https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7423-3577
Figures
Abstract
Political polarization remains a significant barrier to effective climate action in the United States. Conservatives often express skepticism toward climate change policies emphasizing government intervention, while liberals are generally more supportive of these efforts. Solar geoengineering (SG), an emerging technology proposed to cool the Earth’s atmosphere, offers a climate intervention that may transcend entrenched ideological divides. SG remains relatively unknown to the public and has not yet been widely framed in partisan terms. Moreover, its perceived nature as a technological solution could appeal to conservatives resistant to traditional climate measures. This study investigates the relationship between political ideology and public attitudes toward SG, conditional on respondents’ familiarity with the technology. Using a nationally representative sample of 2,109 American voters and applying linear probability and multinomial logistic regression models, we find that greater familiarity with SG is associated with reduced political polarization regarding SG’s perceived effectiveness, associated risks, and preferred climate strategies. Our findings suggest that increasing public awareness of SG could foster bipartisan engagement with climate policy, helping bridge the ideological divide.
Citation: Magistro B, Debnath R, Ebanks D, Wennberg PO, Alvarez RM (2025) Political ideology and views toward solar geoengineering in the United States. PLOS Clim 4(6): e0000643. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000643
Editor: Lily Hsueh, Arizona State University, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Received: October 21, 2024; Accepted: May 13, 2025; Published: June 26, 2025
Copyright: © 2025 Magistro et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Data Availability: All codes and data needed for replication of this study can be found here: https://github.com/rmichaelalvarez/pol_ideology_solar_geoengineering.
Funding: RMA and BM's work is supported by Caltech’s Resnick Sustainability Institute. DE's work on this project was originally supported by Caltech's Resnick Sustainability Institute while he was a PhD Candidate at Caltech. RD's work is supported by the Cambridge Arts, Humanities and Social Science (AHSS) Grants and the Bill \& Melinda French Gates Foundation (OPP1144).
Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
1. Introduction
Human-induced climate change has led to severe and widespread impacts with potentially irreversible consequences for individuals, communities, economies, and ecosystems globally. Despite the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including achieving net-zero carbon dioxide emissions in the coming decades, progress remains slow, prompting calls for additional measures to address global warming.
One such measure is solar geoengineering (SG), also known as solar radiation management (SRM). By increasing the amount of sunlight reflected from Earth or reducing thermal radiation, SG could partially counteract rising global temperatures. However, it also introduces potential new risks and uncertainties, particularly concerning atmospheric processes, climate dynamics, and broader socio-economic factors. A recent report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) recommends a cautious U.S.-led research agenda on solar geoengineering, conducted alongside robust emission reductions and adaptive policies, underscoring that SG should not be viewed as a substitute for cutting emissions [1].
Although SG has received some attention in academic and policy circles, the public remains largely unfamiliar with it, and attitudes toward research on SG often hinge on factors such as trust in experts and concerns about transparency or potential risks [2–8]. A central question in the literature is whether knowing about SG reduces or reinforces efforts to cut emissions— a “moral hazard” scenario—yet evidence is mixed, showing that SG awareness can either weaken or strengthen individuals’ drive for mitigation, depending on their broader climate views [9–15].
However, while research has explored public attitudes toward SG, the role of political ideology in shaping these views is relatively understudied (see Mahajan and co-authors [16] for an exception). Since political polarization is one of the most significant barriers to climate action in the U.S., finding ways to bridge this gap is critical [17]. Conservatives are often skeptical of policies involving governmental regulation or fossil fuel restrictions, while liberals tend to favor such measures [18–24]. This divide is exacerbated by motivated reasoning, a cognitive process that reinforces existing beliefs, leading individuals to interpret information in ways that align with their ideological predispositions [25–27]. In the case of climate change, selective exposure to partisan information further hinders productive climate policy discussions [28,29]. Yet because SG is not yet highly politicized, it may present an opportunity to engage both conservatives and liberals more constructively.
Our central premise is that familiarity with SG can reduce ideological polarization for two reasons. First, as people learn more about SG’s potential and risks, they may gravitate toward the scientific consensus rather than default to partisan cues. Second, because SG might be seen as a technological solution rather than a regulatory one, conservatives could be more receptive to it [30–32] (This perception contrasts with the scientific consensus, which stresses that SG should not be viewed as a standalone solution. Instead, scientists emphasize that SG must be considered alongside aggressive emission reductions and adaptation strategies in order to effectively address climate risks [1]. ). If conservatives perceive SG as compatible with limited government approaches, support may grow, narrowing the ideological gap [32–34].
Using a sample of 2,109 registered American voters recruited by YouGov in November 2022, our findings indicate that most Americans are not familiar with SG, yet those who have heard of it display smaller ideological divides regarding its effectiveness, potential risks, and preferred climate strategies. Conservatives who have heard about SG, for instance, are significantly more likely to believe it can help address climate change, while also expressing concerns aligned with liberal counterparts. These results suggest that as awareness of SG grows, it may reduce polarization and foster a more bipartisan dialogue on climate interventions [1]. More broadly, advancing responsible public engagement on SG could help bridge ideological divides that have historically stalled U.S. climate policy.
2. Theoretical framework
Climate change is a highly polarized topic in the U.S., where political ideology strongly influences public attitudes toward environmental policies. Conservatives tend to be more skeptical of human-caused climate change and oppose policies involving government intervention, while liberals are more supportive of climate action [19–21,24]. Polarization around climate policy is often reinforced by motivated reasoning, wherein individuals selectively seek and interpret information that aligns with their ideological predispositions [25–27,35]. Selective exposure to partisan information further entrenches these ideological divisions [28,29,36].
However, solar geoengineering could uniquely transcend these divides. Because SG has not yet been extensively covered in media or framed along partisan lines, it currently avoids the intense ideological polarization typical of traditional climate mitigation approaches. Furthermore, SG’s framing as a technological solution rather than a regulatory one could make it appealing to conservatives, who often associate climate action with intrusive regulation and fossil fuel restrictions [32]. Although this conservative interpretation is not aligned with the scientific consensus—which clearly positions SG as a complementary measure alongside emissions reductions [1]—its technological appeal may help foster bipartisan engagement.
Building on this idea, our central hypothesis is that increased familiarity with SG can reduce political polarization around climate change. We suggest two main theoretical pathways for this effect. First, greater familiarity with SG, a complex and still relatively unknown technology, may lead individuals to move beyond ideological priors and align more closely with the scientific consensus. Existing research indicates that clear, nonpartisan information can indeed decrease ideological divides by correcting misconceptions, even among initially skeptical groups [11,15,33,37–40]. Second, SG’s appeal as a technological rather than regulatory solution may particularly resonate with conservatives. Increased awareness of SG could thus shift conservative attitudes toward supporting climate intervention, reducing ideological gaps in climate policy preferences. Additionally, lower perceived polarization around less politicized issues like SG can encourage more open-minded, less polarized attitudes among those familiar with the technology [34].
Given these considerations, we anticipate that familiarity with SG will moderate political polarization in public opinion. Specifically, we expect polarization to be more pronounced among respondents who have not heard about SG, since they will likely rely heavily on ideological predispositions. Conversely, polarization should decrease among respondents who have heard about SG, as increased familiarity can lead to views aligned more closely with the scientific consensus and less dominated by partisan biases.
In this study, we empirically test how familiarity with SG interacts with political ideology to shape public attitudes toward three key outcomes: (1) perceived effectiveness of SG in mitigating climate change, (2) concerns about the risks associated with SG, and (3) preferences for strategies to address climate change, including SG investment and emissions reduction.
We expect that:
- Political polarization will be more pronounced among respondents unfamiliar with SG, as their opinions will more likely reflect ideological priors. Liberals unfamiliar with SG may strongly support its potential effectiveness and express higher concern about risks, while unfamiliar conservatives may display greater skepticism. Unfamiliar individuals may also lean toward pursuing both SG and emissions reduction due to uncertainty, irrespective of their political stance.
- Familiarity with SG will reduce polarization. Those who have heard about SG are expected to form opinions informed by scientific understanding rather than solely ideological alignment, thus narrowing differences between liberals and conservatives regarding its potential benefits.
- Increased familiarity with SG will result in more nuanced opinions, with individuals recognizing both the benefits and risks associated with SG. Consequently, those who have heard of SG will likely express higher concern about its risks, reflecting an awareness of the complex trade-offs involved.
- Familiar conservatives may support SG as a technological solution to avoid emissions reductions, aligning with their preference for less government intervention. In contrast, familiar liberals are more likely to endorse combining SG with aggressive emission reduction strategies, consistent with the broader scientific consensus.
3. Data and methods
We analyzed individual-level survey data from the Caltech Climate Survey, administered by YouGov. This survey includes 2,109 registered U.S. voters who participated in online interviews conducted from November 9 to November 18, 2022.
The sample was stratified based on several factors, including age groups (18–29, 30–44, 4564, and 65+), race/ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, African American, Hispanic, and other), gender (male, female), education levels (ranging from high school or less to post-graduate), and geographic regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, West). Furthermore, all analyses were weighted according to gender, age, race, and education based on the American Community Survey, conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, as well as the 2020 Presidential vote (further details are available in the Supplementary Information (S1 File), regarding the sampling methodology).
In the next section, we first show descriptive univariate and bivariate statistics of our key variables of interest on solar geoengineering, which include familiarity with SG (whether respondents have heard of SG in the past year) (For simplicity and readability, all figures labeled “heard nothing about SG” refer specifically to respondents who reported having heard nothing about SG in the past year. ) beliefs about SG’s effectiveness (whether SG will make a difference), concerns about SG, and opinions on national investment priorities— whether we should concentrate on emissions reduction, SG techniques, or both.
Next, we use more advanced statistical methods to examine the associations between political ideology (assessed on a 7-point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative) and attitudes toward solar geoengineering (SG), conditional on familiarity with SG.
First, we use two linear probability models (LPMs), which are OLS (ordinary least squares) regression models applied to binary dependent variables, to examine concerns about SG and beliefs about its effectiveness. We selected LPMs for their ease of interpretation and because they yield coefficients that can be interpreted as changes in probability. Second, we use a multinomial logistic regression model to assess preferences for different climate strategies, such as whether respondents support reducing emissions, investing in SG, or doing both.
In all of our models, we control for a range of variables that could potentially be correlated with both political ideology and perspectives on SG. These variables include gender, age, education level, subjective income, religious affiliation, environmental knowledge, and usage of social media. More detailed information on these control variables and the sample characteristics can be found in the Table A in S1 File and Table B in S1 File. While these control variables are included in our models, we refrain from interpreting them. Our primary focus is on the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward SG, conditional on familiarity with SG, rather than on these control variables, which serve the purpose of adjusting for potential confounders rather than yielding interpretable coefficients of their own [41,42].
After estimating these models, we computed predicted probabilities to present the results in an intuitive and interpretable manner. Predicted probabilities show how likely respondents are to fall into specific categories (e.g., being concerned about SG) based on their political ideology and familiarity with SG, while holding other variables constant. To generate these predicted probabilities, we used a method that creates counterfactual scenarios. Specifically, the dataset was duplicated, with key variables—such as political ideology (extremely liberal vs. extremely conservative) and familiarity with SG (heard nothing vs. heard something)— set to specific values. This approach enables a comparison between groups while keeping all other characteristics (e.g., age, education, income) constant. By comparing these counterfactual scenarios, we can show how changes in familiarity with SG might reduce the ideological divide in opinions about SG.
This method does not introduce any additional modeling assumptions beyond those already embedded in the original models. Instead, it simply allows for a more intuitive presentation of the results.
4. Results
We begin by presenting univariate statistics of key variables of interest, followed by multivariate statistical models using OLS and multinomial logistic regression.
What do American voters know about solar geoengineering (SG): Recently scientific organizations in the U.S. have recommended that additional research be conducted on ways to cool the Earth’s atmosphere. For example, by adding small reflective particles in the upper atmosphere, often called solar geoengineering. How much have you heard about solar geoengineering in the last year:
Do Americans think SG will make a difference?: Do you think that solar geoengineering would make a difference in mitigating the effects of global climate change?
Do Americans have concerns about SG?: How concerned are you about research on solar geoengineering, before the effects of SG projects on the Earth’s atmosphere are better known?
SG versus reducing carbon emissions: Some argue that to slow the effects of climate change countries should focus on reducing carbon emissions. Others argue that countries should focus on geoengineering approaches to slow global warming. How about you, do you think that countries should invest mainly in reducing carbon emissions, invest mainly in solar geoengineering techniques, or both?
These descriptive statistics indicate that over 50% of respondents have not heard about SG in the past year, with the remainder having varying levels of familiarity, ranging from “a little” to “a lot”. In the Table A in S1 File we provide an in-depth analysis of the factors correlated with familiarity with SG, showing which demographic and attitudinal variables are associated with respondents having heard about SG to any degree. The same set of factors explains higher levels of familiarity (i.e., having heard “a little”, “some”, or “a lot”) as opposed to having heard nothing. For simplicity and interpretability in our subsequent models, we dichotomize this variable. This means that we group respondents into two categories: those who have heard “nothing” about SG and those who have heard at least “a little”. By doing so, we focus our analysis on the key distinction between familiarity and unfamiliarity with SG.
Furthermore, in our questions, the term “research” was intentionally used broadly, encompassing a wide range of possible research activities—from computer modeling and laboratory studies, to small-scale atmospheric testing. We focused specifically on attitudes toward research because even preliminary research activities related to SG are currently controversial, let alone actual deployment [1,43]. However, we acknowledge that respondents may have interpreted the word “research” in different ways, potentially affecting reported levels of concern. Future surveys could therefore benefit from explicitly distinguishing among different types of research.
In Figs 1–3, we present raw descriptive bar charts (i.e., observed percentages) of respondents’ answers by whether they have heard of SG in the past year. Respondents familiar with SG are more likely to believe it will make a difference, express concerns about it, support investment in SG alone, and are less likely to want to invest in both SG and reducing emissions. Further details are shown in Fig A in S1 File and Fig B in S1 File.
After these descriptive results, we turn to multivariate regression models to explore the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward SG, conditional on familiarity with SG. As a robustness check, in the SI, we also examine models using party identification (Republicans vs. Democrats), which yield similar results to those based on political ideology.
For ease of interpretation, we dichotomized key outcome variables: whether respondents believe SG will make a difference (yes vs. no) and whether they are concerned about SG (concerned vs. not concerned). To confirm the robustness of our results, we also estimated ordered probit regressions, which are presented in the Fig C, Fig D and Fig E in S1 File. These regressions account for the ordinal nature of the original variables, and the results are substantively similar to those reported here.
Fig 4 shows the predicted probabilities derived from OLS and multinomial logit regressions for believing SG will make a difference, expressing concerns about SG, and preferences for investing in SG, reducing emissions, or both, by political ideology and familiarity with SG.
The findings highlight several important differences in attitudes toward solar geoengineering based on political ideology and familiarity with the topic. First, regarding whether SG will effectively mitigate climate change, extremely conservative respondents are significantly less likely to believe SG will make a difference compared to extremely liberal respondents. However, familiarity with SG substantially reduces this ideological divide. Among respondents unfamiliar with SG, only about 9% of extremely conservative individuals believe it will make a difference, whereas this figure rises to 36% among those familiar. In contrast, extremely liberal respondents consistently exhibit high confidence in SG’s effectiveness, with predicted probabilities around 64% for unfamiliar respondents and 68% for those familiar. Thus, familiarity with SG shrinks the ideological gap from 55 percentage points (among unfamiliar respondents) to 32 percentage points (among familiar respondents), a reduction of 23 percentage points.
Similarly, regarding concerns about SG, extremely liberal respondents initially express higher levels of concern compared to extremely conservative respondents among those unfamiliar with SG. However, increased familiarity with SG narrows this ideological gap significantly. Among those unfamiliar, the difference in concerns between liberals and conservatives is approximately 14 percentage points, decreasing to 6.6 percentage points among those familiar with SG. This narrowing primarily results from increased concern among extremely conservative respondents—from 47% among the unfamiliar to 68% among the familiar. For extremely liberal respondents, concern also increases but by a smaller margin, from 62% to 75%.
Lastly, familiarity with SG correlates with distinct preferences regarding climate strategies. Respondents familiar with SG, regardless of ideology, are more likely to favor investing exclusively in SG than respondents unfamiliar with it. This effect is stronger among extremely conservative respondents (an increase of about 13 percentage points) compared to extremely liberal respondents (an increase of about 5.5 percentage points). Conversely, both liberal and conservative respondents familiar with SG become less supportive of combining SG investment with emissions reduction strategies. This shift may reflect a stronger preference for specific policy solutions among those familiar with SG, or increased uncertainty among those unfamiliar who may default to selecting both options. There are no significant differences between familiar and unfamiliar individuals when it comes to support for reducing emissions alone.
5. Discussion
Drawing on a nationally representative sample of approximately 2,000 Americans, this study investigates the relationship between political ideology and public attitudes toward solar geoengineering, conditional on respondents’ familiarity with SG.
We first document that a significant portion of the American public—54%—has not heard of SG in the past year, confirming low public awareness of this emerging technology. Despite widespread unfamiliarity, our findings indicate that increased familiarity with SG is associated with reduced political polarization. Respondents familiar with SG are more likely to believe that it can effectively address climate change, exhibiting a substantially narrower ideological divide compared to those unfamiliar with SG. This suggests that familiarity with SG may mitigate ideological biases that often constrain productive climate policy discussions.
Additionally, familiarity with SG increases respondents’ concerns about potential risks associated with the technology, reducing the ideological gap and indicating a broader and more balanced recognition of SG’s trade-offs among informed individuals. Regarding policy preferences, our survey provided respondents with three clear, mutually exclusive choices: invest only in SG, invest only in emissions reduction, or invest in both. Although respondents preferred the combined approach, familiarity with SG modestly increased the fraction preferring investment solely in SG. We acknowledge, however, that respondents’ real-world opinions may be more nuanced than our categorical question allowed. For example, some individuals might support using SG to facilitate a slower—but still meaningful—transition to decarbonization. This “middle-ground” position, not explicitly captured in our survey, warrants further exploration. Future surveys would benefit from questions explicitly designed to capture these subtler distinctions, moving beyond binary framings to reflect a broader range of plausible policy preferences.
Interestingly, a significant share of respondents who reported not having heard about SG still expressed clear opinions on its potential effectiveness and risks. This phenomenon likely reflects individuals without prior familiarity relying on general attitudes toward climate technologies or broader ideological predispositions. Such patterns are consistent with prior research on motivated reasoning and heuristic-driven opinion formation in polarized environments [25,27,29]. For instance, Magistro and co-authors [15] demonstrate through a conjoint experiment that partisanship of information sources exerts a far greater influence on SG perceptions than the specific framing of the technology (e.g., as a “complement”, “substitute”, or “moral hazard”). When combined with our results, this suggests that respondents lacking specific knowledge about SG can still form opinions based largely on ideological predispositions, highlighting how low public awareness does not necessarily preclude strongly polarized responses.
Our findings open avenues for future experimental research aimed at understanding the mechanisms behind the observed reduction in polarization. One critical question is whether conservatives familiar with SG perceive it as a less intrusive alternative to emissions reductions, as some observers suggest. If true, such perceptions could conflict with the scientific consensus, which strongly emphasizes pairing SG with robust mitigation efforts. Experimental research is needed to clarify whether familiarity with SG genuinely fosters informed, consensus-driven opinions or merely shifts existing ideological biases into new policy domains.
Finally, our results hold important implications for climate policy more broadly. The recent National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report recommends developing targeted SG research programs, possibly in collaboration with other countries, to better understand its potential and risks [1]. Some scholars have called for a more global, participatory approach to SG research, emphasizing the importance of stakeholder and public input to address concerns about climate justice and the contentious nature of geoengineering debates [43]. Our results suggest that increasing public familiarity with SG, especially through transparent and science-based communication, could help reduce opposition and facilitate more constructive policy discussions.
In conclusion, our study points to the potential of lesser-known climate interventions like SG to bridge ideological divides, offering a rare opportunity to reduce polarization in climate politics. However, this potential is contingent on how SG is framed and communicated to the public. As such, our analysis serves as a starting point for further interdisciplinary research and policy engagement aimed at fostering a more unified approach to addressing the climate crisis. Given the ongoing challenge of political polarization, innovative approaches that emphasize broad public engagement with emerging technologies like SG will be crucial for advancing climate policy.
Supporting information
S1 File. Political Ideology: respondents self-identified political belief. Gender: respondents self-identified gender as man, woman or others. Education: respondent’s self-reported education level. Subjective Income: respondents self-reported financial status. Religion: respondents self-reported religious belief. Environmental knowledge: respondents self-reported weather and climate knowledge.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000643.s001
(PDF)
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