1. Introduction

Norway is a modern welfare state with an open market and a well-functioning economy. Although it is not a classic ‘petrostate’--an established academic concept typically invoked to describe countries that rely heavily on petroleum export in the context of the resource curse and paradox of plenty [1] – Norway confronts the paradox of aspiring to be an international climate policy frontrunner while also being a major petroleum exporter [2,3]. As a major petroleum exporter with considerable state ownership in oil and gas exploration and production activities, petroleum activities figure heavily in its national income, and petroleum interests dominate national political strategies [4]. The Norwegian political economy exhibits divergent forces with regard to rapidly transforming to low-carbon energy systems: significant parts of the national economy are heavily influenced by fossil fuel production and exports, while land-based energy systems are characterised by low-carbon electricity based on renewable energy generation. These energy systems have traditionally existed in almost complete separation, but recent plans for offshore wind energy and electrification of offshore petroleum platforms on the Norwegian continental shelf couple them. The resulting challenge for an electricity system already under pressure to meet demand at affordable costs, combined with the interests of the petroleum lobby, shapes domestic decarbonisation processes. What has been missing up to now in the political discourse in Norway is a consistent, cross-party political consensus on how to deal with both climate change and mitigation policies. Such a consensus could encourage more long-term policy decisions that are anchored within the electorate as well.

The Norwegian case is instructive for understanding energy transition dynamics of states where specific industrial sectors dominate policy paradigms around energy and climate policy. Norway’s petroleum export income is transferred to its national sovereign wealth fund, commonly referred to as “the petroleum fund”, with up to three percent of its annual profits being channelled into the domestic economy. Given the size of the petroleum fund today, more revenue now accrues in the fund from global investments than from the production of oil and gas itself, making Norway less exposed to variable petroleum revenues than other petroleum exporting states. Nevertheless, the official stance across the major political parties is to develop rather than scale back the hydrocarbon sector – until a gradual decline in the distant future. It also involves coupling the hydrocarbon sector to domestic energy systems through the electrification of oil and gas platforms in order to meet Norway’s emission mitigation targets and render Norwegian petroleum production less carbon-emitting than production in other petroleum-exporting states. In this way, the Norwegian paradox is mobilised to justify production until the “last drop” of oil. This makes it relevant to consider how petro-exporting states’ transition ethics runs into conflict with pragmatic strategies for low-carbon energy transitions that are far more efficient, pragmatic, and scalable in reducing climate emissions than solutions tied to the petroleum sector. With an electricity system based on 99% renewable energy, such pragmatic pathways include the national greenhouse emissions mitigation strategy to electrify industry and transport. This strategy seeks to reduce Norway’s share of fossil fuels in its primary energy consumption, which is still around 50 percent. However, rather than aggressively pursue such pragmatic strategies, energy transition contingencies are increasingly modulated by petroleum interests, with increased electricity demand from offshore petroleum production likely to comprise over 10 percent of Norway’s total electricity demand by 2030 [5].

Accounting for such petro-exporter state interests and dynamics, this essay identifies and discusses some key energy efficient transition solutions. A pragmatic focus on such solutions is crucial for enabling feasible pathways to rapidly scale action towards low-carbon energy transitions. Such action is an important part of the requisite response to the climate crisis, which extends beyond decarbonisation to other domains like biodiversity. Like many other countries, Norway is a signatory to important global treaties, such as the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change’s with its Paris Agreement of 2015, and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services with its notable transformative change assessment report of 2024. It also champions the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals running until 2030. This wider policy context – which includes numerous ambitious and time-bound targets at supra-national, national and sub-national scales – provides the backdrop for our argument. As authors with wide expertise on energy transitions, our primary focus is to address the main domestic decarbonisation arena – the electricity system – linked to energy transition ethics. While a more transformative approach to decarbonisation would necessarily direct attention to scaling down and phasing out petroleum activities, as this is unavoidable in a net-zero world [6], the intractable nature of this issue in a petro-exporter political economy does imply that other decarbonisation elements should not be put on hold.

Our basis for exploring energy efficient transition solutions is their demonstrated and potential impact in emergent low-carbon energy systems in Norway and beyond. While no context is free of incumbent interests, we aim to draw insights from instances where such action is not stalled by a petro-intensive political economy, and to identify scope for their application in petro-relevant contexts as well. This research design holds the promise of transferring learning across contexts, with solutions reviewed and referenced based on our collective wide experience with concrete decarbonisation transition solutions, and diverse critical positionality in jointly evaluating applicability to the Norwegian context.

Our motivation for doing this is threefold: First, petro-exporter states’ emissions reduction strategies often rest on techno-optimist future fixes (such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and blue hydrogen), while framing transformative demand-side cuts in the use of petroleum products (such as oil and gas) as a way to avoid supply-side responsibility. This paralysis, however, does not exclude the need to transition other energy system elements. Second, exploring complementary decarbonisation processes, such as energy efficient transition solutions, can over time trigger systemic openings and impetus for transformative shifts. Third, we stress that technical and economic considerations must be coupled with attention to energy ethics and inclusive, participatory, and value-oriented approaches, for example, through citizens’ assemblies. As we later discuss, such assemblies can help overcome political gridlock, reduce polarization, and build trust between the citizenry and policymakers.

In the following sections we review key literature on petro-exporter state ethics and energy efficient transition solutions, followed by elaboration of numerous energy efficient transition solutions applicable to Norway. We then reflect on the payoffs and limitations associated with such a pragmatic approach to energy transition solutions, before concluding with reflections on how to accelerate their implementation.

2. Petro-exporter state ethics and energy efficient transition solutions

Energy systems are not just about technology and infrastructure – they are also productive of and underpinned by cultural practices, socioeconomic relations, political structures, and ethical sensibilities [7,8]. As dense sociotechnical matters, visions of energy transitions thus involve fundamental questions about equity, access, and responsibility. Who benefits from energy transitions? Who bears the cost? What future is envisioned? And whose flourishing is prioritised? Confronted with greater permeability of risks [9], declining trust in institutions [10,11], and the rise in ‘ethical capitalism’ [12, cf. 13], governments, corporations, industries, and citizens are entangled in ethical concerns that are often rendered explicit and visible. Ethics has come to figure prominently in contested and performative spaces where diverse persuasions are enacted, negotiated, and commodified. While this shift towards the language and performance of ethics does not necessarily imply that deeper, more profound moral imperatives are now embraced, it does have implications for how energy transitions are perceived, endorsed, and, not least, challenged.

Recognising energy projects as also ethical(isation) projects is crucial for a pragmatic approach to energy transitions. The values people lean towards, hold, or reject form part of their understanding of what matters to them and why. Without attending to these values, there is a major risk of misapprehending and simplifying what is at stake for others in energy projects. As trust erodes and conflicts arise, positions become defensive and entrenched, making dialogue and engagement increasingly fraught and unlikely. Deliberative consultations with ‘mini publics’, inclusive and attentive governance along with early meaningful engagement that attends to ethical sensibilities and commitments are particularly important in high-stakes transitions like societal visions for ‘net zero’ futures (see, e.g.,[14,15]).

In petro-intensive economies such as Norway, oil and natural gas have formed the “lifeblood” of the nation for decades [16]. And with the ongoing exploration and production in the Norwegian North Sea and Barents Sea, coupled with the petroleum-income based national pension fund and controversies surrounding onshore wind developments, this carbon lifeblood is set to continue pulsating. While subject to strong critique and challenge, the fossil fuel lock-in runs deep, extending through Norwegian society and across multiple and varied regimes of ethics [17,18,3]. Recognising how ethics has become a battlefield where actors and critics uphold the kind of flourishing that they believe should be brought into being, incremental and inclusive pathways for energy transitions at scale are less likely to appear on the front page than the latest national energy controversy. It is precisely therefore that such pragmatic pathways merit articulation and attention.

Petroleum interests should not be caricatured or expected to unfold similarly for all aspects of possible transition elements. Rather, like other vested interests [19], we hold that they are likely to play out differently depending on the context and the interests of the involved and influential actors. As pointed out by the International Energy Agency, in a global perspective, the three most important energy efficient transition solutions include (i) the rollout of renewable electricity technologies, (ii) the low-carbon electrification of buildings, industry and transport, and (iii) traditional energy efficiency [20]. We use these three general transition policy areas to discuss how petroleum ethics, through their informed but assumed interests, are likely to influence policy developments, and use them in the discussion to explore the space for pragmatic decarbonisation policies to develop.

The widespread deployment of renewable electricity technologies, such as solar, wind, and hydro power, is central to decarbonising the electricity sector efficiently. These technologies generate electricity directly without combustion, avoiding large conversion losses entirely. Indeed, analysis shows that global final energy demand could be 40 percent lower if the full electrification potential is deployed [21]. This means that even by simply switching from fossil fuel generation technologies to wind, solar, and hydro power, vast amounts of primary energy can be saved. As these technologies mature, their costs have plummeted, making them increasingly competitive with fossil fuels. Solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind energy are now the fastest-growing sources of electricity globally. The rollout includes not only the installation of these technologies, but also the necessary grid upgrades and the development of energy storage solutions, like batteries or enhanced pumped storage hydropower capacity.

Electrification is the process of switching from direct fossil fuel use to electricity for energy consumption in key sectors. This is crucial for the energy transition because as the power grid becomes cleaner with more renewables, these sectors can also decarbonise. In buildings, this means replacing natural gas furnaces with electric heat pumps for heating and cooling. For transport, it involves the mass adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) for personal and public transport. In industry, it includes using electric boilers, heat batteries, and heat pumps for various processes. Additionally, electrification implies some energy efficiency, as electric systems often convert energy into useful work more effectively than combustion-based systems, thereby reducing wasted energy.

Finally, although often overlooked, energy efficiency remains often the most cost-effective and immediate solution for the energy transition. It involves using less energy to achieve the same or a better level of service, e.g., replacing traditional light bulbs with light-emitting diode (LED) bulbs or optimising industrial processes. The goal is to reduce overall energy demand, which in turn lessens the need for new power generation and infrastructure. Implementing efficiency measures, such as better insulation in buildings, more efficient industrial processes, and smarter energy management, not only cuts carbon emissions but also lowers energy bills and enhances energy security. Importantly, future energy efficiency solutions need to be net zero compatible, meaning that rather than making existing fossil fuel technologies marginally more efficient, they must be elements of a fully decarbonised package of solutions [22].

Recognising the interplay between the ethical considerations and technical fixes allows us to consider how the design and implementation of pragmatic energy transitions are entangled with social values, governance structures, and political interests. It also allows us to frame the following discussion not simply as a catalogue of technical measures, but as an exploration of how such measures can be mobilised in ways that are both feasible and socially legitimate within petro‑exporter contexts like Norway.

3. Energy efficient transition solutions and their implementation in the Norwegian context

In this section, we briefly unpack some key elements of energy efficiency, renewable energy technology deployment, and electrification as key energy efficient transition solutions in the Norwegian context. This is not a comprehensive overview, but necessarily selective both given space constraints as well as our ambition to identify key pathways to advance energy transitions along lines that are relatively uncontroversial in Norway, and globally recognised as being economically desirable in a long-term perspective based on state-of-the-art scholarship, which we indicatively cite.

4. Discussion: Potential payoffs and limitations of pragmatic energy transition approaches

We have outlined the viability of pragmatic solutions that can reduce Norway’s climate emissions. There is some state support for some of these solutions through subsidy programmes such as Enova and research and innovation investments such as the Research Centres for Environmentally Friendly Energy. Overall, however, financial and political support for pragmatic solutions to energy and environmental challenges is lacklustre compared to other Norwegian governmental interventions in technologies linked to the petroleum industry such as CCS and blue hydrogen. While in specific cases such technologies may be necessary due to the lack of present alternatives (such as CCS in waste-to-heat and cement manufacture, and hydrogen in fertilizers and chemicals), there are also significant hurdles in quickly and effectively implementing these technologies [39,40].

The push for uncertain technologies over actually-existing pragmatic solutions points to the limits of petro-exporter states in promoting technological innovation. The challenges lie in how the lines between energy policy, industrial policy, and climate policy in petrostates becomes blurred, and how the policy preferences of certain business and labour interests become promoted by the state contra others [41]. Over the half-century since the advent of its petroleum industry, Norway has established an extensive offshore supply sector as a major employer in the petroleum sector [42]. Companies and labour unions in this sector have collaborated to form powerful lobby organisations such as Konkraft to extract political support and tax benefits for the industry [43]. Today, Norway’s oil resources are becoming increasingly mature and more costly to extract, and even in the best-case scenarios, oil production is expected to drop [44]. Both companies and labour unions in the sector envision that the future of the industry depends both on maintaining current levels of oil production as long as possible and on developing alternative businesses centred on petroleum industry expertise. A primary challenge for these technologies, however, is that markets are immature, often reliant on significant subsidies, and with much lower profit margins than the petroleum sector. In response, the Norwegian state deploys industrial policy intended to support the industry, in the form of energy and climate policy to reduce hard to abate industrial emissions, through extensively subsidised programmes such as a 22 billion NOK investment in the Longship CCS Project. This ironically shortchanges the already available and scalable pragmatic solutions outlined above of adequate support.

Given the three transition policy areas discussed here – electrification of fossil energy use, renewable energy diffusion, and traditional energy efficiency – we argue that petro ethics and interests are likely to unfold in very different ways. First, the most controversial area is likely to be found in the electrification of energy use. As shown by Larsen & Dupuy [45], petroleum electrification projects have been politically granted while other companies seeking connection approvals from the Transmission System Operator (TSO) are increasingly competing for the same electricity – electricity that is increasingly limited both by grid availability and a potentially more constrained national electricity balance. This competition is currently rather strong and implies that there is a limited ground for pragmatic collaboration, and that interests are likely to seek ways of influencing framework conditions in a competitive way. This situation resembles a zero-sum game with little room for synergistic solutions, where non-petroleum industry electrification runs counter to petroleum interests when there is shortage of grid capacity and electricity generation and is deprioritised.

Second, for renewable energy diffusion, the situation is somewhat different. A key difference from electrification is that increased renewables production capacity will increase available electricity for decarbonising petroleum installations, as well as for other industry initiatives. There is evidence of both offshore and onshore industry initiating vertically integrated renewables projects, which are directly connected to industry needs through Power Purchase Agreements. However, while these may seem like synergistic initiatives, petroleum and other industry initiatives and developments have to a large degree been separate. While the petroleum sector facilitates and invests in offshore wind power developments, so far land-based industry has either purchased their needed power from traditional external contracts, or developed onshore projects, for example wind power, without being able to develop competitive Power Purchase Agreement agreements. This means that there is not a direct conflict in interests, but rather limited space for pragmatic policy solutions.

Finally, within traditional energy efficiency (households, buildings, industry), we argue that this is, in the current energy situation in Norway, aligned with interests of the petroleum sector and therefore not resisted by the petroleum sector. Energy efficiency in an increasingly constrained electricity situation is not helped by the price management policies currently operating in Norway. However, energy efficiency would, given effective implementation, lead to more electricity available with the bonus of less conflict between the petroleum industry and other economic activities. While there are other barriers for these policies to be effective, given a constrained electricity situation there is little by way of direct opposition to such policies (although in a situation with a large annual surplus on the power balance, the situation would be different. Here, electrification would be less of an interest conflict. Notably, in such a situation, one can also argue that energy efficiency is in conflict with large hydropower producers’ interests, as it risks undermining their hydropower assets. These are fundamental questions that we do not discuss further, given Norway’s increasingly pressured electricity situation). Given the ostensible interest alignments with the petroleum sector, we identify the area of energy efficiency to be open for pragmatic policy solutions, that has some potential to drive the energy transition without running into the challenge of needing to adopt policies that conflict with the dominant interests of the petroleum sector.

See Table 1 for a summary of interest alignment, rationale, and consequence for pragmatic transition policies.

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Table 1. Summary of interest alignment, rationale, and consequence for pragmatic transition policies.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000880.t001

To bolster the rapid emergence and scaling of pragmatic energy transition solutions, it is imperative to move beyond incumbent actor roles and expand scope for a broader constellation of stakeholders and energy industry innovation and enterprise. This includes creating transition pathways for workers and local communities whose livelihoods are tied to petroleum production and related industries, as well as groups historically excluded from decision-making [46]. A globally just yet locally inclusive transition requires attention to these constituencies, both to mitigate risks of social discord and to unlock opportunities for shared prosperity. Industrial clusters and technology providers stand to benefit from market expansion in electrification, flexibility services, and energy efficiency, while municipalities and local governments can leverage these shifts to attract investment and revitalise regional economies, doing so in a way that reflects citizens’ priorities due to their proximity to local communities. Financial institutions, educational bodies, and civil society organisations also play critical roles in enabling access to capital, skills development, and accountability mechanisms. Importantly, marginalised groups, such as low-income households, tenants, and digitally excluded populations, must be positioned not only as beneficiaries, whether through affordable energy services or community energy schemes, but also as knowledge contributors, bringing their lived experiences and future visions into the design of these initiatives. Recognising a sense of place and local identity helps anchor these contributions and ensures communities remain able to shape their own futures [47]. Equally important is that benefits, such as jobs and revenues, are localised rather than concentrated among incumbent industries or investors, ensuring that communities can influence how these benefits are allocated. Complementary measures, including targeted support for vulnerable groups, can strengthen people’s ability to participate. As Sovacool et al (2025, 15 [48]) argue, in UK’s industrial decarbonisation, for example, this requires “careful, inclusive planning at many different sites and levels of decision-making” supported by coordinated efforts from politicians, civil servants, and coalitions that span socio-ecological advocates and communities.

Broadening involvement demands procedural innovations that embed justice into the design and governance of transition measures [49]. This entails well-resourced engagement processes that afford communities real influence, moving beyond tokenistic consultation to participatory mechanisms such as citizens’ assemblies with suspensive power (referring to the ability to delay or veto policy decisions, see, e.g., [15,50]) thus strengthening the role of energy citizens as core actors in shaping transition pathways [51]. As recommended by the OECD (2025) [52] and EU (2023) [53], and increasingly adopted internationally (ibid), citizens’ assemblies can help with long-term, depolarized, and trust-building climate and energy policy. For example, the Norwegian citizen panel “Future Assembly” convened over several months and released a report with 19 recommendations, including an argument in favour of participatory mechanisms becoming a permanent part of the parliamentary decision-making process [54]. In the Norwegian context, where fossil fuel interests wield significant power through lobbying and sponsorship, citizens’ assemblies offer a democratic counterweight helping to shift the focus from short-term electoral cycles to intergenerational responsibility [55]. This is also the focus of an ongoing campaign by the “People Against Fossil Power” organisation (see Fig 1), which has received the support of several dozen Norwegian researchers in the form of an Open letter [56]. Results from such a citizen panel could be used as the basis for a cross-party political consensus. Such mechanisms are especially valuable where representative democracy has struggled to curb the influence of special interests. Together, these steps can democratise decision-making and turn pragmatic solutions into socially legitimate pathways for inclusive low-carbon transitions [48].

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Fig 1. A campaign at the Oslo Opera House by folk mot fossilmakta (people against fossil power) focused on democratic control over the oil fund, as a supplement to current institutions.

The 15-metre-long banner reads: “People’s Council Now” (13 September 2025). Photo by folk mot fossilmakta; used with permission.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000880.g001

5. Conclusion: How to accelerate implementation of energy efficient transition solutions

Despite the relatively uncontroversial nature of the solutions we highlight, they face some political barriers to advance in Norway. A central theme in the Norwegian context is the petroleum sector’s political clout [4]. Although it is well-established that sectors such as forestry, agriculture, transport, construction, and industry have significant influence in the Norwegian political system, the petroleum sector occupies a special position due to its significance for the economy and employment, and its extraordinary lobbying skills and ability to influence political decisions. One example is the 2020 petroleum tax relief package that was designed to cater to the needs of the petroleum industry and its suppliers during the Covid-19 pandemic. In this and other cases, the industry has emphasised the ripple effects for the supplier industry and employment along the Norwegian coast as arguments to ensure good framework conditions. Indeed, the petroleum industry was central to the emergence of modern lobbying in Norway [57]. Since the 1970s, the Norwegian corporatist system has been dismantled and gradually replaced with more informal lobbying activity wherein various interest groups fight for the ears of decision-makers. The notion of the ‘oil worker’ has become an important symbolic resource that politicians, public figures, and industry spokespersons use to mobilise sympathy for the petroleum industry in public debate [58]. Although environmental organisations and other actors may have agenda-setting power, the petroleum lobbyists have had the decision-making power needed to get their interests through in parliament. A large and stable political majority in parliament has upheld a petroleum policy that in several ways has served as a barrier to energy efficient transition solutions in Norway.

Compared to other countries, there has been relatively broad political agreement in Norway on climate policy, as shown by the parliamentary climate agreements from 2008 and 2012 and the Norwegian Climate Change Act. Although the larger political parties in parliament and government have exercised the most policy influence, the ‘green’ Socialist Left Party and Liberal Party have been able to pressure the major governing parties in different periods – namely the Labour Party and Conservative Party – to agree to a more ambitious climate policy than they would otherwise have pursued on issues such as gas power, CCS, biofuels, restrictions on oil exploration in the Far North, and protection of peatlands [59]. The political clout of smaller parties in climate policy has been strengthened through close ties to the environmental movement. Thus, environmental non-governmental organisations have gained significant support for their positions on several important climate issues, such as the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative, CCS, and the ban on cultivating peatlands. While a radical policy shift is unlikely soon, the new government and political majority in parliament may well be able to agree on incremental and practical policy changes that can unlock energy efficient transition solutions. Over time, a less radical, more pragmatic approach to energy efficient transition solutions in petro-exporter political economies like Norway can potentially unlock the action space for transformative systemic shifts based on demonstrating alternative evolution pathways for low-carbon energy systems, while safeguarding against heavy politicisation of climate policy and likely ensuing polarisation as increasingly evident elsewhere.