CORRECTION

Correction: Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

The PLOS ONE Staff

There are multiple formatting errors in Table 2. Please see the complete, correct table here.

Table 2. The risk of HPAI transmission jumps from one area to another, due to a compartment with only egg transports (i.e. no animal transports), and with no compartment farms situated in a DPPA.

Quantity	Value
Ratio ¹⁾	0.0015 (0.0013-0.0017)
'Single-event' transmission probability ²⁾	$1.2\ 10^{-6}$ - $1.6\ 10^{-5}$
'Triple-event' transmission probability ²⁾	3.6 10 ⁻¹⁰ -5.1 10 ⁻⁸

¹⁾ The risk of jumps is expressed as mean ratio of 'triple-event' transmission via the compartment and 'single-event' transmission by neighbourhood transmission (the 5%-95% interval given between brackets).

²⁾ The range (min-max) of the probability for 'single-event' transmission and for 'triple-event' transmission are added.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212986.t001

There are multiple formatting errors in Table 3. Please see the complete, correct table here.

Table 3. The risk of HPAI transmission jumps from one area to another, due to a compartment with one farm
located in the DPPA.

Quantity	Value
Ratio ¹⁾	0.57 (0.46–0.69)
'Single-event' transmission probability ²⁾	1.1 10 ⁻⁶ -0.010
'Triple-event' transmission probability ²⁾	$1.2 \ 10^{-7} - 8.9 \ 10^{-5}$

¹⁾ The risk of jumps is expressed as mean ratio of 'triple-event' transmission via the compartment and 'single-event' transmission by neighbourhood transmission (the 5%-95% interval given between brackets).

²⁾ The range (min-max) of the probability for 'single-event' transmission and for 'triple-event' transmission are added.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212986.t002

There are multiple formatting errors in <u>Table 4</u>. Please see the complete, correct table here. The publisher apologizes for these errors.



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Table 4. The risk of HPAI transmission jumps from one area to another, due to a compartment with one farm located in the DPPA and with transport of animals (chicken) and eggs.

Quantity	Value
Ratio ¹⁾	0.62 (0.46–0.78)
'Single-event' transmission probability ²⁾	$1.1\ 10^{-6}$ -0.0020
'Triple-event' transmission probability ²⁾	$1.2 \ 10^{-7} - 1.2 \ 10^{-4}$

¹⁾ The risk of jumps is expressed as mean ratio of 'triple-event' transmission via the compartment and 'single-event' transmission by neighbourhood transmission (the 5%-95% interval given between brackets).

²⁾ The range (min-max) of the probability for 'single-event' transmission and for 'triple-event' transmission are added.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212986.t003

Reference

 Hagenaars TJ, Boender GJ, Bergevoet RHM, van Roermund HJW (2018) Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. PLoS ONE 13(11): e0207076. https://doi.org/ 10.1371/journal.pone.0207076 PMID: 30485292