through application-based programs for mitigation activities [45,46].

Equity deserving groups are also less likely to have access to non-structural forms of mitigation. In Canada, high flood risk regions are not eligible for flood insurance – a key piece of non-structural mitigation [36]. Private insurance is already less available and often less effective for equity deserving groups [10], and without access to private insurance, equity deserving groups living in flood risk zones must rely entirely on personal funds and provincial, territorial, and federal programs when a flood occurs. Additionally, Low-income households are much more likely to live in high flood or fire risk zones and are significantly less likely to be able to relocate as their communities come under increasing threat due to climate change [47,6,10]. As such, equity deserving groups experience worse outcomes following an emergency event.

3.2. Preparedness

When EM is unevenly devolved, equity deserving groups are left less prepared for an emergency. Wealthier households often have more public resources and better infrastructure allocated to their communities [6,44]. On a regional level, preparedness resources such as first responders and emergency response equipment are usually concentrated closer to larger population centres and wealthier communities, leaving smaller and more remote communities with fewer or less effective resources available in the case of an emergency [48]. Similarly, people in more economically precarious circumstances are less likely to be able to participate in emergency preparedness exercises or training activities [49,50]. Additionally, In the Canadian context it has been observed that isolated individuals such as older adults or people with reduced mobility are not sufficiently accounted for in emergency plans and are consequently at risk of experiencing worse outcomes during emergency events [51].

3.3. Response

Equity deserving groups receive fewer services during an emergency event. Individuals with reduced mobility, such as seniors or people with physical disabilities are often expected to fend for themselves during an emergency [51,4]. Additionally, populations who are not able to receive emergency responders’ official communications, for reasons such as language barriers or lack of access to social media, generally access fewer services or sometimes receive no support at all during an emergency event [52,53,54]. Similarly, social groups, such as migrants with precarious legal status and unhoused populations, are less likely to be officially accounted for during emergency response, unless a pre-existing relationship exists with an organization that serves those communities [11,7]. Lacking direct connections with local community groups, higher levels of government are less likely to have the ability or necessary knowledge to appropriately consider equity deserving groups when leading emergency response, without significant collaboration with local governments.

In Canada, the disparity in emergency response outcomes for equity deserving groups is particularly clear for First Nations communities. First Nations reserve communities, representing roughly 2% of Canada’s population, spread across approximately 630 communities, are 18 times more likely to experience an emergency evacuation than the rest of the population [55]. Additionally, during evacuations, First Nations evacuees commonly report experiencing racism and mistreatment in their host communities, which further contributes to the long-term psychological damage experienced during an emergency event [56,57].

3.4. Recovery

Equity deserving groups experience worse outcomes after an emergency event. Low-income households are often forced to move following an emergency event as speculators buy up the impacted real estate [58]. The lowest income households generally then move to areas that experienced heavier damage during an emergency event, putting themselves more at higher risk for future events [47]. What’s more, in Canada, racialized people are significantly more likely to work in jobs that are less secure and have fewer benefits, making them more likely to lose access to their sources of income following large scale emergency events [59,60]. Additionally, because local governments face higher costs and lower revenues long after damaged infrastructure is repaired and recovery has been declared, there is often less money available for social programs and the grassroots community organizations that support their operation [61,62]. In fact, communities impacted by a disaster often experience a general economic downturn [63] and enter a prolonged period of fiscal austerity [62] following the emergency event. These two phenomenon disproportionately impact marginalized social groups as they are more likely to be financially vulnerable and face higher levels of systemic discrimination [64,59].

When EM is unevenly devolved, local governments lose the autonomy to lead their community’s recovery from an emergency event. Local governments rarely have the resources to fully recover from an emergency event [13]. In Canada local governments must apply to the provincial government to be reimbursed for recovery activities after a large-scale emergency event, provincial governments then bundle requests for recovery funding and apply to the federal government to be reimbursed for costs incurred by municipalities and provincially led recovery activities [39]. This lengthy process means that local governments must try to ensure their recovery strategy is in line with provincial and federal funding programs, and carry the cost of recovery until federal and provincial governments approve the activities. This is an arduous process that disproportionally disadvantages lower capacity communities who have fewer resources to manage their recovery process. Moreover, even if successful in applying for recovery funding, the federal DFAA program in Canada only provides local governments with funds to build up to existing codes [39], which are often behind climate change adaptation and EM best practices [65].

3.5. Reducing inequity in emergency management governance

From a governance perspective, the clearest way to ensure that equity deserving groups and communities experience better EM related outcomes is for federal, provincial and territorial funding organizations to meaningfully involve them in the process. In their own program review of the DFAA, Public Safety Canada has recommended that federal EM funding programs include local governments and community members when making funding decisions [36], as has been regularly recommended in the literature [22,66,67]. The report also stresses that a key step forward to improving EM outcomes at the local level is to improve the accessibility of response and recovery funding that is currently administered by provinces and territories but ultimately reimbursed by the federal government [36]. Additionally, it is recommended to allow impacted communities the autonomy to decide how to rebuild in a way that centres their disster risk reduction needs [36]. The strategy of providing flexible and accessible emergency funding to local governments was effective in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic [68]. Finally, the report also recommends targeting federal EM funding specifically to equity deserving groups, as is done in the United Kingdom, with particular consideration for programs that impact Indigenous communities and individuals [36]. By improving the accessibility of funding and engaging in meaningful dialogue with local governments and equity deserving groups EM agencies will also be able to better integrate equity deserving groups into regional and national emergency response plans and activities.

4. Conclusion

Canada's EM governance fails to empower local decision-makers. Despite recent federal and some provincial and territorial updates to EM policy and programs, EM funding remains dictated by centralized programs beyond local influence—stripping agency from the governments tasked with frontline implementation. When under-resourced, as seen across Canada and globally, local EM and disaster risk reduction efforts exacerbate inequities, with equity-deserving groups, including Indigenous communities, facing disproportionate harm amid rising climate-driven events. This dynamic directly undermines Canada's reconciliation commitments.

With pledges from across the political spectrum and from all levels of government to improve EM, now is the time to restructure governance by prioritizing local stakeholders, ensuring reliable funding for governments at the front line of EM and disaster risk reduction, and providing more autonomy to grant recipients [30,69,70]. As this perspective paper demonstrates, these shifts yield better outcomes for equity-deserving groups and bolster overall resilience. Implementing the findings of Public Safety Canada's DFAA review and the Office of the Auditor General's review of the EMAP program, would catalyze progress. Meanwhile, further research into identifying the unique needs of different equity deserving groups in the context of EM, defining what governance contexts are most likely to exacerbate inequity more generally and why, and how federal governments can best support local resilience must be undertaken to guide transformative policy.

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