2.2.1. Structural economic dependence.

Because of the dependency of nearly every sector of the global economy—energy production, transportation, agriculture, manufacturing, and the chemicals that go into everyday products, a change in policy that would lead to a rise in prices of either tobacco or fossil fuels would, in 2025, affect more people in the case of fossil fuels, most significantly in the form of rising prices of energy or petrol.

While both industries have a history of employing similar strategies to protect their interests, the structural economic dependency on fossil fuels makes it a far more complex issue that demands careful planning to address. This allows the fossil fuel industry to frame fossil fuels as pragmatic solutions or geopolitically important [53], and claim that their knowledge and expertise “can contribute to the switch to clean energy” and that collaboration with universities is “indispensable” for this [54,55]. The argument that collaborations with the fossil fuel industry are essential due to their financial resources, knowledge, and expertise is frequently raised in discussions within Dutch academic institutions [56,57].

While the tobacco industry currently plays a much smaller role within the Dutch economy than the fossil fuel industry, the situation was different in previous years. According to the “Voorlichtingsbureau Sigaretten en Shag” (Information Bureau for Cigarettes and Rolling Tobacco), the Dutch tobacco industry was in 1985 the largest contributor to the national trade balance in absolute terms, with an export surplus of over ƒ1.2bn (ECU 500 million), and production was growing year on year [58]. Even in 1999, the tobacco industry achieved a percentage growth in turnover that was clearly above the average growth for the total Dutch industry, and accounted for over a quarter of tobacco production within the EU [59]. In the Netherlands, the tobacco industry included 27 companies in 1998, which employed about 5,500 people at the time [59]—down from over 30,000 people in tobacco production (excluding distribution) in 1939. As of the time of writing, it employs less than 1000.

The number of people employed directly in the extraction of crude oil and gas was 3,200 in 2022. However, industries heavily dependent on fossil oil and gas employed many more, such as refining (5,200), basic chemical production (30,900) and plastics production (41,300), to name only a few [60]. On top of this there are industries and businesses involved in supplying the materials, infrastructure, and services to heavy industry. Scaling down the fossil fuel sector could yield substantial health benefits by reducing pollution and associated diseases. However, to avoid economic drawbacks, it is crucial to implement strategies that promote sustainable industries and support workers transitioning from fossil fuel-dependent roles.

2.2.2. Awareness of industry tactics.

A further notable difference between the two industries is the broad recognition of the misleading practices of the tobacco industry and their harmful lobbying practices, as addressed in Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC): “the tobacco industry has operated for years with the express intention of subverting the role of governments and of WHO in implementing public health policies to combat the tobacco epidemic” [61]. Obstruction by the fossil fuel industry receives less attention, and representatives of the fossil fuel industry are openly invited to shape Dutch climate policy (for example at the “climate tables” that informed the Dutch climate accord [62]) and research agendas (for example in the “Topsectoren”—public-private research and innovation programs [63]).

The study of tobacco control and tactics is an established academic field with specific journals such as BMJ’s Tobacco Control [64] and research groups such as the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath [65]. The obstructive tactics of the fossil fuel industry are studied in the emerging academic field of climate obstruction. The Climate Social Science Network (CSSN) wrote in 2021: “Scholars are just beginning to unearth the complex and highly developed network of organizations built to block action on the life-threatening issue of climate change” [66]. Despite efforts of researchers, progress on understanding and overcoming climate obstruction has been slow [67].

2.2.3. Pointing out the cause of harm.

While “tobacco control” is a well-recognised field of public health research and policy, “fossil fuel control” is a less common term compared to “climate policy” or “climate action”. The latter do not make the cause of harm explicit. At the COPs, explicit mentions of fossil fuel phase-outs are often vetoed by fossil fuel interests [68,69] in favour of a narrative of “reducing emissions”. In direct response to this, in 2025, the Governments of Colombia and the Netherlands announced that they will co-host the First International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels [70].

2.2.4. Perception of conflicts of interest in academic collaborations.

There is broad recognition that collaborations with the tobacco industry present significant conflicts of interest—reflected in Principle 1 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which states that “There is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interests and public health policy interests” [61].

Unlike with tobacco-funded research, there are very few journals that restrict publication of fossil fuel-funded papers. To our knowledge, only the BMJ has a policy explicitly prohibiting the publication of research tied to the fossil fuel industry [71]. Dutch universities justify collaboration with the fossil fuel industry on energy transition and sustainability projects. Yet, as a Dutch public health authority director noted as early as 1996, the tobacco industry funds research to influence debates and researchers, not out of philanthropy. “The suggestion that researchers are immune to such influences is a noble but highly unrealistic thesis ” [72]. This also applies to the fossil fuel industry.

Despite clear parallels, the potential for conflict of interest in fossil fuel collaborations remains largely unacknowledged by most universities and researchers. Nearly all Dutch universities claim they only engage with fossil fuel companies on projects contributing to the energy transition [10]. However, this overlooks the inherent conflict of interest posed by oil and gas companies whose core business is fundamentally at odds with long-term climate goals [73].

2.2.5. Perception of ethics of academic collaboration.

There appears to be a difference between how tobacco industry collaborations and fossil fuel industry collaborations are evaluated in the Netherlands. For example, in 2017–2018, a tobacco industry-funded research project at Utrecht University generated significant controversy. Following public pressure, the university chose to return the funding and independently finance the research. Rector Bert Van der Zwaan told the newspaper Volkskrant: “As a university, we are deeply embedded in society; we listen to societal voices, even when criticism is expressed” [74,75]. In contrast, the university started new collaborations with fossil fuel companies TotalEnergies, BP, and RWE in 2024, which according to the university were already (orally) agreed upon before the university’s 2023 statement to “only enter into research collaborations with fossil companies and organizations if they are intensively and demonstrably committed to accelerating the energy transition, in line with the Paris Climate Agreement” [76–78]. One of these new collaborations involves Prof. Petra de Jongh (see also S1 Appendix), who receives €1.5 million from BP for a research project on liquid fuels. The professor justifies the partnership by stating: “BP is one of the top-four major oil companies in terms of climate. The company is making major investments in renewable energy. This is a company we can work with.” [78].

A broader tolerance toward fossil fuel partnerships was also evident during a 2023 debate on corporate collaborations, where Prof. Yvonne van der Meer of Maastricht University commented: “No university will enter into a partnership with the tobacco industry, but we shouldn’t immediately rule out fossil fuel companies” [79]. Notably, Saudi Arabian oil company Aramco funded the research chair Sustainability of Chemicals and Materials, currently held by Prof. van der Meer, at the Aachen-Maastricht Institute for Biobased Materials—a joint initiative between Maastricht University, RWTH Aachen University, and Fraunhofer IME. In a 2024 article published by Follow the Money (FTM), the rector of Maastricht University stated that it is “conceivable that no permission would be granted for a side activity at Philip Morris International or British American Tobacco” [80]. However, ancillary activities with fossil fuel companies are not (yet) regarded as problematic by university boards. According to the Mapping Fossil Ties database, between 2022 and 2025, 30 individuals in Dutch academia had ancillary activities in the fossil fuel industry (including consulting for the industry) (see Fig 1), and an additional 4 individuals received structural funding for their research chair or their PhDs from the fossil fuel industry (see Supplementary Materials). In the Netherlands, externally financed professorships (so-called “bijzondere hoogleraren”) are common. Research of Financieel Dagblad (FD) in 2022–2023 exposed that 1 in 5 professors in the Netherlands were externally funded [81]. Government funding of universities has been receding and Dutch universities and researchers are actively stimulated to look for external funding to fill the funding gap and conduct research that best aligns with the priorities of the government and the business sector [82].

3.1.1. Influence of tobacco industry lobbying.

Since the 1960s, tobacco industry lobbying in the Netherlands has been extensive and effective: delaying action in the 1970s, toning down mandatory warnings on cigarette packets in the 1980s, and changing the Dutch government position on the European Commission’s minimum taxation proposal in 2009—to name a few concrete successes [26]. When close contacts, regular meetings, and input during the policy drafting were allowed, the tobacco industry was able to have significant influence on policy making, pushing the main arguments of individual choice for the consumer, economic importance for the government, and self-regulation for the industry. The latter did not work: the “gentlemen’s agreement” of 1965 to not advertise positive health claims of cigarettes was broken in 1976 by the industry, and self-regulation of advertising agreed in 1990 was also ineffective [87,88].

The Dutch trade organisation VNO-NCW played a large role: when Dutch health minister Borst-Eilers prepared to revise the Tobacco Act in 1994–5, Alexander Rinnooy Kan (then VNO-NCW chair, earlier rector magnificus of Erasmus University Rotterdam, and later economics and business administration professor at University of Amsterdam as well as a senator in the Dutch parliament) sent her a letter informing her that they saw “no place for a paternalistic national government” [89]. He sent the minister of economic affairs a copy of a lecture of his, arguing for the right of corporations to give “commercial information”, and that “the time has passed when some still thought that advertisements encourage consumers to consumptive behaviour against their will” [90]. This is contradicted by the 1975 Health Council report noting that “there is no real freedom of choice vis-a-vis smoking or not”—both because of the “social norms, the intrusive advertising” as well as that “pharmacalogical factors”, i.e., nicotine dependency, maintain the status quo of smoking [91].

The former doctor Borst-Eilers was able to push through an amendment of the Tobacco Act, but the accession of the ex-VNO-NCW lobbyist Edith Schippers to the position of Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport in 2010 led to dismantling of much tobacco control regulation, and ending subsidies for STIVORO (the national organisation for tobacco control) in 2011 leading to its close 2 years later [26].

Article 5.3 of the FCTC requires that “in setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco control, parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.” The WHO guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 recommend measures that “aim protecting against interference not only by the tobacco industry but also, as appropriate, by organizations and individuals that work to further the interests of the tobacco industry” [61].

However, VNO-NCW still represents the interests of the tobacco industry in dealings with parliament. Niek Jan van Kesteren, general director in 2012, acknowledged lobbying for the tobacco industry and described themselves as “one of the few friends the tobacco industry has” [92]. For example, despite being excluded from direct negotiations over the Nationaal Preventieakkoord—a Dutch national prevention agreement aimed at reducing smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, and obesity [93]—the tobacco industry managed to exert indirect influence through VNO-NCW and the CBL (Dutch Retailers Association), with the result that tax increases were delayed and a ban on the visible display of cigarettes was softened in the Rookakkoord (smoking prevention agreement) of 2018 [94]. The enforcement of Article 5.3 of the FCTC also remains inconsistent at the European level, allowing the industry to retain influence within the European Commission [83,95].

Translation to fossil fuel control: extensive lobbying against effective climate policy: Fossil fuel industry lobbying for fossil fuels and against policy restricting them is extensive [96]. Internal documents shed light on the International Gas Union’s lobbying strategy for fossil gas [97]. Recently, the fossil fuel and other heavy industries were successful in lobbying for blue hydrogen (produced from fossil gas) to be classified by the EU as “low-carbon”, making it eligible for subsidies and shielding it from legislation against high-carbon fuels and feedstocks [98].

3.1.2. Health professionals and charities.

In contrast to the lobbying efforts by the tobacco industry, a number of health professionals and charities have played a key role in advancing tobacco control and public health in the Netherlands. Willemsen regards 1964 as the year when “serious concerns about smoking stirred the Dutch nation and health organisations like the Dutch Cancer Society got actively involved with tobacco control”. This happened after a report from the US Public Health Service “clearly establishes an association between cigarette smoking and substantially higher death rates” [99]. A Dutch national organisation for tobacco control, STIVORO, was founded in 1974 and brought together the voices of three charities on their board to present a unified front to counter the tobacco lobby. It also provided continuity to combat what Willemsen calls “institutional amnesia”—the knowledge loss that comes from the high turnover of decision-makers in a democracy such as the Netherlands.

STIVORO coordinated health advocacy organisations, organised successful media campaigns and counter-campaigns—for example heading off a campaign by Philipp Morris to cast doubt on the harm of passive smoking in 1996. Nevertheless, the foundation had less access to the policymaking process than the tobacco lobby, and less resources for lobbying and legal battles. A dependence on government funding made it difficult to criticise the government (a problem also faced by its counterpart ASH in the UK), and a confrontational approach in the face of an industry-friendly government after 2007 led to its funding being cut in 2011 [26].

Willemsen describes the Dutch medical community’s stance on tobacco control as “passive”, especially compared to their counterparts in the UK, and suggests this may be due to high rates of smoking among doctors as well as lobbying, for example through magazines distributed to family practitioners [26]. While the Medische Alliantie tegen het Roken (Medical Alliance Against Smoking) was set up in 1993, it was closed in 2008, in part due to lack of interest. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, stronger advocacy by medical organisations led to more decisive action, such as anti-tobacco advertisements. The English Health Education Council ran confrontational and effective advertising campaigns on the deadly effects of smoking and the myth of “safer” cigarettes in the 1970’s. The Royal College of Physicians and the British Medical Association were vocal in their advocacy for tobacco control [26].

Individuals in the medical profession and research did engage in advocacy: university professors of public health such as Johan Mackenbach [100] and Marc Willemsen [101] have vocally called for stricter measures. Medical professionals Wanda de Kanter and Pauline Dekker have been influential in raising public awareness about the harms of tobacco use and advocating for stronger tobacco control policies [102]. Notably, the most ambitious tobacco control measures in the Netherlands were introduced by a former medical doctor, health minister Els Borst-Meijers.

In the 2010s, reports from Marc Willemsen, health advocates, and investigative journalism shed light on how the industry had historically worked to delay or weaken Dutch tobacco control efforts. The campaign Rookpreventie Jeugd [102] (Youth Smoking Prevention) by Wanda de Kanter and Paulien Dekker, along with the formation of the Alliantie Nederland Rookvrij (Netherlands Smoke-Free Alliance) in 2018, framed tobacco control as an issue of protecting youth and achieving a Smoke-Free Generation [103]. These initiatives raised public awareness about how the industry strategically targets young people, obstructs policymaking, and misleads the public about the harms of smoking. The 2016 “Sick of Smoking” lawsuit, in which lawyer Bénédicte Ficq attempted to prosecute tobacco companies for intentionally addicting consumers, further intensified public scrutiny [104].

Translation to fossil fuel control: health professionals are taking an increasingly large role in fight against fossil fuels: In recent years, health professionals in the Netherlands have been increasingly speaking up about the health impacts of fossil fuels. There are various initiatives, such as the Groene Zorg Alliantie (“Green Health Alliance”), Caring Doctors, De Duurzame Verpleegkundige (“The Sustainable Nurse”), Zorg voor Klimaat (“Health for Climate”), De Klimaatdokter (“The Climate Doctor”) and Van Wie is de Lucht? (“Whose is the air?”).

3.1.3. International influence on Dutch tobacco control.

Policy action in other countries also affected Dutch policy: State Secretary Hans Simons (State secretary of well being, public health, and culture from 1989 to 1994) argued during his tenure for stricter rules around advertising citing stricter policy in the UK and Denmark; the political party Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA) argued for banning smoking in public places in 1980 following the example of France; and Minister Borst-Eilers’ visit to the US and learning about successful tobacco control policy in 1995 inspired her own proposals for tobacco policy.

International agreements were also decisive: the Netherlands had agreed to oppose the EU tobacco advertising ban as long as it was not the decisive vote; when this became the case as the UK withdrew its opposition in 1997, the Netherlands followed suit.

A major milestone in tobacco control was the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which entered into force in 2005. This convention explicitly denormalised the tobacco industry as a stakeholder, and instead posits the tobacco industry as a party with a structural conflict of interest when it comes to public health. This means that countries that ratified it need to “protect [public health] policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law” and to implement various measures to reduce tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke [61].

The Netherlands signed the FCTC in 2005, and this meant that the Dutch exemption to smoking in small cafés could be challenged in court successfully in 2014 [105]. Despite being originally ignored by tobacco control groups, who saw it more relevant to “third-world countries”, it became instrumental in the Netherlands as this was “the first time anywhere in the world that a national court decided that an FCTC requirement outranked a contradictory national law” [26]. It should be noted that the enforcement of Article 5.3 of the FCTC remains inconsistent, allowing the industry to retain influence within the European Commission despite existing regulations [83,95].

Translation to fossil fuel control: international influence on dutch climate policy: There are few apparent examples of fossil fuel control or climate legislation having been inspired by developments elsewhere. One example is the Dutch Klimaatwet or Climate Act: a memo from the Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, a Dutch advisory body to the government, describes lessons from the UK Climate Act of 2008 for the Dutch Climate Act [106]. During the debate in the Dutch senate in 2019, the year the act was passed, a senator alludes to the UK Act having inspired the Dutch Act [107].

In contrast to tobacco, no “WHO Framework convention on fossil fuel control” exists. The Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty has not yet been signed by the Netherlands [108].

3.1.4. Changing attitudes enable policy, policy changes attitudes.

According to the WHO, “the main influence on each country’s tobacco use trend is the effort the country invests in tobacco control” [109]. Since the 1980s, the Netherlands has taken increasingly strict measures to curb tobacco use, such as banning advertising and smoking in public places, health warnings on smoking products, raising taxes and the legal age of purchase, and implementing smoke-free areas. This has led to reduced smoking rates; 18.2% of the Dutch population over 18 smoked in 2024 [110], compared to 43% in 1980 [111].

Willemsen notes how, in Dutch politics, tobacco use shifted from being perceived as an economic benefit to a public health threat between the 1960s and now. The years 2002–2004 were decisive, “when the Tobacco Act was amended and Minister Borst successfully took tobacco policy out of the sphere of influence of the trade ministry and under the control of the Ministry of Health, resulting in tobacco control measures that had a huge impact on society” [26].

These policy changes not only reshaped governmental priorities but also played a crucial role in shifting public attitudes toward tobacco use. Stricter regulations, combined with growing awareness of health risks, contributed to a societal shift in which tobacco consumption became increasingly viewed as a public health concern rather than a personal choice or economic asset. For example, support among smokers for smoke-free workplaces rose in a year from 56% before the 2004 workplace ban to 79% after [26]. This example shows that taking (policy) action itself can drive attitudinal change.

Translation to fossil fuel control: some effective strategies in tobacco control have not been applied yet to control fossil fuels: The policies that were effective in tobacco control, have mostly not been applied to fossil fuels yet. Because of efforts of civil society members, several municipalities in the Netherlands including The Hague and Amsterdam have implemented a ban on fossil fuel advertising [112]. In the advertising space, especially on a municipal level, parallels between fossil fuels and tobacco are increasingly being made, with the UN Secretary General calling on countries to ban tobacco advertising [113,114]. Some Dutch municipalities have low-emission zones applying to certain vehicles [115], however, there are no health warnings on products, nor increased taxes on fossil fuel products.

On the contrary, the Netherlands subsidises fossil fuels by around €40 billion per year [116]. Climate was brought under the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 2017, which was then renamed to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate. Between 2024 and 2026, climate was split off into the “Ministry of Climate and Green Growth”, before being brought back together with Economic Affairs.

While the Director of Environment, Climate Change, and Health of the WHO stated in 2022: “Fossil fuels are the new tobacco: we need the same tools as against tobacco... We need a legally binding treaty on fossil fuels that goes even further than tobacco.” [117], there is no WHO Framework Convention on Fossil Fuel Control yet. Fossil fuel companies are still seen as important stakeholders in climate policy in the Netherlands; this attitude is reflected in the maatwerkafspraken (“tailor-made agreements”), which are bilateral, voluntary agreements negotiated between the state and large industrial emitters [118]. However, the WHO FCTC has been used as an inspiration for staff at the VU Amsterdam to argue for their university to take a similar stance on fossil fuel partnerships—a strategy that proved effective, as key stakeholders later acknowledged that it had a significant impact on their thinking [119].

3.1.5. The limited influence of Dutch universities on tobacco control.

We had initially expected that, because scientists were the ones first showing a link between tobacco and cancer, scientific institutions would also have been leading the way on tobacco control. However, there does not appear to have been a coordinated effort from Dutch universities in terms of tobacco policy advocacy or policy formation on tobacco collaborations.

Individuals, mainly active in public health research, have attempted to use their influence to reach the general public. Universities have worked with STIVORO on knowledge dissemination around the dangers of smoking, but rarely on tobacco control advocacy [26]. Since 2013, there is a Netherlands Network of Tobacco Control Researchers which includes researchers working on tobacco control, with an annual conference and a research prize [120].

Rather, it is the tobacco industry that seems to have had influence on the universities. A letter from the Nationale Jongerenraad voor Milieu en Ontwikkeling (National Youth Council for Environment and Development) to the CDA House of Representatives faction notes that at the 1993 anniversary celebration of Erasmus University Rotterdam “Lucky Strike was the primary sponsor and let that be known with big signs” as well as running games to win a pack of cigarettes. The Rotterdam Student Corps was sponsored by Gauloises in 1996, and at a Leiden University introduction fair for new students around that time, the organisers promoted the sponsor “Lucky Strike” on their jumpers [50].

Translation to fossil fuel control: contradictory role of Dutch universities in climate action: While many in the scientific community seeks to raise awareness of the climate crisis and contribute to the development of solutions, partnerships with fossil fuel industries are common. Dutch researchers seem to respond to shifting public opinion around difference external partnerships. This is illustrated by a researcher during a discussion organised by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) in November 2024: “Collaboration with certain partners inevitably comes at the expense of your credibility as a scientist. For example, if you conduct health research for cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris or if, as a food researcher, you receive sponsorship from McDonald’s and Coca-Cola, you are not seen as credible. Society views collaborations with fossil fuel companies in the same way, but researchers are much slower to respond to this societal shift” [121].

In the next subsection, we look at Dutch academia and the shifting lines of collaboration with the tobacco and fossil fuel industries.

3.2.1. International influence on Dutch academic collaboration with tobacco industry.

The tobacco industry has a long history of using academic legitimacy to spread disinformation, withholding data or publishing false or misleading data, industry capture of journals to subvert the peer review process, paying for misleading science, hiding behind front groups to bypass bans, and attacking scientists publishing science dangerous for the industry [122]. Universities—both worldwide and in the Netherlands—have historically collaborated with the tobacco industry, including accepting funding from tobacco companies.

In the US and the UK, attitudes were shifting on accepting medical research funding from the tobacco industry as early as 1996 [123], although tobacco funding was still mainstream: Cambridge University let British American Tobacco fund a professorship that same year for GBP1.5M (approximately GBP3.6M in today’s terms) [124]. Cancer research foundations including Cancer Research UK, the Norwegian Cancer Society, and members of the Union Internationale Contre le Cancer stopped funding research in research institutions accepting tobacco funding in the late 1990s [125]. Cancer Research UK stated that it would “not provide financial support where those who are, or would be, supported by Cancer Research UK funds are working in such proximity to others supported by tobacco industry funding that there is any possibility or likelihood that facilities, equipment or other resources will be shared” [126].

Several academic institutions in the US, South Africa, and Australia formulated policy around collaboration with the tobacco industry in the 2000s. Harvard’s School of Public Health formulated a policy in 2002 to “not to accept any grant or anything else of value from any tobacco manufacturer, distributor, or other tobacco-related company.” According to The Wire, the policy was updated in 2004 to add that “prohibition will apply to funding from companies that make or market tobacco products or from entities supported by such companies” [127,128]. Also the Ohio State University College of Public Health [129], the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine [130], the University of Cape Town [131], and several Australian universities [132] do not accept funds from the tobacco industry.

University of California San Francisco (UCSF) faculty voted to refuse tobacco industry funding in 2003 “to put into policy what has been a practice at UCSF for years” [133]. Interestingly, the University of California has a policy that explicitly states it does not ban the solicitation or acceptance of research funding from tobacco companies or their affiliates [134].

In the UK, charities who fund health research such as Cancer Research UK and the Wellcome Trust have policies distancing themselves from tobacco-funded research and researchers [126,135]. A joint statement in 2004 by Cancer Research UK and Universities UK (an organisation representing the interests of UK universities) hints that tobacco funding could “compromise the independence or integrity” of teaching and research, as well as the universities’ reputations, but stops short of advising universities not to accept tobacco funding. While this statement was interpreted by news outlets as a ban on tobacco funding [136], a policy from the University of Reading from 2017 contradicts this, claiming that there is “no legal basis for... a blanket restriction on dealing with tobacco companies” and that “the University will make a decision on whether to engage with a tobacco company on a case by case basis” [137].

In the US, in 2017, organisations like the American Cancer Society [138] and the World Heart Federation [139] spoke out against tobacco collaborations. And in January 2022, the Forum of International Respiratory Societies reiterated that its members could not engage with companies owned by tobacco firms, in line with their ethical codes [140].

Translation to fossil ties: dutch campaigners, independent research coalitions and some dutch universities inspiring international fossil dissociation movements In contrast to the situation around academic tobacco collaborations, some Dutch universities are frontrunners when it comes to fossil dissociation policy—we discuss this more in Section 3.2.5. Princeton in the US was the first university to announce a ban on research funding from fossil fuel companies in 2022, but rolled back their policy in 2024 [141]. In the UK, 18 universities have written policies to no longer accept fossil fuel companies at their careers fairs, but wider policy is yet to follow [142].

3.2.2. Journals restricting tobacco industry influence.

Already in 1996, the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, the American Journal of Respiratory Cell and Molecular Biology and the Journal of Health Psychology stopped publishing tobacco-industry funded work to address the overwhelming evidence of the tobacco industry’s scientific misconduct [72].

Despite arguing against such a ban at the time [143], in 2013, The British Medical Journal (BMJ) implemented a policy to no longer publish studies funded wholly or partially by the tobacco industry [144]. Since 2024, they also exclude work where the authors have personal financial ties with the tobacco industry.

We also speculate that the wish to differentiate themselves from so called “industry-captured journals”—journals with editors in or sympathetic to the tobacco industry publishing highly skewed research, such as Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology [145]—may have been another reason for journals to distance themselves from tobacco influence.

While most leading medical journals don’t have such policies in place [146], the policy of BMJ and seven other medical journals both problematised the industry and made it more challenging for tobacco-funded research to be published, reducing the incentive for researchers and institutions to collaborate with the industry.

Translation to fossil ties: climate and sustainability journals generally do not currently restrict fossil fuel funding: Unlike with tobacco-funded research, there are very few journals that restrict publication of fossil fuel-funded papers. To our knowledge, only the BMJ has a policy explicitly prohibiting the publication of research tied to the fossil fuel industry [71].

3.2.3. Shift in attitude on academic tobacco collaborations.

In the Netherlands, the attitude shift on tobacco collaborations appeared to happen later than in the US and the UK, namely in the 2000s and 2010s, as described in section 3.1.4. While medical professionals were less vocal than in the US and the UK (see section 3.1.2), one Dutch organisation stands out: in 2013, the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Oncologie (NVvO) expressed ethical concerns regarding partnerships between healthcare institutions and the tobacco industry. They addressed these concerns in a letter to Yvonne van Rooy, the chair of the Nederlandse Vereniging van Ziekenhuizen (NVZ), urging the NVZ to publicly support tobacco discouragement policies and to actively promote such policies within Dutch hospitals. This action was prompted by an article in Vrij Nederland, which highlighted that the employers’ organization VNO-NCW was lobbying against anti-smoking measures at both the national and European levels [147].

In 2017, public backlash against an announced collaboration between Utrecht University and Philip Morris International (PMI) was significant, prompting the university to reconsider its position [74,75]. This strong backlash and media attention marked a turning point, reinforcing the norm that academic institutions should not engage with the tobacco industry. In 2018, Leiden University faced scrutiny for participating in a study that received indirect funding from PMI—something the university was reportedly unaware of at the time [148].

In 2021, PMI acquired Vectura, a company specialising in inhaler-based drug delivery [149,150]. This created both ethical and practical dilemmas for a Dutch research group that had signed a 4-year agreement with Vectura in 2018. The researchers published an article explaining their personal perspective on how this acquisition affected their research [140]. The fact that they were suddenly affiliated with a tobacco company brought them “deep moral concern”. They used the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity to weigh their options and concluded that continuation of the agreement may be more favourable than termination—particularly motivated by the project’s relevance and their sense of responsibility to complete it. The main obstacle was that respiratory journals would not accept papers reporting work funded by tobacco companies. Nevertheless, their study was still published in the European Respiratory Society (ERS) journal which said the research was not in breach of its policy as the grant from Vectura was initiated in 2018 [151]. The researchers emphasised: “Given the tobacco industry’s historical involvement in manipulating and funding research(ers) to deceive consumers regarding the harmful effects of smoking, it is difficult to ensure the independence of tobacco-funded research regarding the health-related aspects of smoking. Research funded by the tobacco industry can, therefore, never include claims, recommendations, links or conclusions regarding electronic nicotine delivery devices, nicotine use or other tobacco-related products” [140].

Translation to fossil ties: the start of a general attitude shift? Student action groups occupying their universities and staff actions (open letters, discussions with boards, and opinion pieces) have led to university-wide and national discussions about “fossil ties”. As described in the introduction, a “fossil free research norm” is emerging in Dutch academia [16].

Examples in 2023 and 2024 illustrate how taking (policy) action itself can drive attitude change. After the VU Amsterdam banned research partnerships with fossil fuel partners in 2023, initially hesitant staff members—some of whom had actively opposed the decision—later expressed support and pride in the university’s leadership. This shift was attributed both to clearer messaging over time and the tendency to align with an established status quo [119]. Further, a survey at TU Delft in 2024, in which approximately 10% of the academic community participated, found that 87% of respondents had never previously expressed views on fossil fuel collaborations. Despite the university’s strong ties to the fossil fuel industry, only 17% of respondents recommended against taking measures to limit collaboration [152].

From our own interactions with university staff, we notice that their attitude is changing with growing awareness of obstructive practices and academia’s role. Climate scientists, other researchers, and climate NGOs have been speaking out in actions and opinion pieces. However, large public backlash, like against the announced collaboration between Utrecht University and PMI in 2017, is yet to happen.

3.2.4. Tighter policies by cancer research funders.

KWF (Dutch Cancer Society), a major funder of cancer research in the Netherlands, tightened its guidelines in response to the controversy surrounding Utrecht University’s collaboration with PMI in 2017 [86]. KWF had long maintained policies against tobacco industry ties, but in 2017, it expanded these restrictions. Under the new rules, not only are principal investigators prohibited from working with the tobacco industry, but this restriction now applies to all project participants. These stricter guidelines had significant implications for universities that rely heavily on KWF funding, effectively forcing many institutions to reassess their industry partnerships.

A KWF spokesperson explained in 2018: “We do not consider the tobacco industry to be a normal commercial business, the impact of smoking on health is enormous. One in two smokers is at risk of developing a disease. In the Netherlands, 20,000 people die each year as a result of their addiction, 12,000 of whom from lung cancer. In our view, you should not want to collaborate with such companies” [86].

Translation to fossil ties: no funding policies explicitly restricting fossil fuel industry yet: KWF requires recipients of funding for research or other projects to not act counter to the mission, objectives and fundraising activities of the organisation. This is made explicit in their funding conditions when it comes to the tobacco industry [153]. KWF has started prioritising Commercial Determinants of Health since 2025, specifically in the form of addressing environmental impacts on health and addressing commercial influence and political and legal barriers [154]. KWF has indicated that it will review their funding conditions to see if more industries can be explicitly excluded (personal communication with KWF).

NWO, the Dutch public research funder, tightened its funding policy in 2024 [155] in to reduce risks of greenwashing and dual use in fossil fuel applications [156]. However, the interpretation of the policy is left to the researchers and therefore does not formally restrict fossil fuel partnerships.

3.2.5. Lack of policy on tobacco collaboration in Dutch academia and persisting partnerships.

Despite widespread opposition to collaborating with the tobacco industry and statements from universities deeming such collaborations unacceptable (see section 2.2.5), Dutch universities and academic institutions do not have policies prohibiting such collaborations (for details of how we surveyed Dutch academic institutions, see S2 Appendix).

Moreover, our findings show that Dutch academic ties with the tobacco industry have persisted in recent years. Our findings are summarised in S2 Appendix. Over the past 20 years, there have been instances of funded research, academics holding additional roles at tobacco companies, master’s theses supervised by industry representatives, and sponsorship of student associations. We identified staff members with dual affiliations and industry-linked research publications as recently as 2024.

Besides direct collaborations with tobacco producers, researchers are, sometimes unknowingly, linked to the tobacco industry via health-tech companies. Investments in the pharmaceutical and health markets is part of the strategy of the tobacco industry to secure its business model via diversification. The industry funds research on smoking-related disorders, drugs, therapies, and cessation aids for individuals struggling with addiction or illnesses caused by smoking [80]. These indirect funding structures often leave scientists, universities, and journals unaware of the tobacco industry’s involvement in research. Follow the Money writes that the line between the pharmaceutical and tobacco industries is blurring. As a result, it is sometimes difficult for scientists to escape the influence of cigarette manufacturers [80].

For example, through pharmaceutical or health ventures, the tobacco industry gains channels to lobby policymakers and civil servants at conferences—which the tobacco industry is supposed to be barred from via the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [80,83]. A striking example of leveraging academic research for lobbying purposes is Philip Morris’ intentional framing of a research question to associate cigarette smuggling with terrorism in 2018. This narrative was subsequently employed to lobby for stricter controls on cigarette smuggling, allegedly driven largely by the industry’s concern over the negative impact of smuggling on its business interests. A researcher from Leiden University who worked on the project, looking back, found it a “curious project” and later understood that the “strange question” about the relation between cigarette smuggling and terrorism was inserted in the research by the funder Philip Morris [157].

Other universities and researchers see no issue with indirect collaborations: Maastricht University declared to the WHO in a grant application that they don’t work with the tobacco industry [151]. However, a professor at Maastricht advises PlatoScience, a company partially owned by the tobacco industry. Researchers from the Investigative Desk and the BMJ quoted him saying: “As long as British American Tobacco does not interfere with my scientific work, I see no immediate problem.” The university told the journalists that this collaboration with PlatoScience “is not a collaboration with the tobacco industry” [151].

Translation to fossil ties: stagnation in transparency and policy formation on fossil fuel collaborations: While no Dutch universities had policies in place around tobacco partnerships, 10 out of 14 Dutch universities are forming or have formed policy around fossil fuel industry collaborations. However, the VU Amsterdam is the only Dutch university to date (April 2025) which has finalised a policy excluding new research collaborations with fossil fuel industry which do not “demonstrably commit, in the short term, to the objectives of the Paris Climate Agreement” [158,159]. Utrecht University announced in July 2023 its intention to implement a similar policy; however, its assessment framework for fossil fuel industry collaborations is characterised by notable exceptions [5]. Eight other universities have formed or are forming policies for stricter guidelines around fossil fuel collaborations, however, many of them evaluate whether the research topics are desirable rather than assessing the collaboration partners [17]. Universities face challenges in determining the criteria for evaluating research projects, and critics advocate for assessments at the partner level due to concerns such as the risks of greenwashing [160], steering the direction and conclusions of research and therefore the energy transition [161], and bolstering a social licence to operate for the sector [162]—the latter two being concerns for working with the tobacco industry as well [125].

Similarly to indirect collaborations via companies partially or fully owned by tobacco producers, indirect collaborations with the fossil fuel industry exist as well. Examples are research with Concawe (a fossil-funded research organisation), HydrogenNL (an industry association), the Sustainable Industry Lab (a thinktank with academic and industry partners, see case 0070 [4]), and the New Energy Coalition (a private educational foundation with academic and industrial partners, see case 0014 [4]). Since 2024, Dutch universities publish comprehensive lists of external funding sources [163] and ancillary activities [164]. This initiative arose following investigative journalism by Financieel Dagblad (FD) and inquiries in parliament, which prompted the Minister of Education, Culture, and Science to enhance transparency in academic financing [165]. However, similar transparency for research collaborations has yet to be fully established. In response to pressure from students and faculty, 6 out of 14 Dutch universities have made some progress by publishing lists of research collaborations with the fossil fuel industry. Still, these lists are often outdated or incomplete [10].

4.1.1. Journal policies and fossil fuel industry involvement.

Future research could explore which medical and academic journals have established policies regarding fossil fuel industry involvement. Additionally, investigating which journals publish the most papers co-authored with fossil fuel industry representatives could provide valuable insights into the extent of industry influence. Research could also examine the role of “industry-captured” journals—publications with editorial boards sympathetic to industry interests—and assess their influence on academic discourse. A focus on the specific policies these journals have in place to manage or disclose industry affiliations would be valuable in understanding the transparency and potential biases in published research.

4.1.2. Scholar engagement and collaboration.

It would be valuable to connect with researchers in fields like cancer research, who once may have received funding from the tobacco industry but have seen attitudes shift away from such collaborations. Understanding the factors that contributed to these changing attitudes could provide valuable insights into how academic institutions can better navigate conflicts of interest and promote more ethical research practices moving forward.

Additionally, it would be valuable to engage with scholars working on the commercial determinants of health, particularly those examining the role of unhealthy commodity industries like tobacco and fossil fuels. Research could explore how these scholars view the influence of industries like fossil fuels within academic contexts, as well as existing collaborative efforts aimed at mitigating or confronting industry interference in public health research.

4.1.3. Attitudes and public discourse.

Examining attitudes towards the tobacco and fossil fuel industries among students, faculty, and the general public offers insights into how these industries are perceived and how those perceptions influence the academic environment. Research could explore how exposure to specific information, social networks, and the implementation of institutional policies or guidelines shape these attitudes. This research would be crucial for understanding the broader social and cultural factors that influence academic decisions related to industry collaboration and could inform strategies to reduce industry influence in academic settings.

4.1.4. New trends in the tobacco industry and parallels with fossil fuels.

As the leading cause of death from NCDs, the threat of tobacco is far from dead. In recent years, the tobacco industry has focused on e-cigarettes, vaping, heated tobacco, and nicotine pouches. Tobacco use among children is rising, and vaping is a large part of this rise: according to the RIVM (the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment) the percentage of adolescents (12–16 years) who vape weekly has increased from 2% to 9% between 2019 and 2023 (conventional smoking increased from 4% to 6%) [166,167].

Vaping and non-combustible tobacco products may be the new front in which public health and the tobacco industry clash. For example, Philip Morris International funded a researcher at the University of Tokyo to lobby for lower tax on its heated tobacco product IQOS [168], and funded research at Kyoto University [169]. Research on new trends from the tobacco and fossil fuel industries could help understand how diversifying business tactics may translate into new forms of industry influence on research.