Figures
Abstract
Existing research has explored the link between nationalization of politics in the US and increasing partisan polarization. However, no study heretofore has systematically examined how different social network structures interact with increasingly nationalized partisan interactions to result in sustained partisan polarization. Results from analyses of a number of different network specifications, different network sizes, different average degrees and different nationalization levels show that the level and speed of polarization are governed by two interchangeable channels of partisan exposure — the volume of local connectivity (average degree) and the strength of the national signal (nationalization), while a comparison between a Facebook network and four theoretical networks reveal that mixing speed (algebraic connectivity) and community structure (modularity) shape the durability of polarization. Therefore, polarization is best understood as the emergent product of nationalization and connectivity, with network structure a genuine but second-order contributor whose influence is greatest when nationalization is low.
Author summary
Partisan polarization in the United States is often blamed on the “nationalization” of politics, a trend where local issues are increasingly overshadowed by national partisan conflicts. However, it remains unclear exactly how the underlying structure of our social networks interacts with these overarching nationalized signals to sustain such deep societal divides. In this study, we used computational modeling of various social networks—including a real-world Facebook structure and several theoretical models—to observe how polarization unfolds. We discovered that the speed and severity of polarization are driven primarily by two interchangeable forces: the volume of our local social connections and the intensity of the national political narrative. Interestingly, the specific architecture of a social network—such as its tightly knit communities or how efficiently information spreads—plays a secondary role. Network structure primarily influences how long polarization lasts, and its impact is greatest only when the national political signal is relatively weak. Ultimately, our findings reveal that persistent partisan divides emerge from the combination of social connectivity and nationalized politics. To address modern polarization, we must look beyond local “echo chambers” and recognize the overwhelming power of nationalized political signals.
Citation: Li J (2026) Nationalization, network structure and partisan polarization. PLOS Complex Syst 3(8): e0000121. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcsy.0000121
Editor: Hocine Cherifi, Université de Bourgogne: Universite de Bourgogne, FRANCE
Received: February 28, 2026; Accepted: July 22, 2026; Published: August 26, 2026
Copyright: © 2026 Jing Li. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Data Availability: The data set and code used are available at figshare via https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.33027863.
Funding: The author(s) received no specific funding for this work.
Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
Introduction
The rise of partisan polarization is one of the most significant political developments in the United States in recent decades. Existing research has delved into various factors that might be the source behind this phenomenon. One school of thought believes that the increasingly nationalized focus of American politics is associated with the increase in partisan polarization at the mass level. That is, as political communications traverse geographical boundaries, national political topics and agendas become increasingly more salient and important while state and local politics lose more and more of their visibility and salience and become overwhelmed by national politics [1–8]. The result is that local elections align more and more with national election results, and partisans become staunch followers of national political leaders and their increasingly extreme partisan rhetoric, and partisans as a whole become more and more divided and polarized at the mass level. That is to say that there is a general tendency for politics at different geographical or jurisdictional levels to align with each other as political life in a society moves from locally oriented to more nationally oriented.
While the way people engage in politics and the channels through which people communicate in politics becomes more national in nature and less bounded by geographical distance, communications and connections still happen through a wide variety of social networks. And it is important to examine and understand how the nationalization of political interactions differ across different network structures and the corresponding implications for the partisan polarization process. For example, it could be the case that for network with a more local structure, the polarization process could be less intense as politics move from local to national while the opposite could be true for network with less edges knitting local connections and more edges crossing local geographical boundaries. Relevant research has started to explore the role of local clustering and bridge node on the polarization process [9]. In the following, we explicitly examine how the mass partisan polarization process works through different types of network at different nationalization levels: ring network, Erdos-Renyi Random Network, small world network, and scale-free network. Nationalization level determines the extent to which partisans interact with others beyond their neighborhood and local community.
The results across a significant number of network specifications, different nationalization levels and network sizes show that the level and speed of polarization are governed by two interchangeable mechanisms of partisan exposure — the volume of local connectivity (average degree) and the strength of the national signal (nationalization) — such that abundance of either compensates for the scarcity of the other, and only the absence of both leaves a network unpolarized. Network topology thus acts as a modifier rather than a first-order control of polarization. And a comparison of the polarization process between a real world Facebook network and four theoretical networks further reveals that mixing speed (algebraic connectivity) and community structure (modularity) shape the durability of polarization. Facebook and the ring lattice networks sustain polarization because they mix slowly and are community-sealed, whereas the random graph and preferential-attachment network mix well, have low modularity and show rise-then-fall behavior. The overall conclusion is that polarization is best understood as the emergent product of nationalization and connectivity, with network structure a genuine but second-order contributor whose influence is greatest when nationalization is low.
These results speak to the importance of both network structure and the geographical scope of network connections for the rise of partisan polarization at the mass level. Previous research may have touched upon one of these two factors, but never consider the influence of both in an integrated analytical framework. Results presented in this study fill this gap and shed new lights on the structural reasons behind the rise of partisan polarization. It also helps policy makers to develop more effective measures to combat the worrying trend of increasing mass partisan polarization in a number of countries. In particular, for communities with different network structures and different level of nationalized politics, policies designed to prevent or combat mass polarization should also be tailored to the specific circumstances of the location. A one-fits-all solution will not be able to generate the desired results across a diverse set of communities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section two introduces background concepts and literature on network types and the mass partisan polarization process; section three describes our modeling framework; section fourth presents the analytical results; and section five offers conclusion and discussions.
Network structure, nationalization and mass partisan polarization
Partisan polarization in the United States is one of the most studied political phenomenon in recent decades. And it manifests in quite a few different ways. Republicans and Democrats increasingly dislike each other, a process known as affective polarization [10,11]. And they increasingly disagree on important policy topics such as immigration, climate change, abortion, LGBT rights, gun control and the size of welfare state [12,13]. This paper focuses on mass partisan ideological polarization, the increasingly divergence in ideological lining between Democrats and Republicans at the population level [14,15].
Computational modeling of polarization is rooted in opinion dynamics and cultural dissemination. [16] demonstrated that local convergence need not imply global consensus. When agents are more likely to interact with similar neighbors and then become more similar through interaction, local homogeneity can coexist with global diversity. This model is not a direct model of U.S. partisanship, but it establishes a key insight: polarization can emerge from decentralized interaction rather than from top-down coordination.
Bounded-confidence models extend this logic by allowing agents to interact only when their opinions fall within a threshold. In the Hegselmann-Krause model, agents update toward the average opinion of those within their confidence bounds [17]; in the Deffuant-Weisbuch model, randomly paired agents adjust toward one another only when their opinions are sufficiently close [18]. These models can generate consensus, multiple opinion clusters, or fragmentation depending on the confidence threshold and initial opinion distribution. They are especially useful for theorizing how exposure may fail to moderate attitudes if citizens discount sufficiently distant views.
However, bounded confidence alone explains clustering more than it explains polarization. To offer a better account of polarization, later models introduced contrast effect, negative influence, biased assimilation, or affective mechanisms. [19] modeled attitude change through assimilation, contrast, and indifference, showing how uniformity, bi-polarization, and pluralism can emerge from a small set of interaction rules. [20] showed that weak ties and small-world shortcuts do not automatically integrate a society; depending on micro-level influence assumptions, bridges can instead intensify cultural polarization. [21] demonstrated that homophily alone is insufficient to polarize a DeGroot averaging process, but homophily combined with biased assimilation can produce polarization. [22] pushed opinion dynamics toward affective and emotional mechanisms by modeling opinion change as a function of information and emotional arousal.
The network dimension of partisan polarization begins with the homophily effect. Similarity brews friendship, social and partisan networks [23]. In politics, homophily can operate through geography, religion, ethnicity, and partisan identity. Homophily matters because it changes both the information flow and the social cost of taking a particular position on a policy issue. When political disagreement is rare within a local network, out-party views are less likely to be perceived as legitimate disagreement and more likely perceived as an ideological threat. Digital platforms complicate this process. [24] found that Facebook users’ cross-cutting exposure depends on friend networks, ranking algorithms, and individual clicking choices, with social ties and user choices playing a major role. [25] showed that Twitter following networks can be used to infer ideological positions and that online political networks exhibit substantial ideological structure. Using a field experiment on Twitter, [26] found that exposure to opposing partisan elites can sometimes increase polarization rather than reduce it. These findings caution against a simple “more exposure equals more moderation” assumption. [27] further warns that the Internet alone cannot explain the full demographic pattern of rising U.S. partisan polarization.
Nationalization of politics refers to the increasing alignment of local, state, and national political behavior around the same national partisan cleavage and political agenda. In a more localized party system, state and local candidates could cultivate reputations, coalitions, and issue agendas that partially diverge from national party brands. In a nationalized political environment, local elections are increasingly interpreted through national partisan identities and conflict. [2] argues that American political behavior has become increasingly nationalized: voters’ evaluation of politics has become less anchored in local contexts and more organized around national parties, national media, and national political competition. [28] added a geographic dimension by showing that left-lining parties, including the U.S. Democratic Party, have become spatially concentrated in cities, while right-lining parties often win more efficiently across suburban, exurban, and rural constituencies. The result is not simply ideological sorting, but partisan geographical sorting [29].
Nationalization of politics can contribute to polarization through at least four mechanisms. First, uniform national cues reduce local variation. Citizens in different places receive similar elite messages, campaign framing, and partisan narratives. Second, nationalization turns the out-party into a large and morally charged national coalition rather than a set of neighbors with locally familiar interests. Third, national parties bundle policy issues into coherent partisan packages, making disagreement on one issue more likely to imply social distance across many related issues. Fourth, nationalized media and elections increase the salience of national partisan conflict even in local contests, weakening the capacity of local identities to cross-cut national party identity. In modeling terms, nationalization of politics is a parameter governing the relative weight of national versus local cues in opinion and ideological position updating.
Existing account of the link between nationalization of politics and partisan polarization is mostly descriptive and generic in nature. It lacks detailed investigation of the connections between polarization and nationalization and how nationalization of politics contribute to partisan polarization through different network structures. If individuals form and sever partisan ties based on ideological proximity or shared neighborhood, then the same national cue can have different effects on the distribution of individuals’ ideological positions depending on whether it transmits through a sparse cross-cutting network or a clustered small-world network. This paper addresses these unanswered questions from the angle of social network structure. That is, we look at how the association between nationalized politics and polarization manifests differently through different network structures. This analytical approach offers a meso-level view of how partisans’ micro-level behavior results in macro-level changes and enriches the existing literature on nationalized politics and partisan polarization.
Toward integrated modeling of nationalization, network structure, and polarization
More specifically, we examine the following network types: ring network, Erdos-Renyi random network, small-world network, and scale-free network. The ring network is a graph where nodes are arranged in a circle and connected to a fixed number of nearest neighbors. Ring network is vertex-transitive, meaning every node is structurally identical to each other, has the same number of edges, and any node can be mapped to another by a symmetry of the network. Given a ring network with fixed size, the complexity of the network can be increased by adding more edges to the network. And the network diameter scales linearly with the number of nodes. A water supply system where households are connected strictly linearly to their neighbors is a ring network in action. The Erdos-Renyi random network [30] is a network with N nodes where every possible edge exists with a fixed probability p. The network is fully defined by these two parameters: N and p. The total expected number of edges is equal to . The degree distribution follows a binomial distribution with parameters
. The clustering coefficient is equal to p. Increasing p will increase the density and connectivity of the network. A real world example is random chance-based encounter of strangers at a massive festival.
The small-world network (Watts-Strogatz model) is characterized by both high local clustering and short average path length, essentially bridging a regular lattice and a random network. It is commonly seen in social network, biological network and infrastructure network. Modeled with the Watts and Strogatz model [31], it is defined by the total number of nodes N or size of the original lattice, the neighborhood within which nodes of the network will be connected, and the rewiring probability p, the probability that an edge connecting two nodes in the regular lattice is disconnected from one end and reconnected to another randomly selected node. The scale-free network (used interchangeably with preference attachment network) is one where edges of node follow a power-law distribution. That is the network’s node degree distribution follows , where many small-degree nodes co-exist with a small number of high-degree nodes. As the scaling exponential of degree-distribution,
governs the “rich-get-richer” rule and determines how massive the power hubs become. Modeled with the Barabasi-Albert model [32], the complexity of the network increases with the number of edges initiated for each new node added to the network. Social media is a prime example of scale-free network where a handful of celebrity accounts or massive content creators hold the vast majority of all connections while most users share a tiny fraction of the network. Fig 1 visualizes the four network types.
Polarization process
For mass partisan polarization, we model it as an iterative process where in each time step, individuals of different partisanship interact with each other, and through these interactions, their ideological positions change towards either left or right of their current positions. Building upon existing models on mass partisan polarization [33–35], here we model the partisan ideological polarization process across different types of social network and different nationalization level of political interactions.
Initial state
Individuals start with ideological positions that are normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.2, and range between -1 and 1 (plugging in liberal conservative scale values from surveys such as the American National Electoral Studies as the initial ideological positions will give us substantively identical results in terms of model convergence and influence of model parameters). A value above 0 indicates a liberal Democratic position while a value below 0 indicates a conservative Republican position. Individuals are spread across networks of different types representing the social spaces they are involved in. For simplicity, we consider a community of 100 individuals with each one occupying one node in a network. Each individual’s neighborhood is the individuals that have an edge directly connecting her.
Mass partisan polarization depicts a process where individuals interact with both co-partisans and out-partisans. And as a result of these interactions, their ideological positions move either left or right of their current ideological positions. The systematic patterns in individual ideological position change over time, for example, individuals moving closer to the interlocutor’s ideological position when interacting with people within her ideological tolerance threshold and moving farther away from the interlocutor’s ideological position when interacting with people outside her ideological tolerance threshold, result in partisan ideological polarization at the mass level.
We consider three important parameters when modeling the polarization process: nationalization of partisan interactions , the extent to which communications among partisans are national in nature and increasingly involve individuals outside their social network neighborhood; tolerance threshold for ideological distance,
; and responsiveness,
. Tolerance threshold for ideological distance refers to the distance in ideological position above which a randomly selected individual moves away from the interlocutor’s ideological position when interacting and below which she moves closer to the interlocutor’s ideological position when interacting. The existence of a threshold that determines the direction of change in interpersonal interactions has been confirmed by both the bounded confidence models discussed above [17,18] and the social judgment theory on latitudes of acceptance, non-commitment and rejection [36]. A smaller tolerance threshold will intensify the polarization process as partisans are less tolerant of ideological difference. Responsiveness or step size refers to the proportion of the ideological distance a randomly selected individual moves closer to or further away from the interlocutor’s ideological position when interacting. A larger responsiveness will accelerate the polarization process as partisans make a larger ideological change in each interaction with others.
Interaction rules for polarization process
We model a polarization process where ideologically like-minded individuals become closer in their ideological positions when interacting with each other while ideologically dissimilar individuals become further apart when interacting [33]. As shown in previous studies [15,34], the more partisan interactions are online and not bounded by neighborhood proximity and geographical distance, the less face-to-face interactions and a higher level of nationalized partisan interactions and a higher exposure to salient partisan media and news contents online, the more intense the partisan polarization process becomes.
The evolution of ideological positions happen within a finite population of N agents over discrete time steps t. The population is embedded in a static network G = (V, E), where V represents the set of agents and E represents fixed structural connections (neighbors). At each step t, a randomly selected agent i interacts with its connections consisting of its neighbors and a random sample of non-neighbors. Let
be the set of neighbors of i with degree
, and let
be the set of non-neighbors, then the set of non-neighbors interacting with i is
, where
is the nationalization parameter. Then, the combined pool of interlocutors
for i is:
.
Agent i has ideological position at time t and the ideological distance between i and interlocutor j is
. If the interlocutor’s ideological position is within the tolerance threshold
, the agent is attracted; otherwise, the agent is repulsed:
[33], where is the step size or responsiveness, the fraction of the ideological distance that is reduced or increased after an interaction. In addition, if the interlocutor j is a neighbor of i (
) and is of the opposite partisanship, then, their ideological distance will be reduced a fraction based on the intergroup contact theory [37,38]. That is:
Finally, the updated ideological position is clipped to the defined domain of to determine the state at t + 1:
As an illustration, if an individual’s ideology is 0.4 and the tolerance threshold is 0.25, the actor will move closer to anyone with ideological position between 0.15 and 0.65 when interacting. If responsiveness is 0.06 and the person interacts with another person who has an ideological position of 0.6, the person will move from its current position at 0.4 to the other person’s position at 0.6, and has a new ideological position of
. If the other person has ideology 0.1, which is outside the ideological tolerance threshold, the person will move
away from the other person and has a new ideological position of
.
The nationalization parameter determines the size of interlocutors an individual interacts with that are not neighbors relative to her neighborhood size. The bigger
is, the more an individual interacts with non-neighbors online. When
, an individual interacts with the same number of non-neighbors as the number of neighbors she has; and when
, an individual only interacts with her neighbors.
, therefore, governs the relative proportion of global versus local interlocutors for each person. It does not influence the overall connection probability or interaction density while it does influence the geographical scope of information dissemination with higher
corresponding to more global rather than local information dissemination. Table 1 lists the default parameter values for the polarization process. The default values of
closely match values used in the existing literature [33]. A tolerance threshold of
is one eighth of the maximum possible ideological distance while a step size of
means 8 percent of the ideological distance between two interlocutors. We show results for N = 100, 200, 400, 800 below.
We measure polarization as the variance of ideological positions , where
is the population mean [33]. The initial polarization level is 0.04 as individuals’ starting ideological positions follow a normal distribution with standard deviation 0.2. The lowest possible polarization level is 0 when all individuals have the same ideological position and the highest possible value is 1 when half of the individuals are at the liberal extreme position of 1 and the other half are at the conservative extreme position of -1. As an example, Fig 2 shows the small world network and its distribution of ideological positions at iterations 0, 5000 and 10000 with rewiring probability 0.5 and nationalization of partisan interactions 0.5. We define convergence to polarization not as the cessation of movement in ideological position, but as the stabilization of the macroscopic variance. That is the population is said to have converged to a polarization state
at time
if, for a defined time window
and a stability threshold
:
. In simple terms: Convergence occurs when the rate of change (slope) of the polarization curve effectively flattens to zero, indicating that the forces of attraction and repulsion have reached a dynamic equilibrium.
Calibrating time in the polarization process is through the unit of agent activations called step, and we present results using the unit of iteration. In one iteration, an individual interacts once with each of her neighbors and same number of non-neighbors. Suppose an individual has one interaction with another person either online or offline in one day, and she has 8 neighbors, an iteration would roughly equal 16 days in the polarization process. And the mass partisan polarization process starts to converge after 9 years with default model parameter values (the time taken to convergence in years is for a population of 100 individuals).
Results
Simulation experiments design
To disentangle the complex interplay between network topology and information exposure mechanisms, we implemented a comprehensive set of computational experiments using a parallelized computing framework. The technical implementation was designed to execute a full factorial sweep across three primary dimensions: network topology, structural density, and the degree of nationalized partisan interactions (). For each of the four canonical network models, Erdős–Rényi (Random), Watts–Strogatz (Small-World), Barabási–Albert (Preferential Attachment), and Ring network, we vary both the network size (N, 100, 200, 400, 800) and average degree (
). And for the small world and preference attachment networks, we also vary the rewiring probability (0.01, 0.05, 0.2) and the scaling exponential of degree distribution (
) respectively. And, the nationalization parameter
(with an interval of 0.25) was varied to control the probability of agents interacting with non-neighbors outside their local neighborhood, thereby, simulating the transition from strictly local social interactions to nationalized information consumption and exchange. To ensure valid comparison, all analytical scenarios for each network type have identical initial network distribution of partisanship and ideological positions. And to isolate the relationship between network topology and polarization, we only make comparisons between different networks with identical network size and average degree. To ensure statistical robustness against stochastic initialization effects and randomness, for each unique parameter combination, 20 independent runs were executed and presented results below are means over these 20 runs.
Results
Figs 3–9 present results for seven network specifications (Ring Lattice, Random Graph, Preferential Attachment at = 1.0 and
= 1.5, and Small World at rewiring probabilities of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.2) crossed with four network sizes (N = 100, 200, 400, 800 agents) and four average degree (
). Each pane in the figures is a vertical stack of four panels corresponding to the four nationalization levels of partisan interaction, ranging from 0.25 at the top to 1.0 at the bottom at an interval of 0.25. Within every panel the horizontal axis is the simulation iteration and the vertical axis is ideological polarization, measured as the variance of individual ideological positions. The four colored trajectories in each panel correspond to average node degree
respectively. One thing worth noting is that the time axis is not fixed across different network sizes — it runs to roughly 10,000 iterations for N = 100 and 80,000 for N = 800 — because the time taken for convergence to polarization scales with network size (about 100 iterations for each agent), so number of iteration per agent is approximately the same across networks of different size.
Across all topologies, polarization rises monotonically toward a saturating plateau; average degree is the dominant within-panel driver, with = 20 reaching the ceiling rapidly and
= 5 remaining low unless nationalization is high. Rising nationalization both accelerates the convergence to polarization and “rescues” sparse networks, lowering the degree needed for full polarization.
Average degree remains the dominant within-panel driver, while rising nationalization accelerates the convergence to polarization, “rescues” sparse networks and lowers the degree needed for full polarization.
Average degree is the dominant within-panel driver, while rising nationalization accelerates the convergence to polarization, “rescues” sparse networks and lowers the degree needed for full polarization.
Average degree is the dominant within-panel driver, while rising nationalization accelerates the convergence to polarization, “rescues” sparse networks and lowers the degree needed for full polarization.
Average degree is the dominant within-panel driver, while rising nationalization accelerates the convergence to polarization, “rescues” sparse networks and lowers the degree needed for full polarization.
Average degree remains the dominant within-panel driver, while rising nationalization accelerates the convergence to polarization, “rescues” sparse networks and lowers the degree needed for full polarization.
Average degree remains the dominant within-panel driver, while rising nationalization accelerates the convergence to polarization, “rescues” sparse networks and lowers the degree needed for full polarization. Polarization for low-degree networks are visibly suppressed.
Across all seven network specifications, patterns of the polarization process are consistent: polarization rises monotonically from an unpolarized state and saturates toward an upper plateau, with no meaningful non-monotonicity along the way. The trajectories differ from one another in two ways: how fast they converge and how high a polarization level they reach. The single most powerful within-panel contributor to polarization is average degree. In every figure the = 20 curve (black) climbs fastest and settles near the maximum, while lower-degree curves are progressively slower and lower, with
= 5 (orange) frequently remaining almost flat at low polarization over the entire time frame. Denser partisan interaction thus accelerates and intensifies polarization uniformly regardless of how the edges are arranged. This ordering by degree is preserved in every network type and at every network size, which is the clearest evidence that connectivity volume is a first-order control on the polarization dynamics.
Nationalization is the second major axis, read by moving down the four panels of any single figure, and its effect is both to amplify polarization and — more interestingly — to compensate for sparse connectivity. At the lowest nationalization level (0.25, top panel) only the densest networks polarize fully: the high-degree curves reach the ceiling while = 5 and often
= 10 stall at low values and effectively never polarize within the observation window. As nationalization increases toward 1.0 (bottom panel), the sparse-network curves are progressively “rescued,” so that by full nationalization even
= 5 climbs to near-complete polarization, just more slowly than the denser networks. This is the central interaction visible throughout the atlas of scenarios: the marginal effect of nationalization is largest precisely where structural connectivity is weakest, and equivalently the degree threshold required to reach full polarization falls as nationalization of partisan interactions rises. Structural density and nationalization behave as partial substitutes — two channels through which cross-cutting partisan exposure is provided — such that abundance of either one is sufficient to push the system to a polarized state, while only the joint scarcity of both (low degree and low nationalization) leaves a network in an unpolarized state.
The contrasts between network types are more subtle than the degree and nationalization effects. The ring Lattice and the three small world specifications are nearly indistinguishable from one another, and as rewiring probability does not change the number of edges, increasing the small-world rewiring probability from 0.01 to 0.2 produces only a mild acceleration in polarization, most visible for intermediate density = 10 network at low nationalization, which converges to polarization somewhat sooner as more long-range shortcut edges are introduced. In other words, injecting a modest number of random bridges into a clustered lattice nudges the timing of polarization without changing its eventual polarization level or regime. The Random Graph behaves similarly to these clustered topologies at the plateau but tends to move upward a little faster with intermediate density, consistent with its shorter path lengths spreading influence more efficiently.
The most consequential structural distinction is preferential attachment, and specifically the degree-distribution exponential controlled by . Both preferential-attachment networks reach high polarization at high degree, but at low-degrees, the rise towards polarization is visibly suppressed relative to the homogeneous networks, and this suppression is stronger at
= 1.5 than at
= 1.0. Under the steeper
= 1.5 exponential, the
= 5 trajectory remains pinned near its low starting polarization level across the lower nationalization levels and only begins to climb once nationalization is high, and even the converged polarization level is marginally lower and noisier than the lattice-based networks. The mechanism at work is that a heavy-tailed degree distribution concentrates edges on a small set of hubs and leaves a large periphery of poorly connected nodes; that periphery resists polarization unless nationalization is strong enough to compensate for its missing local connectivity. Degree heterogeneity, not just mean degree, therefore, shapes the aggregate outcome — the same average connectivity distributed more unequally yields less complete polarization at low nationalization.
Finally, the four different network sizes establish that patterns discussed above are robust to scale rather than artifacts of a particular N. Comparing polarization of N = 100 to that of N = 800 for any network type, the ordering of polarization trajectories by average degree, the downward shift of the degree threshold for polarization with rising nationalization, and the network type-specific contrasts are all reproduced. Network size affects two things only: smaller networks produce noisier, more jagged trajectories, especially near the saturated ceiling where finite-population fluctuations are visible, and the absolute time-to-convergence grows with N with the scaled iteration budget. Larger networks simply render the same dynamics more smoothly and over a longer nominal time horizon.
Taken together, results shown here provide a coherent picture. Convergence to heightened partisan polarization is governed jointly by how densely and how nationally agents interact, with network topology acting as a modifier rather than a primary cause. Connectivity volume and nationalization are the two dominant, and partially interchangeable forces; clustering and the presence of long-range ties (the ring lattice/small-world axis) matter mainly for the timing of polarization; and the one structural feature that genuinely alters the polarization level is degree inequality, through the large, resistant periphery that scale-free wiring creates. Figs 10–13 directly show the time taken in iterations to reach convergence to polarization for each analytical scenario and further confirm the patterns identified from the corresponding polarization trajectories (results for small world networks with rewiring probability 0.05 are shown in S1 Fig in the supporting information). The consistency of the patterns across four network sizes lends the findings the scale-robustness expected of a general result.
The patterns are consistent with what have been shown in the corresponding polarization trajectories: nationalization of partisan interactions and network density, i.e., average degree are the two dominant mechanisms determining convergence to polarization.
The patterns are consistent with what have been shown in the corresponding polarization trajectories: nationalization of partisan interactions and network density, i.e., average degree are the two dominant mechanisms determining convergence to polarization.
The patterns are consistent with what have been shown in the corresponding polarization trajectories: nationalization of partisan interactions and network density, i.e., average degree are the two dominant mechanisms determining convergence to polarization.
The patterns are consistent with what have been shown in the corresponding polarization trajectories: nationalization of partisan interactions and network density, i.e., average degree are the two dominant mechanisms determining convergence to polarization.
Comparison with a real world network
Analyses above focus purely on theoretical networks, it is worthwhile to investigate how real world network can function differently from them. Here, we make use of a Facebook network [39] that exemplifies a social media network. The network has 1034 nodes and average degree of 103.5, while the average path length is 2.95 and the diameter is 9. Fig 14 shows the degree distribution of the network, which indicates a power law distribution of connections. Then we run the partisan polarization process on this network and compare its polarization trajectory with those of four theoretical networks that have the same network size and average degree. The initial distribution of both partisanship and ideology is identical across the Facebook network and the theoretical ones. The only difference is how the distributions are spread across the different network structures. Fig 15 shows the partisan polarization process under different nationalization levels for these networks. We can observe that the Facebook network converges slower to polarization than the ring lattice and small world network with rewiring probability 0.05 and random graph in most scenarios. The exception is when nationalization level is 0.25, there is a drop in polarization for the random graph. The preference attachment network with degree distribution exponential 1 always shows a rise-then-fall phenomenon and mostly significantly at low nationalization level.
The shape resembles a power law distribution.
The Facebook network converges slower to polarization than the ring lattice, the small world network with rewiring probability 0.05 and the random graph in most scenarios. When nationalization level is 0.25, there is a drop in polarization level for the random graph. The preference attachment network with degree distribution exponential 1 always shows a rise-then-fall phenomenon.
Table 2 shows the modularity, algebraic connectivity and retention rate of the five networks. Modularity describes the degree to which a network can be partitioned into a set of cohesive and tightly knit communities with sparse connections between them. Algebraic connectivity is the second smallest eigenvalue of the normalized Laplacian matrix
, where A is the adjacency matrix and D is the degree matrix of the network. It indicates the speed at which a network converges to a consensus. Retention rate is the ratio between the final polarization level and the peak level, indicating how much polarization is maintained after convergence. We can observe that the networks that sustain polarization most are those that have low algebraic connectivity and high modularity - Facebook (
0.02, modularity 0.54, only 6 percent edges crossing communities) and the ring lattice (
0.004, modularity 0.77) — whereas the random graph and preferential-attachment network (
0.73, modularity 0.11, about 76 percent of edges crossing communities) have the most drop in polarization after rising to the peak. Preferential attachment’s rise-then-fall pattern and relatively low retention rate is explained by its combination of high algebraic connectivity and low modularity.
Conclusion and discussions
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that systematically investigates the interaction of network structure and nationalization of partisan interactions on the formation and retention of partisan polarization. The results help to disentangle the distinct influence of these two factors on polarization such that we have a clear sense of how these two independently and/or combine together to shape the trajectory of a polarization process. We also attempt to examine the difference between theoretical network types and real world social media network in forming and maintaining polarization under different nationalization levels.
The analytical results give a clear picture of the particular ways nationalization and network structure interact to shape the rise and development of partisan polarization. The polarization trajectories across four different network sizes, four different average degrees, seven different network specifications, and four nationalization levels unambiguously show that the level and speed of polarization are governed overwhelmingly by two interchangeable channels of partisan exposure — the volume of local connectivity (average degree) and the strength of the national signal (nationalization) — such that abundance of either compensates for scarcity of the other, and only their joint absence leaves a network unpolarized. Network topology acts as a modifier rather than a first-order control of polarization: small-world rewiring is essentially inert, the ring and random graph families are nearly interchangeable, while the one structural feature that visibly shifts the outcome is degree inequality — heavy-tailed preferential-attachment wiring, especially at high degree distribution exponential , suppresses polarization by leaving a large under-connected periphery.
The comparison of a real world Facebook network and the four theoretical ones shows that retention of polarization — the fraction of peak polarization a network holds onto — correlates strongly with low algebraic connectivity and high modularity, which is not in tension with patterns of the polarization trajectories. Local connectivity and nationalization determine how far and how quickly polarization builds while mixing speed (algebraic connectivity) and community structure (modularity) shape durability — whether polarization, once reached, is sustained against the homogenizing pull of cross-community averaging, which is what the retention rate captures. Facebook and the ring lattice networks sustain polarization best because they mix slowly and are community-sealed, whereas the well-mixed random graph and preferential-attachment networks show most visible rise-then-fall; preferential attachment’s low retention in particular is attributable to the mixing-and-modularity deficit.
A consistent pattern among all results above is that when partisan interaction is strongly nationalized, network structure scarcely matters — a sufficiently nationalized environment drives networks of very different structure to the same polarized equilibrium. It is only under weak nationalization that topology asserts itself, and even then it does so at the margin: local connectivity determines the reach of polarization while community sealing preserves it once formed. Real-world polarization is thus better understood as an emergent product of nationalization and connectivity, with network structure a genuine but second-order control whose influence is greatest exactly when the national political signal is weakest.
A direct implication of this result is that social media platform tweaks — reshuffling news feeds, injecting cross-cutting ties, promoting “bridging” content — will have little impact if partisan interactions remain strongly nationalized. To the extent that stakeholders (media organizations, platform designers, civic institutions, party actors) can shift salience back toward local and issue-specific stakes rather than a single national partisan axis, they are changing the variable that matters most. And because community sealing governs whether polarization endures, increasing the fraction of edges that genuinely cross communities is the structural change most likely to let polarization dissipate rather than lock in. Practically, this gives social media platforms and researchers concrete, auditable metrics — cross-community edge fraction, modularity — to monitor and evaluate interventions against. And it cautions policymakers against over-investing in structural fixes during periods of intense nationalization when these measures are expected to be least effective. Empirical networks and randomized structural or salience interventions can also be used to enhance the current findings.
There are many directions in which future research can build upon this study. First, rather than relying on five networks only, future work could generate an ensemble of networks that varies in modularity, clustering, and degree heterogeneity, which would enable us to more systematically estimate the structure-to-retention relationship and disentangle the influence of mixing speed from that of community sealing. Second, recording per-node ideology snapshots and decomposing total polarization into within- versus between-community components over time would show whether Facebook and ring lattice’s durability really comes from between-community variance being locked in. Third, the finding that network topology matters mainly under weak nationalization invites a systematic interaction analysis that analyzes the structure-retention relationship separately at each nationalization level, or treats nationalization as a moderator in a fitted model, which would corroborate the “structure asserts itself only when the national signal is weak” finding. Moreover, comparing empirical social, organizational, and geographic networks that differ in observed modularity and degree inequality helps to test whether the network dynamics uncovered here generalize to real world social and political issues. Finally, different measures of partisan polarization can be tested to further enhance the robustness of current findings.
Supporting information
S1 Fig. Convergence time for small world network with rewiring probability 0.05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcsy.0000121.s001
(PDF)
Acknowledgments
I thank the reviewers and Wendy K Tam for helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.
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