The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
Conceived and designed the experiments: JG BAN JH. Performed the experiments: JG. Analyzed the data: JG BAN. Wrote the paper: JG BAN JH.
We investigated the moral stereotypes political liberals and conservatives have of themselves and each other. In reality, liberals endorse the individual-focused moral concerns of compassion and fairness more than conservatives do, and conservatives endorse the group-focused moral concerns of ingroup loyalty, respect for authorities and traditions, and physical/spiritual purity more than liberals do. 2,212 U.S. participants filled out the Moral Foundations Questionnaire with their own answers, or as a typical liberal or conservative would answer. Across the political spectrum, moral stereotypes about “typical” liberals and conservatives correctly reflected the direction of actual differences in foundation endorsement but exaggerated the magnitude of these differences. Contrary to common theories of stereotyping, the moral stereotypes were not simple underestimations of the political outgroup's morality. Both liberals and conservatives exaggerated the ideological extremity of moral concerns for the ingroup as well as the outgroup. Liberals were least accurate about both groups.
“The national Democratic Party is immoral to the core. Any American who would vote for Democrats is guilty of fostering the worst kind of degeneracy. The leaders of this party are severely out of touch with mainstream, traditional American values. They are crusaders for perversion, for licentiousness, for nihilism and worse.”
—Joseph Farah
“Republicans don't believe in the imagination, partly because so few of them have one, but mostly because it gets in the way of their chosen work, which is to destroy the human race and the planet. Human beings, who have imaginations, can see a recipe for disaster in the making; Republicans, whose goal in life is to profit from disaster and who don't give a hoot about human beings, either can't or won't.”
—Michael Feingold
For as long as there have been political rivalries there have been unflattering stereotypes painted by each side about the other. These stereotypes go far beyond clichés about latte liberals and gun-rack conservatives; as the quotations above show, they often include the claim that the other side is immoral or downright evil.
Of course, evil is in the eye of the beholder, and liberal and conservative eyes seem to be tuned to different wavelengths of immorality. For conservatives, liberals have an “anything goes” morality that says everything should be permitted for the sake of inclusion and diversity, no matter how bizarre or depraved (e.g.,
Although the literature on stereotypes has tended to concentrate on biases and inaccuracies, several reviews have noted the accuracy of many social stereotypes in terms of real group differences
A review by McCauley
This brings us to politics, where people are quite willing to report their preferences for ingroups over outgroups (e.g.,
Moral Foundations Theory was created to identify the moral content areas most widely discussed in the anthropological and evolutionary literatures. The theory posits five best candidates for being the psychological “foundations” upon which moral virtues and institutions can be socially constructed. The first two foundations are Harm/care (involving intuitions of sympathy, compassion, and nurturance) and Fairness/reciprocity (including notions of rights and justice). These two foundations are generally concerned with the protection and fair treatment of individuals; they are therefore called the two “individualizing” foundations. The other three foundations, in contrast, are called the “binding” foundations because they underlie moral systems in which people are bound into larger groups and institutions. (These labels are not meant to imply that welfare and fairness concerns can never be group-focused, or that the others can never be individual-focused; see
Graham, Haidt, and Nosek
If this pattern is found so consistently, are people aware of these differences? Research on partisan stereotypes
To examine the moral stereotypes that liberals and conservatives hold about each other, we took advantage of a method introduced by Dawes, Singer, and Lemons
Regarding our first research question (Are moral stereotypes accurate?), because of the pervasiveness of the actual liberal-conservative differences, we predicted that participants would, on average, correctly guess that liberals value the individualizing foundations more than conservatives do, and that conservatives value the binding foundations more than liberals do. Regarding our second question (Are these stereotypes exaggerations of real group differences?), although McCauley
Following the existing stereotype literature, we consider the first hypothesis to be the default prediction: if the results only show outgroup derogation by partisans about each other, then moral stereotypes are no different than other forms of stereotyping. However, if the results show asymmetrical inaccuracies (hypotheses 2 and 3), inaccuracies about the ingroup as well as the outgroup, or overestimations as well as underestimations of moral values, then this would suggest that moral stereotypes involve novel psychological processes beyond the well-understood intergroup stereotyping processes driving exaggeration of outgroup characteristics.
The participants were 2,212 visitors (62% female; median age 28; only U.S. residents or citizens) to ProjectImplicit.org, where they were randomly assigned to this study. All participants in the research pool had previously filled out demographic information, including sex, age, and political identity (7-point scale, strongly liberal to strongly conservative). 1,174 participants self-identified using one of the three liberal options, 538 chose the “moderate” midpoint, and 500 chose one of the three conservative options. Data from 77 participants were excluded because of high ratings on the catch item of the MFQ; removal of these participants did not significantly alter any of the results. The study was approved by the University of Virginia Institutional Review Board.
The MFQ consists of two parts, moral relevance and moral judgments. In the relevance part, participants indicate the moral relevance of foundation-related concerns (e.g., “whether or not someone did something disgusting,” for Purity) on a 6-point scale, from never relevant to always relevant. In the judgments section, participants rated their agreement with foundation-related statements (e.g., “It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself,” for Ingroup) on a 6-point scale, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Alphas for the foundation subscales were .71 (Harm), .69 (Fairness), .58 (Ingroup), .73 (Authority), and .83 (Purity).
To keep the study session brief and repetitiveness to a minimum, we capitalized on the power of a large sample with a planned missingness design
Instructions for the liberal [and conservative] versions of the moral relevance measures read as follows:
When A TYPICAL LIBERAL [CONSERVATIVE] decides whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to the liberal's [conservative's] thinking? Remember, instead of selecting your own answers, answer all questions as a typical liberal [conservative].
Instructions for the moral judgments measure read as follows:
Please read the following statements and indicate the extent to which A TYPICAL LIBERAL [CONSERVATIVE] would agree or disagree. Remember, instead of selecting your own answers, answer all questions as a typical liberal [conservative].
To gauge the accuracy of participants' predictions of “typical” liberal and conservative responses, we needed a standard of comparison. The most obvious comparisons were the
To further increase confidence in our exaggeration interpretations, we also obtained scores for a short-form MFQ collected from a nationally-representative sample
We measured and analyzed accuracy at the level of moral foundations subscores, aggregates of 4–5 items each; this allowed us to capture accuracy in terms of mean foundational concerns, as well as relative rankings of the five foundations. For the ten MFQ subscores (five foundations measured by relevance and judgments subscales) we compared predicted (moral stereotype) scores answered as a typical liberal or typical conservative to four criteria: (a) the actual liberal/conservative means in the current sample, (b) the actual means for extreme liberals/conservatives in the current sample, (c) the actual liberal/conservative means in the representative sample, and (d) the actual means for extreme liberals/conservatives in the representative sample.
As an example, the mean Harm-relevance score for all participants answering as a typical conservative was 2.46, with a standard deviation of 1.11 (see
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Relevance: | Harm | 3.77 | 0.93 | 4.00 | 0.80 | 4.11 | 0.80 | 2.46 | 1.11 | 3.43 | 0.95 | 3.23 | 1.11 |
Fairness | 3.87 | 0.90 | 3.78 | 0.82 | 4.00 | 0.76 | 2.29 | 1.07 | 3.11 | 0.91 | 3.11 | 1.12 | |
Ingroup | 2.53 | 0.89 | 2.60 | 0.94 | 2.40 | 0.95 | 3.12 | 0.90 | 2.72 | 0.98 | 2.46 | 1.17 | |
Authority | 2.36 | 0.86 | 2.44 | 0.84 | 2.26 | 0.86 | 3.41 | 0.84 | 2.88 | 0.77 | 3.04 | 0.87 | |
Purity | 2.06 | 1.00 | 2.33 | 0.97 | 2.14 | 1.02 | 3.38 | 0.97 | 3.02 | 0.95 | 3.14 | 1.21 | |
Judgments: | Harm | 3.72 | 0.92 | 3.53 | 0.88 | 3.64 | 0.90 | 2.72 | 1.10 | 2.98 | 0.92 | 2.92 | 0.95 |
Fairness | 3.79 | 0.87 | 3.76 | 0.79 | 4.00 | 0.75 | 2.55 | 1.02 | 3.05 | 0.78 | 2.90 | 0.91 | |
Ingroup | 1.81 | 0.81 | 1.85 | 0.88 | 1.73 | 0.84 | 2.96 | 0.89 | 2.32 | 0.81 | 2.52 | 0.95 | |
Authority | 2.05 | 1.09 | 2.39 | 0.99 | 2.05 | 0.97 | 4.08 | 0.94 | 3.58 | 0.74 | 3.93 | 0.74 | |
Purity | 1.62 | 1.12 | 1.63 | 1.09 | 1.38 | 1.13 | 3.74 | 1.12 | 3.04 | 1.01 | 3.27 | 1.03 |
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Relevance: | Harm | 3.81 | 1.03 | 3.77 | 0.96 | 4.31 | 0.53 | 2.35 | 1.22 | 3.43 | 1.10 | 3.57 | 1.16 |
Fairness | 3.85 | 1.03 | 3.57 | 0.96 | 3.92 | 0.70 | 2.25 | 1.22 | 3.22 | 1.04 | 3.35 | 1.15 | |
Ingroup | 2.36 | 1.27 | 2.93 | 1.23 | 2.92 | 1.38 | 3.12 | 1.30 | 3.18 | 1.33 | 3.39 | 1.22 | |
Authority | 2.34 | 1.13 | 2.95 | 0.95 | 2.48 | 1.15 | 3.81 | 0.98 | 3.30 | 1.03 | 3.54 | 1.00 | |
Purity | 1.73 | 1.16 | 2.53 | 1.22 | 2.17 | 1.40 | 3.52 | 1.12 | 3.16 | 1.19 | 3.54 | 1.13 | |
Judgments: | Harm | 3.73 | 1.15 | 3.23 | 1.03 | 3.50 | 1.11 | 2.32 | 1.38 | 2.78 | 1.16 | 2.84 | 1.17 |
Fairness | 4.18 | 1.01 | 3.95 | 0.81 | 4.13 | 0.77 | 3.07 | 1.30 | 3.63 | 0.99 | 3.41 | 1.17 | |
Authority | 2.39 | 1.27 | 3.40 | 0.96 | 2.96 | 1.17 | 4.26 | 0.98 | 4.00 | 0.79 | 4.11 | 0.95 | |
Purity | 1.72 | 1.38 | 2.71 | 1.18 | 2.10 | 1.41 | 3.64 | 1.21 | 3.53 | 0.98 | 4.01 | 0.95 |
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Relevance: | Harm | −1.89 | 1281.15 | −0.11 | −6.33 | 427.36 | −0.61 | −6.47 | 385.75 | −0.66 | −17.93 | 571.72 | −1.50 | −9.08 | 532.89 | −0.79 | −5.12 | 535.73 | −0.44 |
Fairness | 5.22 | 1270.77 | 0.29 | −2.65 | 435.51 | −0.25 | 0.14 | 418.73 | 0.01 | −15.99 | 580.92 | −1.33 | −7.44 | 526.33 | −0.65 | −3.81 | 532.36 | −0.33 | |
Ingroup | −3.44 | 1253.77 | −0.19 | 1.22 | 520.94 | 0.11 | 0.49 | 481.33 | 0.04 | 7.72 | 469.87 | 0.71 | 5.12 | 546.99 | 0.44 | 1.88 | 543.74 | 0.16 | |
Authority | −1.91 | 1264.17 | −0.11 | 1.09 | 464.44 | 0.10 | −3.85 | 441.87 | −0.37 | 9.82 | 572.81 | 0.82 | 7.41 | 527.65 | 0.65 | 6.35 | 541.44 | 0.55 | |
Purity | −4.72 | 1278.15 | −0.26 | −0.77 | 491.63 | −0.07 | −7.33 | 451.77 | −0.69 | 6.53 | 531.09 | 0.57 | 2.30 | 539.96 | 0.20 | 3.74 | 545.00 | 0.32 | |
Judgments: | Harm | 6.51 | 1286.48 | 0.36 | 0.45 | 462.67 | 0.04 | 1.28 | 475.18 | 0.12 | −5.16 | 626.68 | −0.41 | −0.90 | 524.02 | −0.08 | −1.25 | 505.71 | −0.11 |
Fairness | 6.04 | 1279.04 | 0.34 | −3.74 | 428.03 | −0.36 | −3.73 | 481.93 | −0.34 | −9.37 | 700.27 | −0.71 | −4.47 | 512.56 | −0.39 | −3.67 | 503.77 | −0.33 | |
Ingroup | −3.79 | 1270.49 | −0.21 | 1.52 | 576.13 | 0.13 | 2.06 | 551.54 | 0.18 | 12.13 | 580.37 | 1.01 | 7.59 | 529.00 | 0.66 | 5.83 | 521.19 | 0.51 | |
Authority | −8.53 | 1284.70 | −0.48 | −0.35 | 445.33 | −0.03 | −4.96 | 448.14 | −0.47 | 8.66 | 670.83 | 0.67 | 4.77 | 475.30 | 0.44 | 7.31 | 523.64 | 0.64 | |
Purity | −3.87 | 1278.19 | −0.22 | 4.74 | 494.39 | 0.43 | 1.10 | 468.42 | 0.10 | 10.51 | 580.14 | 0.87 | 4.47 | 509.34 | 0.40 | 7.99 | 523.15 | 0.70 |
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Relevance: | Harm | −3.01 | 326.80 | −0.33 | −5.78 | 478.58 | −0.53 | −5.87 | 461.51 | −0.55 | −6.04 | 36.17 | −2.01 | −2.93 | 41.84 | −0.91 | −1.20 | 40.97 | −0.38 |
Fairness | 0.11 | 339.27 | 0.01 | −4.62 | 475.86 | −0.42 | −2.60 | 460.96 | −0.24 | −6.37 | 35.97 | −2.12 | −3.21 | 41.19 | −1.00 | −1.68 | 40.26 | −0.53 | |
Ingroup | 0.37 | 304.77 | 0.04 | 3.19 | 434.43 | 0.31 | 2.59 | 433.84 | 0.25 | 4.96 | 34.93 | 1.68 | 3.80 | 38.78 | 1.22 | 2.36 | 38.40 | 0.76 | |
Authority | 1.50 | 308.12 | 0.17 | 2.95 | 456.37 | 0.28 | −0.76 | 447.19 | −0.07 | 2.85 | 36.41 | 0.95 | 2.27 | 42.60 | 0.69 | 1.82 | 40.53 | 0.57 | |
Purity | −0.83 | 316.98 | −0.09 | 1.39 | 440.46 | 0.13 | −3.59 | 440.19 | −0.34 | 1.99 | 35.28 | 0.67 | 0.44 | 39.54 | 0.14 | 1.08 | 38.00 | 0.35 | |
Judgments: | Harm | 2.96 | 352.95 | 0.31 | −0.96 | 484.70 | −0.09 | −0.35 | 482.81 | −0.03 | −1.99 | 55.74 | −0.53 | −0.09 | 67.70 | −0.02 | −0.27 | 67.93 | −0.07 |
Fairness | 0.21 | 371.54 | 0.02 | −5.85 | 491.58 | −0.53 | −6.25 | 490.83 | −0.56 | −3.24 | 55.83 | −0.87 | −1.22 | 64.72 | −0.30 | −0.82 | 63.53 | −0.21 | |
Ingroup | −0.89 | 352.20 | −0.09 | 2.90 | 451.04 | 0.27 | 3.28 | 464.37 | 0.30 | 4.15 | 52.35 | 1.15 | 2.51 | 60.93 | 0.64 | 1.62 | 59.53 | 0.42 | |
Authority | −1.62 | 377.07 | −0.17 | 3.17 | 493.39 | 0.29 | −0.31 | 494.19 | −0.03 | 1.50 | 58.22 | 0.39 | 0.14 | 82.66 | 0.03 | 1.08 | 65.07 | 0.27 | |
Purity | 0.34 | 338.81 | 0.04 | 6.06 | 471.20 | 0.56 | 3.17 | 483.64 | 0.29 | 3.53 | 54.63 | 0.96 | 1.06 | 72.24 | 0.25 | 3.02 | 58.37 | 0.79 |
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Relevance: | Harm | 2.46 | 391.36 | 0.25 | −1.08 | 515.34 | −0.09 | −1.45 | 488.15 | −0.13 | −17.92 | 680.00 | −1.37 | −8.80 | 550.21 | −0.75 | −6.56 | 560.31 | −0.55 |
Fairness | 6.63 | 401.81 | 0.66 | 0.07 | 509.87 | 0.01 | 1.31 | 495.63 | 0.12 | −17.88 | 699.29 | −1.35 | −8.48 | 533.44 | −0.73 | −3.78 | 538.53 | −0.33 | |
Ingroup | −7.85 | 402.02 | −0.78 | −3.28 | 509.00 | −0.29 | −3.97 | 493.61 | −0.36 | 0.33 | 639.17 | 0.03 | −0.43 | 571.93 | −0.04 | −2.58 | 570.16 | −0.22 | |
Authority | −7.30 | 461.20 | −0.68 | −4.64 | 506.78 | −0.41 | −9.26 | 488.12 | −0.84 | 8.02 | 638.68 | 0.63 | 4.96 | 579.52 | 0.41 | 6.54 | 589.20 | 0.54 | |
Purity | −10.03 | 394.04 | −1.01 | −4.40 | 500.56 | −0.39 | −9.09 | 495.01 | −0.82 | 6.73 | 619.98 | 0.54 | 1.83 | 576.95 | 0.15 | 1.90 | 584.48 | 0.16 | |
Judgments: | Harm | 8.37 | 435.83 | 0.80 | 3.38 | 512.00 | 0.30 | 2.95 | 513.68 | 0.26 | −7.08 | 778.47 | −0.51 | −1.72 | 523.85 | −0.15 | −3.12 | 510.30 | −0.28 |
Fairness | 6.64 | 440.90 | 0.63 | 0.48 | 491.21 | 0.04 | −0.31 | 503.19 | −0.03 | −9.24 | 827.57 | −0.64 | −3.21 | 502.35 | −0.29 | −3.56 | 468.95 | −0.33 | |
Authority | −12.91 | 523.46 | −1.13 | −7.01 | 494.97 | −0.63 | −10.06 | 498.34 | −0.90 | 4.69 | 804.21 | 0.33 | 2.34 | 473.33 | 0.22 | 3.85 | 523.87 | 0.34 | |
Purity | −12.84 | 462.81 | −1.19 | −4.84 | 512.59 | −0.43 | −7.61 | 515.71 | −0.67 | 2.78 | 797.42 | 0.20 | −1.58 | 475.99 | −0.14 | 1.50 | 534.26 | 0.13 |
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Relevance: Harm | −2.17 | 30.64 | −0.78 | −2.79 | 51.19 | −0.78 | −2.85 | 55.95 | −0.76 | −7.91 | 40.32 | −2.49 | −4.55 | 47.82 | −1.32 | −3.68 | 46.42 | −1.08 | |
Fairness | 0.59 | 28.32 | 0.22 | −1.45 | 40.00 | −0.46 | −1.02 | 38.80 | −0.33 | −7.78 | 40.17 | −2.46 | −4.33 | 47.47 | −1.26 | −2.31 | 46.83 | −0.67 | |
Ingroup | −2.96 | 26.41 | −1.15 | −1.33 | 29.51 | −0.49 | −1.58 | 30.78 | −0.57 | −0.85 | 42.26 | −0.26 | −1.12 | 50.26 | −0.32 | −2.18 | 49.95 | −0.62 | |
Authority | −0.46 | 26.68 | −0.18 | 0.08 | 30.42 | 0.03 | −1.76 | 30.62 | −0.64 | 1.89 | 41.58 | 0.59 | 1.01 | 48.08 | 0.29 | 1.79 | 46.24 | 0.53 | |
Purity | −2.24 | 26.27 | −0.88 | −0.44 | 28.53 | −0.16 | −2.48 | 28.84 | −0.92 | 0.77 | 41.46 | 0.24 | −1.00 | 48.96 | −0.29 | −1.05 | 47.34 | −0.31 | |
Judgments: Harm | 1.87 | 26.89 | 0.72 | 0.26 | 30.71 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 31.68 | 0.05 | −3.00 | 43.69 | −0.91 | −1.03 | 51.88 | −0.29 | −1.71 | 51.36 | −0.48 | |
Fairness | 1.43 | 27.50 | 0.54 | −0.59 | 36.67 | −0.20 | −0.92 | 35.66 | −0.31 | −2.50 | 42.79 | −0.76 | −0.34 | 49.49 | −0.10 | −0.52 | 50.72 | −0.15 | |
Authority | −2.81 | 27.16 | −1.08 | −1.07 | 31.59 | −0.38 | −2.24 | 31.74 | −0.80 | 1.13 | 42.01 | 0.35 | 0.37 | 51.13 | 0.10 | 1.02 | 46.02 | 0.30 | |
Purity | −2.38 | 26.72 | −0.92 | 0.14 | 30.10 | 0.05 | −0.93 | 29.83 | −0.34 | −1.28 | 44.84 | −0.38 | −2.85 | 59.59 | −0.74 | −2.05 | 50.30 | −0.58 |
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Relevance: | Harm | −0.57 | 0.07 | −0.88 | 0.20 | −1.31 | 0.04 | −1.78 | 0.05 | −0.97 | 0.09 | −0.58 | 0.09 |
Fairness | −0.67 | 0.06 | −0.89 | 0.20 | −1.57 | 0.04 | −2.02 | 0.05 | −1.14 | 0.09 | −0.99 | 0.09 | |
Ingroup | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.21 | 0.58 | 0.04 | 0.78 | 0.05 | 0.46 | 0.08 | 0.24 | 0.08 | |
Authority | 0.43 | 0.06 | 0.77 | 0.16 | 1.05 | 0.04 | 1.09 | 0.05 | 0.90 | 0.08 | 1.11 | 0.08 | |
Purity | 0.69 | 0.07 | 0.99 | 0.22 | 1.32 | 0.04 | 1.39 | 0.05 | 0.95 | 0.09 | 1.53 | 0.09 | |
Judgments: | Harm | −0.55 | 0.07 | −0.72 | 0.15 | −1.00 | 0.04 | −1.25 | 0.06 | −0.65 | 0.09 | −0.74 | 0.09 |
Fairness | −0.70 | 0.06 | −1.10 | 0.14 | −1.24 | 0.04 | −1.63 | 0.05 | −0.80 | 0.08 | −0.75 | 0.08 | |
Ingroup | 0.47 | 0.06 | 0.79 | 0.15 | 1.15 | 0.04 | 1.41 | 0.05 | 0.93 | 0.07 | 0.76 | 0.07 | |
Authority | 1.20 | 0.06 | 1.89 | 0.13 | 2.04 | 0.04 | 2.22 | 0.05 | 1.59 | 0.10 | 2.04 | 0.09 | |
Purity | 1.41 | 0.07 | 1.89 | 0.17 | 2.12 | 0.05 | 2.47 | 0.06 | 1.47 | 0.10 | 1.97 | 0.09 |
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Relevance: | Harm | −0.34 | 0.09 | −0.74 | 0.22 | −1.45 | 0.05 | −1.89 | 0.06 | −1.08 | 0.10 | −0.81 | 0.10 |
Fairness | −0.35 | 0.08 | −0.57 | 0.23 | −1.60 | 0.05 | −2.14 | 0.06 | −1.14 | 0.10 | −0.82 | 0.10 | |
Ingroup | 0.25 | 0.11 | 0.47 | 0.34 | 0.76 | 0.05 | 0.98 | 0.07 | 0.57 | 0.11 | 0.45 | 0.12 | |
Authority | 0.35 | 0.08 | 1.06 | 0.28 | 1.48 | 0.04 | 1.47 | 0.06 | 1.22 | 0.10 | 1.78 | 0.09 | |
Purity | 0.63 | 0.10 | 1.37 | 0.33 | 1.79 | 0.05 | 2.01 | 0.06 | 1.28 | 0.10 | 1.80 | 0.10 | |
Judgments: | Harm | −0.45 | 0.09 | −0.66 | 0.29 | −1.42 | 0.05 | −1.75 | 0.07 | −0.96 | 0.11 | −1.07 | 0.11 |
Fairness | −0.32 | 0.08 | −0.72 | 0.24 | −1.11 | 0.05 | −1.50 | 0.06 | −0.66 | 0.10 | −0.63 | 0.10 | |
Authority | 0.60 | 0.08 | 1.15 | 0.28 | 1.87 | 0.05 | 2.00 | 0.06 | 1.51 | 0.10 | 1.92 | 0.10 | |
Purity | 0.82 | 0.09 | 1.91 | 0.32 | 1.92 | 0.05 | 2.26 | 0.07 | 1.24 | 0.12 | 1.82 | 0.11 |
As both the top panel (comparisons to current sample) and bottom panel (comparisons to representative sample) of
Stereotypes about the Harm and Fairness concerns of the typical liberal tended to be more accurate as compared to actual liberal scores in the two datasets. Here again conservatives were the most accurate, only slightly underestimating liberal individualizing concerns (average
Stereotypes about the typical liberal, on the other hand, tended to underestimate the binding moral concerns actual liberals reported. Here again liberals were the least accurate, underestimating their own binding concerns the most (average
Our results go beyond previous studies, however, in finding and explaining an otherwise puzzling result: liberals were the least accurate. We presented three competing hypotheses about accuracy: 1) We found some support for the hypothesis that moderates would be most accurate, which they were in the case of the binding foundations. However, and most crucially, partisan inaccuracies were not mirror images of each other (in which case the red and blue lines in
While we obtained a nationally-representative sample for comparison of MFQ scores, it is important to note that the predicted answers as typical liberals/conservatives all came from a non-representative Project Implicit sample. However, the participants in this study do “run the gamut” across the ideological spectrum, from very liberal to very conservative, and
Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out reference effects in these predictions based on non-representative sampling. In particular, while the conservatives in this sample are indeed conservative, they may also have different social experiences than a representative conservative. For example, conservatives who live in urban or predominately liberal enclaves might have greater insight into liberal beliefs than conservatives who live in rural or predominately conservative enclaves. A useful follow-up investigation would examine the effect of exposure to liberals and conservatives in one's social context. If this is impactful, and if the present sample is systematically skewed in this regard, then accounting for social context may qualify the present conclusion of conservatives having greater accuracy than liberals. It is also worth noting that our single ideology item did not allow for participants to indicate that they were libertarian, or that they were liberal on social issues but conservative on economic issues. Research on libertarians has revealed a pattern of moral concerns unlike that of liberals, moderates, or conservatives
The ideological “culture war” in the U.S. is, in part, an honest disagreement about ends (moral values that each side wants to advance), as well as an honest disagreement about means (laws and policies) to advance those ends. But our findings suggest that there is an additional process at work: partisans on each side exaggerate the degree to which the other side pursues moral ends that are different from their own. Much of this exaggeration comes from each side underestimating the degree to which the other side shares its own values. But some of it comes, unexpectedly, from overestimating the degree to which “typical” members of one's own side endorse its values. Studies of ingroup stereotypes tend to show that they are more accurate and less exaggerated than stereotypes about an outgroup
The asymmetrical pattern found in moral stereotypes about the individualizing foundations fits remarkably well with recent work on ideological opponent and own-group misperceptions. Examining co-perceptions of conflicting groups such as pro-life/pro-choice and hawks/doves, Chambers and Melnyk
It is striking that instead of basic partisan outgroup derogation, in which both sides predict that the other is less moral in general, we found foundation-specific moral stereotypes about liberals and conservatives—and these moral stereotypes were largely shared by all. Participants across the political spectrum exaggerated liberal moral disregard for Ingroup, Authority, and Purity, and conservative disregard for Harm and Fairness—that is, exaggerations of the patterns predicted by Moral Foundations Theory. This suggests that moral stereotypes might be unique in that they are motivated (partisans want to cast the other side as immoral) and yet partisans share the
Chambers and Melnyk
We thank Christian Smith and Steve Vaisey for making available their nationally-representative moral foundations data, and we thank Selin Kesebir for assistance with statistical formulas.