Abstract
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 in the aftermath of Partition, has long been an emblem of robust transboundary water cooperation between India and Pakistan. It survived wars and recurring conflict through its well-organised allocation of the Indus River system. In April 2025, however, India placed the treaty “in abeyance” following a fatal terrorist attack in Pahalgam. The IWT is therefore no longer a purely technical accord. It has become a source of geopolitical bargaining power, national identity, and rhetorical securitisation. This essay explores the treaty’s image in the public imagination through academic commentary, political discourse, and media reporting, including critical voices within Pakistan that question the treaty’s equity and long-term sustainability. It traces a transition from stability to apparent vulnerability under the combined pressures of climate change, population growth, and mounting bilateral tension. The analysis identifies points of convergence, such as the treaty’s underused ecological and adaptive governance provisions, and points of divergence, such as competing framings of “water terrorism” and strategic necessity. A dedicated section asks whether the treaty’s fixed allocations can survive climate change. The essay closes with three targeted recommendations and examines whether the IWT can move beyond coercion to help create common regional futures.
Citation: Nagabhatla N, Manhas NS (2026) Indus Waters Treaty in the public discourse: Politics, media, and academia. PLOS Water 5(8): e0000602. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pwat.0000602
Editor: Richard Meissner, University of South Africa, SOUTH AFRICA
Published: August 6, 2026
Copyright: © 2026 Nagabhatla, Manhas. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors received no specific funding for this work.
Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
Introduction
Transboundary water governance is one of the most intractable dilemmas in international relations, especially in areas where hostility has persisted over time and where the natural and political environments are delicate. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is the clearest example of this dilemma. Brokered by the World Bank, the treaty was signed by India and Pakistan on 19 September 1960. It divided the waters of the Indus River basin—a lifeline for South Asian agriculture, energy production, and livelihoods—in the turbulent aftermath of the 1947 Partition [1]. The treaty assigned about 80 per cent of the basin’s flows to Pakistan through exclusive rights over the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab). The eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) went to India. The treaty also created the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) and a graduated dispute-resolution procedure to encourage technical cooperation. It has endured wars, territorial conflicts, and infrastructure problems over the past six decades, including arbitrated negotiations over the Baglihar (2007) and Kishanganga (2013) projects, thereby highlighting the importance of cooperation despite an otherwise hostile bilateral relationship [2].
The treaty’s strength is now under unprecedented pressure. On 22 April 2025, a terrorist attack at Pahalgam in Kashmir killed 26 civilians. Within a day, India announced that the IWT would be held “in abeyance”—the first such step in the treaty’s history. New Delhi invoked national security and the principle of a “fundamental change of circumstances” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) [3]. The abeyance froze bilateral meetings, data exchanges, and routine water releases. It signalled a deliberate linkage of hydrology to counterterrorism policy. Climate change adds a further layer of stress: Himalayan glaciers are projected to reduce river flows by 30–40 per cent by mid-century, and the basin hosts the world’s second-most overstressed aquifer [4]. In this charged setting, each side has accused the other of “water terrorism”, and rhetoric has at times extended to threats of military, even nuclear, retaliation.
Our key argument is straightforward. The 2025 abeyance has recast the IWT in the public mind as a frail relic of Cold War diplomacy—one that can be securitised and turned to unilateral ends. A closer reading of academic, political, and media discourses suggests otherwise. The IWT can, and should, be developed into a dynamic framework for adaptive and climate-resilient governance. Far from making “water wars” inevitable, its underused provisions—Articles IV, VI, VII, and VIII on ecological integrity, data sharing, and mutual consultation—offer avenues to reduce coercion and to commit to shared basin sustainability [4,5]. The essay proceeds chronologically. It then maps convergences across discourses (such as depoliticisation appeals by the Stimson Center) and divergences (such as Indian framings of “Nehru’s folly” versus Pakistani framings of existential threat). Comparisons are drawn with adaptive arrangements in the Nile and Senegal basins. The conclusion is that only inclusive dialogue and environmental stewardship can reframe the IWT to protect regional stability for the more than 300 million people who depend on the basin [5]. In doing so, the essay combines scholarly rigour with policy advocacy, and it invites stakeholders to turn crisis into opportunity in an age of increasing hydrological uncertainty.
Historical overview: A timeline of key events
The IWT grew out of the 1947 Partition of British India, which split the Indus basin between the two new states and made an allocation of resources urgent for irrigation and economic stability. The Indus and its tributaries—Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—are central to agriculture in the fertile plains of Punjab and Sindh. Disputes arose immediately because canals essential to Pakistan depended on headworks located in India. In 1948, India briefly suspended water supply to Pakistan; international pressure led to its resumption [6].
Negotiations mediated by the World Bank began in 1952 and concluded with the treaty’s signature nine years later. The pact created the Permanent Indus Commission, comprising representatives of both countries, to support implementation and technical cooperation. It also provided for neutral experts and international arbitration on unresolved matters. The early decades were broadly stable. Both countries built major infrastructure—the Tarbela and Mangla dams in Pakistan, and the Bhakra-Nangal facility in India—much of it financed by the World Bank [7].
Disputes nevertheless emerged. In the 1980s, Pakistan protested India’s Wullar barrage on the Jhelum as a breach of storage limits; following bilateral negotiations, India scaled the project back in 1987. In the early 2000s, the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab drew criticism over its design and spillway gates, which Pakistan argued gave India too much control [8]. A World Bank–appointed Neutral Expert upheld the project in 2007 with minor modifications—the first significant application of the dispute process. The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project went further, to international arbitration. In 2013, the tribunal allowed India to proceed but mandated minimum downstream flows [9].
Climatic stress and hydro-diplomatic dynamics have since reshaped the treaty’s operation. Accelerating glacier melt and increasingly volatile flows strain its fixed allocations, while political mistrust limits the PIC’s effectiveness in data sharing and joint monitoring. The 2016 Uri crisis revealed the risks of securitisation, when India first signalled that the treaty could be put on hold. Adherence to core principles nonetheless preserved the treaty’s integrity until 2025. Calls for reform—to respond to environmental change and demographic growth—remain stuck in geopolitical sparring, leaving the IWT poised between collaboration and competition over an indispensable lifeline [10].
IWT in abeyance
The terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, which resulted in 26 civilian deaths, prompted India to take an unprecedented step by suspending the Indus Waters Treaty. India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri announced this decision the following day, framing it as a move driven by national security concerns. Unlike on previous occasions, India acted decisively: it declared the IWT temporarily suspended, halted technical talks with Pakistan, and stated explicitly that commission meetings would not occur. This was the first time in the treaty’s history that its activities were deliberately paused in response to terrorism [10,11]. The suspension represents both continuity—since terrorism has consistently destabilized India-Pakistan water relations—and change, as the April 2025 attack marked a departure from the tradition of keeping the Treaty neutral and apolitical. Overall, the history of the IWT reflects a shift from resilience to vulnerability, with the current suspension deepening water governance concerns within the region’s security landscape [12].
This move marked a departure from India’s previous responses to terrorist attacks—such as the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama incidents—where India threatened to withdraw from the IWT but continued to follow its provisions. The suspension signalled a shift toward directly linking the treaty’s operational status to the bilateral security situation and Pakistan’s behaviour. The Indian government’s language also invoked principles of international law, such as a “fundamental change of circumstances” or breach of good faith, to justify the step [10,11].
Furthermore, India did not wait to move from declarations to concrete actions. It stopped water flow on occasion—for example, by not releasing water into the Chenab from the Baglihar Dam—and sought to increase storage by flushing reservoirs without notice. Both actions deviated from the procedures outlined in the treaty. At the same time, India announced major water infrastructure projects, including expanded canal networks and large-scale hydropower plants, to divert rivers mainly allocated to Pakistan, signalling a strategic withholding of river flow [13].
Academic and expert perspectives
A significant recent contribution is the 2025 article “Can the Indus Waters Treaty Survive India–Pakistan Tensions?”, published in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies (online 12 August 2025). The paper notes that the IWT’s three-tier dispute resolution system—the Permanent Indus Commission, the Neutral Expert (NE), and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)—has traditionally insulated water issues from broader geopolitical conflict. India’s suspension of the treaty on April 23, 2025, following the Pahalgam attack, it argues, amounts to a “political and hydrological earthquake” that challenges the treaty’s fundamental goodwill clause [8,10].
Drawing on historical analogies such as the 1948 water cutoff and the World Bank–mediated negotiations, the authors revisit the 80–20 allocation between the western and eastern rivers and its implications for Pakistan’s lower-riparian position [11]. Today’s pressures, they argue, were unforeseen at signature: a 2015 NASA assessment ranked the basin’s aquifer as the world’s second most overstressed, and Himalayan glacial melt is projected to cut flows by 30–40 per cent after 2050. The paper asks whether India’s move is a temporary “strategic pause” rather than a termination, and weighs it against VCLT Articles 60 and 62 while the treaty remains in force [10]. It warns against unilateral actions that undermine “equitable and reasonable utilization” under the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. The treaty’s record of resolving disputes—such as Baglihar in 2007, also discussed in Amit Ranjan’s 2025 South Asia Research analysis—remains notable. Yet challenges persist: India draws only about 95% of its eastern-river share owing to Punjab-Haryana over-extraction, while Pakistan faces glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) and intensifying heat waves [14].
The Stimson Center’s narrative emphasizes that India and Pakistan should strengthen the Indus Waters Treaty by advocating for depoliticization. It notes that internal mismanagement, not the treaty, accounts for about half of the water shortages expected by 2030, and it situates the dispute within a stark demographic shift: India’s population, roughly 1.46 billion, has tripled since 1960 [15]. The Clingendael Institute’s July 25, 2025, commentary, “Indus Water Treaty 2025: A Pause of Cooperation, Not an End,” echoes Round Table analysis by attributing the suspension to global distractions like U.S.-China tensions. It dismisses Pakistan’s 2016 PCA pivot on Kishanganga (330 MW, 2018) and Rattle (850 MW) projects as unreasonable and praises the PCA’s June 30, 2025, supplemental award, which affirms jurisdiction and rejects unilateral suspension [3].
The Vision IAS reports of February and May 2025 reaffirm India’s Neutral Expert stance of January 2025. A CSIS brief of May 2025, “Can India Cut Off Pakistan’s Indus River Lifeline?”, similarly warns against volatility: India’s limited storage capacity rules out immediate weaponization, but data-sharing stoppages could hurt Pakistan during the monsoon season [16]. The Round Table paper goes further than most. It argues that the IWT’s water-sharing approach lacks the flexibility now required, particularly as the Kashmir dispute shows no sign of resolution. Unless renegotiated, it warns, the treaty’s inflexibility—with no sustainability, environmental, or climate clauses—could lead directly to “water wars” in a basin supplying roughly 300 million people, where flows already declined about 5% between 1962 and 2014 [3]. Scholars from ORF (2023) and the Round Table authors thus portray the suspension consistently: not as an end in itself, but as a coercive tool for revision—one carrying significant security implications if bilateral talks, as reaffirmed by the World Bank in April 2025, fail to adapt to evolving realities.
Domestic critiques within Pakistan
The discourse inside Pakistan is not monolithic. Alongside the official narrative that defends the treaty as a guarantee of lower-riparian rights, a notable strand of domestic and critical scholarship questions the IWT itself. This literature offers an extensive account of such critiques, which cluster around three concerns [17–19]. The first is equity. Critics argue that the 1960 settlement permanently traded away Pakistan’s rights over the eastern rivers in exchange for transitional works and financing. By displacing customary principles of equitable utilization, the treaty also left Pakistan with little recourse beyond its own objection mechanisms, structurally dependent on three western rivers whose headwaters lie in Indian-administered territory [19]. The second is sovereignty. Commentators contend that the treaty entrenches India’s physical control over headworks and project design on the western rivers. Every Indian run-of-the-river project—from Baglihar to Kishanganga and Ratle—therefore becomes a contest over cumulative storage, pondage, and timing rather than a settled entitlement [20,21,18]. The third concern is environmental change. Pakistani scholars increasingly question whether a fixed division negotiated for mid-twentieth-century hydrology can remain sustainable amid glacial retreat, erratic monsoons, and severe groundwater depletion in Punjab and Sindh [17].
Provincial politics sharpen these critiques. Sindh-based commentary, in particular, links the treaty debate to long-standing grievances over upstream canal development and inter-provincial allocation, framing the IWT as one layer of a wider distributive injustice. Engaging these perspectives matters for this essay’s argument in two ways. It shows that the demand to revisit the treaty is not solely an Indian position; questions of fairness and long-term sustainability are being raised within Pakistan as well. It also implies that any future renegotiation or modernization will need to answer domestic equity and sustainability concerns on both sides of the border, not merely rebalance entitlements between the two states [17,19].
Political narratives
Political narratives around the IWT have shifted from cautious cooperation to weaponization. Stories in 2024–2025 increasingly portrayed water as a strategic resource tied to security, terrorism, and border issues. In India, the BJP government’s stance has hardened: the treaty is portrayed as an unfair, outdated concession imposed during Jawaharlal Nehru’s era, made more untenable by rising cross-border threats. After the April 22, 2025, attack in Pahalgam—claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF), an affiliate of Lashkar-e-Taiba—Prime Minister Narendra Modi recalled the 2016 Uri attack and again invoked the phrase “Blood and water cannot flow together.” The treaty was placed in abeyance on April 23. Indian officials cited Pakistan’s conduct, framed as state-sponsored terrorism, as a material breach under the VCLT [22].
On June 21, 2025, in an interview with the Times of India, Home Minister Amit Shah announced that India would “never restore” the IWT and would use the waters freely, insisting that “not even a drop” would flow to Pakistan. He described the suspension as a “peaceful response” to Pakistan’s intransigence, citing projects like the Shahpurkandi Dam (completed in 2024 on the Ravi) and the Ujh Dam. This story gained traction after the 2023 amendment notice, with The Times of India reporting in August 2025 that JP Nadda criticized Nehru for the “magnanimous” 80–20 division, framing Modi’s emphasis on India’s current needs—a population of 1.46 billion and hydropower requirements for clean energy. Through the Ministry of External Affairs, Indian authorities justified halting PIC meetings and data sharing, claiming that Pakistan’s PCA pivot conflicted with the treaty’s graduated resolution approach, while pointing to India’s own humanitarian data sharing during the 2025 floods [23,24]. Pakistan’s counter-narrative labels India’s actions as “water terrorism” and an existential threat; its National Security Committee (NSC) on April 24, 2025, described the suspension as a “unilateral, unjust, and act of war,” citing UN resolutions related to Kashmir and threatening reciprocal measures, potentially including suspension of the 1972 Simla Agreement [25].
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, in August 2025, declared that India “won’t snatch even one drop,” echoing remarks made by former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari in June-August 2025 regarding control over “all six rivers” or potential conflict if water flows are cut. These statements were linked to Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus for some 80 per cent of its agriculture and a third of its hydropower. General Munir’s remarks on August 10, 2025, in Tampa—that Indian dams could be destroyed with “ten missiles” and that the Indus is not India’s “family property”—added a nuclear undertone [26]. In September 2025, the Pakistan Foreign Office condemned India’s decision not to share telemetry data as an “act of bad faith” and a violation, while still under suspension, urging India to share data through the IWT mechanism. This rhetoric, also heard during Sindh protests against federal canal plans, portrays India as an aggressive upper riparian violating customary law. Commentators like Ahmer Bilal Soofi explain that there is no provision for unilateral suspension [20]. Broader geopolitical readings widen the lens further: some point to China, whose 1963 border settlement with Pakistan bears on water flows, while Indian commentators such as Uttam Sinha, in his 2025 work Trial By Water, trace Mao Zedong’s influence on the IWT’s early negotiating tilt [27].
Trump’s intervention in May 2025 aimed at establishing a ceasefire, along with his September 2025 Truth Social post mourning India’s “loss” to China, highlight U.S. concerns about escalation. Pakistani media outlets like Dawn (September 2025) [28], see the IWT as a test of global stability, while Indian outlets such as The Pioneer focus on Mao’s role in creating such imbalances. These contrasting framings—India exercising “protective sovereignty” versus Pakistan fighting for sovereign survival—have become the dominant conflict narratives [29]. India’s plan to expand the Ranbir Canal on the Chenab, diverting up to 150 cubic metres per second, illustrates the stakes, although officials note that India’s limited storage rules out immediate humanitarian harm (Reuters, May 2025) [30].
Media analysis
Media reporting on the IWT in 2024–2025 was heavily shaped by sensationalism, selective storytelling, and geopolitical imagination, which amplified tensions and played to national audiences at the expense of accuracy. Indian newspapers such as The Times of India and The Economic Times treated the September 2024 amendment notice and the April 2025 suspension as moments of triumphal nationalism. Headlines included “India Issues Formal Notice for Changes” and “Not a Drop to Pakistan.” Editorials praised Modi’s “blood and water” line as a fitting response to Pahalgam. The legal complications under the VCLT received little scrutiny. Nor did the demographic frame: India’s population has grown from about 450 million in 1960 to roughly 1.4 billion today [31,32]. The New Indian Express (September 5, 2025) highlighted humanitarian data-sharing during floods as evidence of India’s restraint, presenting the suspension as a “strategic pause” to renegotiate [33].
Indian coverage leaned on the historical register of loss (“Nehru’s folly”) and the success of Shahpurkandi (operational in 2024) as proof of India reclaiming its share, even with the PCA’s June 2025 award still contested. Pakistani media, however, described India’s actions as “water terrorism” and threats to their existence, with Dawn (September 2025) questioning “Why the Indus Waters Treaty Matters Globally” and warning of potential food crises in Punjab and Sindh, where 80% of agriculture depends on the Indus [34]. They also continued highlighting threats like Munir’s “ten missiles,” which raise concerns about nuclear escalation. Geo News (September 5, 2025) and Arab News Pakistan repeated Bhutto-Zardari’s war threats, alleged “illegal” Indian activities, called for UN intervention, and aired visuals of dry Chenab beds after diversions. Coverage tied these issues to Kashmir and framed the IWT as a wrongful relic of Partition, a framing intensified by India’s 2019 revocation of Article 370. Headlines like “Will India and Pakistan Go to War Over Water?” appeared in the New York Times (June 16), the Guardian (February 21), NBC (August 22), and other major outlets worldwide [35].
International media coverage was somewhat more nuanced but still leaned toward sensationalism: Reuters (May 16, 2025) — “Exclusive: India’s New Canal Plan in Divisive Kashmir Would Cut Pakistan Water,” citing sources on Modi-ordered Chenab projects; Al Jazeera (April 24 and July 9, 2025) [36], — “Can India Stop Pakistan’s River Water — And Will It Spark a New War?”, discussing experts including Abid Hussain [36], on Pakistan’s acute water vulnerability and UN water norms. NPR (July 8, 2025) focused on Pakistan’s struggles, with farmers calling the Indus their “lifeline” amid shrinking glaciers, blaming India for “weaponizing water.” The Diplomat (May 9, 2025) examined suspension’s “uncharted territories,” warning of humanitarian crises like failing 2025 monsoons, while Clingendael (July 17, 2025) described it as a “quake” driven by global distractions [21]. Social media reflected the same divide. Indian users celebrated a “reclamation of rivers”; Pakistani users condemned the Chenab diversions as violations. A Visegrád 24 post on the suspension (April 23, 2025) drew over 5,000 likes and predicted a “Pakistan water scarcity crisis.” Flood coverage rose sharply after Pahalgam (e.g., BBC, April 25, 2025, on a “freeze threatening Pakistan”). The 2025 floods then reinforced entrenched narratives: Pakistan’s Foreign Office (September 6, 2025) accused India of worsening downstream damage through incomplete data sharing and called it an “act of war.” Outlets such as Bloomberg (May 27, 2025) reported tensions at a “new low”, urged World Bank mediation, and projected a 50% water deficit by 2030. According to the Stimson Centre (2024), such echo chambers foster distrust, hindering cooperative efforts to improve climate resilience [8–10].
Points of convergence and divergence
Several convergences emerge across academic, political, and media discourses. All stakeholders acknowledge the treaty’s historical resilience through mechanisms such as the PIC, the Neutral Expert, and the PCA. Yet the rigidity of the arrangement amid climate stressors—glacial melt projections, and the basin’s status as home to the world’s second-most overstressed aquifer—remains under-examined in every discourse. The case for depoliticization also persists: activating underutilized articles on ecological integrity, data sharing, and adaptive governance could avert water crises affecting millions. The political narratives, meanwhile, converge in their securitization of water as leverage. India frames the suspension as a “fundamental change of circumstances” in response to terrorism; Pakistan answers with “water terrorism”, UN resolutions, and escalatory, even nuclear, rhetoric. Both framings converge on exaggeration and often sideline technical nuance [37].
Divergent narratives sharpen existing tensions, and convergence pathways underscore the treaty’s dormant potential for climate-resilient cooperation, while divergences—India’s unilateralism versus Pakistan’s retaliation—risk coercion over dialogue, necessitating forward-looking recalibration for shared futures [38].
The Treaty has endured multiple wars and geopolitical tensions through its structured allocation mechanisms—demonstrating transboundary cooperation’s viability amid bilateral hostility. No viable alternative exists to Indus basin cooperation; India and Pakistan must re-engage to modernize the treaty or forge a new adaptive framework addressing glacial melt, aquifer depletion, and millions of livelihoods [39]. The convergence narratives, though nascent, strategically advocate regional thinking for de-escalation—transforming coercion into shared climate-resilient governance and pre-empting “water crises led conflict” in this over-stressed basin.
Climate change and the Treaty’s survivability
The IWT’s deepest vulnerability is not political but hydrological. The treaty divides rivers, not risk. Its core bargain assigns whole river systems to each party on the basis of mid-twentieth-century flow records, and it contains no climate clause, no environmental-flow standard, no drought-sharing formula, and no reference to groundwater. The drafters assumed a broadly stationary hydrology. Climate change removes that assumption, and it does so on three fronts at once.
The first front is supply. The basin draws an unusually large share of its flow from snow and glacier melt. The Himalayan and Karakoram glaciers feeding the Indus are projected to pass “peak water” around mid-century, after which flows could decline by 30–40 per cent [4]. The second front is timing. Warming shifts the melt season earlier in the year, so peak flows arrive before the main kharif sowing window and recede when crops need water most. Volatility also rises: the basin now oscillates between glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) and prolonged dry spells, as the devastating 2025 monsoon floods illustrated. The third front is demand. The basin’s population has roughly tripled since 1960, and farmers on both sides increasingly pump groundwater to buffer surface variability—the very behaviour that led NASA in 2015 to rank the Indus aquifer as the world’s second most overstressed [15].
Can the allocations themselves survive these pressures? The river-wise split has a paradoxical resilience: because the treaty assigns rivers rather than volumes, shrinking totals do not technically breach any quota. But this is precisely the problem. The design transfers virtually all scarcity risk downstream to Pakistan, whose entitlement to the western rivers is an entitlement to whatever happens to flow in them. As absolute flows decline, paper rights and wet water diverge. Meanwhile, the disputes most likely to multiply under climate change are exactly those the treaty handles worst: storage, pondage, drawdown flushing, and the timing of releases—the contested technical core of Baglihar, Kishanganga, and Ratle. Erratic flows raise the stakes of every operational decision an upstream dam takes. Without an adaptation mechanism, each climate shock—a failed melt season, a GLOF, a flood—risks becoming a bilateral crisis rather than a shared management problem. In this sense, the honest answer is that the treaty as written can formally survive climate change, but the cooperation it was meant to guarantee cannot, unless the parties build adaptive machinery around it.
Such machinery need not reopen the core bargain. Article VII, on future cooperation, provides a legal hook for a climate protocol negotiated as an annex rather than an amendment. Its plausible elements are known from other basins. Flow-indexed or tiered sharing rules for drought years—analogous to the shortage-sharing tiers agreed for the Colorado River—would convert scarcity from a zero-sum shock into a pre-agreed schedule. Joint glacier, snowpack, and GLOF monitoring, building on ICIMOD’s regional cryosphere work, would give both commissions a common factual baseline. Basin-wide environmental-flow norms could extend the precedent set by the 2013 Kishanganga award’s minimum-flow requirement. Groundwater, currently invisible to the treaty, could be added to the PIC’s agenda through coordinated aquifer monitoring. The Senegal basin’s OMVS, where member states jointly own key infrastructure, and the Nile Basin Initiative’s cooperative framework show that allocation treaties can evolve into adaptive regimes without collapsing. The IWT can survive climate change only if both parties treat its allocations as a floor for cooperation rather than a ceiling [4,5,39].
Looking ahead
A treaty of more than six decades, long hailed as a rare success in transboundary water cooperation, is now in limbo. Recent geopolitical tensions have reignited public and scholarly debate around its relevance and resilience. Existing narratives increasingly frame the treaty not just as a technical water-sharing agreement but as a symbol of political leverage and national identity—especially after India’s decision to place it “in abeyance”. Analysts at national, regional, and global levels have begun to interrogate the treaty’s governance potential, highlighting overlooked provisions for adaptive cooperation, ecological protection, and data sharing. These aspects have largely remained dormant, overshadowed by strategic disputes over hydroelectric projects and conventional allocation.
The treaty’s rigid legal framework, once a stabilizing force, now appears ill-equipped for climate change, groundwater depletion, and regional water insecurity. Renewed focus on these gaps nonetheless offers a point of hope for reopening dialogue. Media emphasis on competing legal interpretations does not help create that space. India questions the legitimacy of international arbitration rulings; Pakistan seeks to leverage them. These positions reflect deeper asymmetries in power, perception, and strategic intent. Technical cooperation persists in isolated instances, but the broader diplomatic posture reveals a widening rift—one that risks undermining regional stability and the ecological integrity of shared waters. Comparative experience is instructive here: basins such as the Nile and the Senegal have moved from conflict toward peace-building frameworks, though they too are now tested by geopolitical and environmental stress. The lesson is that hard, coercive actions may serve short-term political objectives, but they entangle vital water flows—lifelines for millions of people and ecosystems—in broader disputes. These stakes are not only political but ecological, and are nowhere clearer than at the Indus Delta itself.
Waheed and colleagues [40] extend this diagnosis by locating the Delta’s decline not simply in climate change or natural scarcity, but in a longer historical and political process in which colonial-era water institutions, centralized control, and upstream development priorities have progressively reduced environmental flows to the Indus Delta. Their central critique is that the IWT, although often presented as a successful conflict-management instrument, helped lock in a technocratic, upstream-oriented water regime that treats the river as a distributable resource rather than a living deltaic system, so that ecological decline in the Delta is not adequately considered or addressed within its scope. They further argue that colonial-era legal and infrastructural choices created a path dependence, whereby later policy has largely reproduced rather than corrected the same logic of centralization, irrigation expansion, and elite control. To capture this, they propose a Delta Harm Score as an analytical tool showing how far individual policy instruments carry colonial legacies, power asymmetries, weak equity provisions, poor implementation, and harmful ecological outcomes.
This assessment aligns with our own: recent policies continue to reflect the same extractive governance paradigm, using progressive language while still failing to secure enforceable environmental flows or meaningful community participation. A resilient future for the basin will therefore require more than technical fixes to treaty mechanics. It will require legally guaranteed freshwater releases to the Delta, stronger institutional reform, an ecosystem-restoration orientation, and a governance approach that places equity, local knowledge, and ecological integrity at the centre of decision-making, alongside the diplomatic and legal recommendations set out below.
Recent scholarship highlights that, rather than reinforcing stability through strategic patience, the current escalation has turned Indus water flows into an instrument of coercive diplomacy, with media narratives increasingly reflecting this shift. Looking ahead, three interlinked recommendations stand out. Each is paired with concrete, near-term examples.
First, reverse the drift from cooperation to coercion by re-anchoring the treaty in rules-based, predictable practice. In practical terms this means: resuming Permanent Indus Commission meetings on a fixed biannual calendar that is explicitly insulated from the political climate; converting the ad hoc humanitarian flood-data sharing seen during the 2025 floods into a standing, automated protocol using telemetry stations, so that data exchange no longer depends on goodwill; and inviting World Bank technical facilitation—as already exercised in the 2022 appointment of the Neutral Expert—to sequence the currently parallel legal processes. De-escalation also has a rhetorical component: senior officials on both sides refraining from “not a drop” and “ten missiles” language would lower the temperature at no material cost.
Second, activate the treaty’s underused provisions rather than abandoning them. Article VI’s data-exchange obligations could be modernized into a shared digital portal for real-time river flows, accessible to both commissions. Article VII’s “future cooperation” clause could host the first joint engineering works of the treaty’s history—for example, coordinated reservoir operations during flood emergencies, or joint sediment-management studies at Baglihar and Kishanganga, where drawdown flushing is the single most contested operational issue. Ecological safeguards could be given content by negotiating basin-wide environmental-flow norms that generalize the minimum-flow requirement set by the 2013 Kishanganga award, and by piloting one joint watershed-restoration project in a shared tributary catchment. Activation is especially urgent for the eastern rivers, where over-extraction and infrastructure-led approaches have already degraded ecosystems.
Third, build a shared understanding of “regional risk” that moves beyond zero-sum narratives. Concrete first steps include: a jointly commissioned India–Pakistan climate-risk assessment of the basin, prepared with neutral technical partners such as ICIMOD or the World Bank; a basin-wide GLOF and flood early-warning network linking upstream sensors to downstream civil-protection agencies; coordinated monitoring of the overstressed transboundary aquifer, so that groundwater finally enters the bilateral agenda; and inclusive basin dialogues that bring farmer organizations from both Punjabs and Sindh to the table, mirroring the stakeholder forums of the Senegal basin’s OMVS. Track-2 academic and professional exchanges—of the kind convened by the Stimson Center—can sustain these conversations when official channels stall. Without such a shift, the current stalemate will deepen environmental damage and erode the very stability the treaty was designed to protect. With it, the basin could become a laboratory for climate-resilient, peace-supporting water diplomacy.
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