The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
Conceived and designed the experiments: ES ABG GF. Analyzed the data: ES ABG GF. Wrote the paper: ES ABG GF.
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control makes a number of recommendations aimed at restricting the marketing of tobacco products. Tobacco industry political activity has been identified as an obstacle to Parties’ development and implementation of these provisions. This study systematically reviews the existing literature on tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations and develops taxonomies of 1) industry strategies and tactics and 2) industry frames and arguments.
Searches were conducted between April-July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Articles were included if they made reference to tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations; supported claims with verifiable evidence; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990–2013. 48 articles met the review criteria. Narrative synthesis was used to combine the evidence.
56% of articles focused on activity in North America, Europe or Australasia, the rest focusing on Asia (17%), South America, Africa or transnational activity. Six main political strategies and four main frames were identified. The tobacco industry frequently claims that the proposed policy will have negative unintended consequences, that there are legal barriers to regulation, and that the regulation is unnecessary because, for example, industry does not market to youth or adheres to a voluntary code. The industry primarily conveys these arguments through direct and indirect lobbying, the promotion of voluntary codes and alternative policies, and the formation of alliances with other industrial sectors. The majority of tactics and arguments were used in multiple jurisdictions.
Tobacco industry political activity is far more diverse than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate political activity. Tactics and arguments are repeated across jurisdictions, suggesting that the taxonomies of industry tactics and arguments developed in this paper are generalisable to multiple jurisdictions and can be used to predict industry activity.
The public availability of internal tobacco industry (TI) documents resulting from state-level litigation and the signing of the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in the USA has formed the basis of an extensive body of work on TI political activity (see
This paper therefore aims to both systematically review the existing literature on strategies used by the TI to influence regulation aimed at restricting the marketing of tobacco products, and to develop taxonomies for categorising the tactics and arguments used. By providing a summary of industry actions in this area, this review is likely to be a valuable resource for enhancing the ability of public health advocates and policymakers to understand, predict, and potentially counter tactics the TI might use to exert influence on policy and the types of arguments it is most likely to make when it does. This is particularly important given that multiple Articles of the World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) make recommendations regarding the marketing of tobacco products, for example Article 13 recommends a “comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and sponsorship”
This review aimed to identify all articles that examined TI attempts to influence marketing regulation from 1990 to 2013 (see
The databases Web of Knowledge (which includes Web of Science, BIOSIS Previews, and MEDLINE), Business Source Premier, and Embase were searched using the search string:
Initial study inclusion/exclusion criteria were discussed extensively between all three authors, piloted and re-piloted. The final inclusion/exclusion criteria used in this review can be seen in
Data extraction (
This review splits TI political activity into ‘strategies’ which include individual ‘tactics’ (the methods by which a corporation attempts to exert influence) and ‘frames’ which include individual ‘arguments’ (the reasons given by a corporation as to why they oppose one idea or support another).
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) paper
Hillman and Hitt’s
We initially developed our list of strategies/tactics and frames/arguments via ‘a priori coding’
In this paper the tactics and arguments used by the TI were categorised using the taxonomies outlined above. We then counted the number of times each was used. If a tactic or argument was referred to more than once (in one or multiple articles) regarding the
The geography of where each tactic and argument was used was also identified. If the article included was transnational, wherever possible the geography of where the individual tactics and arguments were used was listed. For example, the article by ASH
In total 48 articles that mentioned arguments and tactics used by the TI when attempting to influence marketing regulation were included within this review. Over half (56%) of the articles focussed on activity in North America, Europe or Australasia, 17% focussed on Asia (
Geographical Location | Number of articles (%) | Articles |
Africa | ||
Asia | ||
Australasia | ||
Europe | ||
North America | ||
South America | ||
Transnational | ||
Different official bodies class Uzbekistan as either a Central Asian or European country. We have categorised it as Asian, as per the UN
The TI uses a number of recurring tactics (
Strategy (number of times identified) | Tactic | Number of times identified, by geography | |
Information (44) | Direct lobbying (meetings and correspondence with legislators/policymakers) | ||
Indirect lobbying (using third parties, including front groups, to lobby on the industry’s behalf) | |||
Shaping the evidence base | Commissioning, writing (or ghost writing), or disseminating research/publications |
||
Preparing position papers, technical reports or data on impacts (including economic impact studies) | |||
Establishing industry/policymaker collaboration (e.g. via working group, technical group, advisory group)/work alongside policymakers providing technical support/advice | |||
Constituency building (42) | External constituency building | Form alliances with and mobilise other industry sectors/business/trade organisations | |
Media advocacy (press releases, publicity campaigns, public hearings, interviews) | |||
Form alliances with or mobilize unions/civil society organizations/consumers/employees/the public | |||
Creation of front groups or astroturf organisations |
|||
Internal constituency building | Collaboration between companies/development of pan-industry group or industry trade association |
||
Policy substitution |
Develop/promote (new or existing) voluntary code/self-regulation | ||
Develop/promote alternative regulatory policy |
|||
Develop/promote non-regulatory initiative (generally seen to be ineffective/less effective, e.g. education programmes) | |||
Legal (15) | Pre-emption | ||
Using litigation/threat of legal action | |||
Constituency fragmentation and destabilization (2) | Preventing the emergence of, neutralising and/or discrediting potential opponents (individuals, organisations or coalitions) | ||
Financial Incentive (2) | Providing current or offering future employment to those in influential role | ||
Gifts, entertainment or other direct financial inducement |
Including research/publications intended to undermine or misrepresent existing evidence.
Creation of group for specific purpose of working against proposed policy.
Routine use of a trade association was not counted, industry collaboration had to be ‘active’.
Includes efforts to prevent the implementation of ‘anticipated’ policies.
In some cases, industry uses legislators to promote their alternative policies.
Frame (number of times identified) | Argument | Number of times identified, by geography | ||
Negative Unintended Consequences (32) | Economic (21) | Manufacturers (10) | The cost of compliance for manufacturers will be high/the time required for implementation has been underestimated | |
Regulation will result in financial or job losses (among manufacturers) | ||||
The regulation is discriminatory/regulation will not affect all producers/customers equally | ||||
Public Revenue (7) | Regulation will cause economic/financial problems (for city, state, country or economic area (e.g. European Union)) | |||
Associated industries (4) | Regulation will result in financial or job losses (among retailers and other associated industries, e.g. printing, advertising, leisure) | |||
Public Health (4) | Regulation will have negative public health consequences | |||
Illicit Trade |
Regulation will cause an increase in illicit trade | |||
Other (5) | Regulation could have other negative unintended consequences (e.g. cause confusion amongst customers, set a precedent for other types of products/’slippery slope’) | |||
Legal (30) | Infringes legal rights of company (trademarks, intellectual property, constitutionally protected free speech (e.g. US First Amendment), international trade agreements) | |||
Regulation is more extensive than necessary/regulation is disproportionate | ||||
Body doesn’t have the power to regulate/it’s beyond their jurisdiction | ||||
Regulation will cause an increase in compensation claims | ||||
Regulatory Redundancy (13) | Industry adheres to own self-regulation codes/self-regulation is working well | |||
Industry only markets to those of legal age/is actively opposed to minors using product | ||||
Existing regulation is satisfactory/existing regulation is satisfactory, but requires better enforcement | ||||
Insufficient Evidence (11) | There’s insufficient evidence that the proposed policy will work/marketing doesn’t cause or change behaviour (it’s only used for brand selection and capturing market share), so regulation will have no effect | |||
The health impacts of consumption remain unproven |
‘Illicit Trade’ is separate as it both undermines public health policy and has economic consequences.
This review identified 18 separate tactics (
The strategies ‘Constituency fragmentation’ and ‘Financial incentive’ were documented least frequently and each only in a single geographic region (North America and Europe respectively). The other strategies were widely used, although two individual tactics were only documented in single jurisdictions: pre-emption (Legal strategy) was only seen in the USA, although used in multiple states; and the preparation of position papers/technical reports (Information strategy) was only seen in the European Union. A further Information tactic, establishing collaboration with or working alongside policymakers, was only identified in Europe but within two jurisdictions.
A variety of Information strategies were identified and widely used. These include direct
The use of indirect lobbying, where the TI’s interests are often hidden behind front groups or allies from other industry sectors or trade organisations, was also frequent. Evidence from only Europe and North America may reflect the loss of TI credibility in these regions and hence its need to use third parties, or it may simply reflect the research base. Examples illustrate the range of contexts in which this tactic was used. When opposing the UK’s Tobacco Advertising Bill in 2000, for example, the TI “encouraged a range of other organisations” to lobby the government on their behalf, these included the British Brands Group, the Association of Convenience Stores, and the Advertising Association
Attempts to shape the evidence base were also identified as a key element of the TI’s information strategy
External Constituency Building was often linked to indirect lobbying because the TI both creates front groups or astroturf organisations to lobby on its behalf
Internal Constituency Building (collaboration among manufacturers) was also common and cut across different policies and jurisdictions
The use of policy substitution also appears to be a key strategy used to prevent the implementation of marketing regulations, and has been documented globally. Most frequently the TI proposes the implementation of voluntary regulation in place of formal legislation
Similarly, the TI often develops or promotes non-regulatory initiatives, such as youth education programmes, in order to avoid more formal legislation and appear socially responsible
The third policy substitution tactic identified is the development or promotion of an alternative regulatory policy to the one being proposed that is less effective and more favourable to their business interests
Using or threatening legal action against a proposed regulation was commonly used and seen globally
This review identified 17 separate arguments (
While all of the frames were seen across a wide range of geographic areas, again highlighting the cross-national nature of TI political activity, three arguments within these frames were only used in one jurisdiction: “Regulation will cause an increase in illicit trade” was only identified as having been used in the USA
A large number of arguments focused on the negative unintended consequences of legislation. These included claims of economic losses to tobacco manufacturers (both compliance costs and job losses)
Arguments questioning the legality of policies to curb TI marketing (legal frame) are very common and aim to shift the focus of the debate away from public health and consumer protection, aiming instead to highlight the potential administrative costs of new policies. The argument that a proposed policy contravenes the TI’s legal rights has been widely used to fight a variety of public health policies including the regulation of packaging (health warnings and plain packaging)
Other arguments falling within the legal frame involve exaggerated and emotive claims such that regulation is “extreme”, “disproportionate” (PM on plain packaging
Arguments that the regulation is unnecessary (regulatory redundancy frame) were also frequently used. These claims took a variety of forms including that the TI is opposed to youth smoking and does not market to youth
Questioning the strength of evidence
There are major doubts over the accuracy of almost all of the arguments identified in this taxonomy. For example, asserting that plain packaging violates trademarks under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules ignores the distinction made between registration and use under TRIPS and the Paris Convention
This systematic review suggests that the TI uses a relatively narrow range of strategies/tactics and frames/arguments when attempting to influence marketing regulation, albeit a wider range than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate political activity. This review also suggests that TI political activity is not geographically specific, with strategies/tactics and frames/arguments being used across a wide variety of jurisdictions. Consequently the taxonomies developed within this paper are likely to be helpful in understanding TI political activity internationally.
Hillman and Hitt’s
Although it appears that the TI uses a number of discrete arguments within a narrow range of frames, many of them fall within a larger ‘cost-benefit’ meta-frame which promotes the economic and social costs of proposed public health policies and underplays their benefits. This approach is highly relevant to current policymaking which embeds stakeholder consultation and impact assessments within the process of policy formation. It has previously been shown that the TI successfully lobbied for the introduction of impact assessments in Europe (impact assessments using a cost-benefit approach in which the impacts of policies are monetised) because it felt that this system would work to its advantage and make it harder for public health policies to be implemented
Finally we note that there is some overlap in the tactics and arguments used by the TI. For example, there is both a legal strategy and a legal frame, the policy substitution strategy overlaps with the regulatory redundancy frame (especially, for example, the tactic ‘develop/promote voluntary code/self-regulation’ and argument ‘industry adheres to own self-regulation’), and many of the arguments within the negative unintended consequences frame are linked to efforts in constituency building. This highlights how the tactics and arguments used by the TI are mutually reinforcing.
This review has a number of limitations. First, although a broad search strategy and search string was used when initially identifying articles it is still possible that some relevant articles may have been missed and therefore not included within the review. To minimise this, we worked with a librarian, searched online research repositories, and contacted experts in the field to identify additional articles. Second, the coding of arguments and tactics within the articles is often subjective. To mitigate this, all three authors reviewed and re-reviewed the coding at various points during the systematic review process and, at the end, collectively reviewed 50% of the included articles, plus all of those in categories where coding concerns had been identified. Third, the identification of tactics and arguments, and the jurisdictions in which they are used, is dependent on the available literature, its quality, and any publication bias. This in turn may depend on limitations in the availability and nature of the TI documents on which much of the literature is based. These issues have a number of implications. For example, many of the articles included did not focus primarily on TI attempts to influence marketing regulations and thus only made brief references to TI tactics or arguments, with little context or background. We attempted to overcome this limitation by requiring each tactic and argument to be supported by verifiable evidence. Information regarding the success or failure of a particular policy proposal was not always recoded, making it impossible to reliably determine which tactics or arguments were most successful in defeating marketing-related regulations. Furthermore, it is highly likely that some of the tactics and arguments were used more frequently by the TI than identified within the literature. For example, financial incentives are likely to be used more frequently and broadly than the two occasions identified in Europe
The main strength of this review is its systematic approach and its attempt to rigorously categorise industry strategies/tactics and frames/arguments; to our knowledge it is the first attempt to do so. A key strength is the geographic diversity of the literature reviewed. Although over half of the included articles (26 articles, 56%) focussed on North America, Europe or Australasia (perhaps in large part due to grants provided by the US National Cancer Institute for research on TI documents in the early 2000s), a significant proportion did not, and the geographic base was far more diverse than some previous reviews of industry tactics
This systematic review has identified common tactics and arguments that the TI uses to prevent the implementation of regulation, and has shown that they are repeatedly used across different jurisdictions. Policymakers need to be aware of these in order to understand how the TI may try to manipulate the regulatory environment in their own interests, and public health advocates can use this information to prepare effective counter strategies. The recent failure of the British government to pursue plain packaging legislation highlights the importance of such knowledge.
Models of corporate political activity based on internal TI documents represent a potentially valuable analytical tool with which to examine opposition to public health policies and identify low visibility activity. The repeated use of tactics and arguments identified in this review underlines the potential of such an approach. Further work is now needed to examine whether the taxonomies for TI tactics and arguments developed in this paper can be applied to other industries and policy areas. Further research is also required to examine the interconnections between strategies/tactics, frames/arguments and audiences, as different social actors are likely to propagate different messages and have different political effects. Finally, due to limitations in the included literature, we also recommend that future research on corporate influence should, where at all possible, include contextual information, ensure all claims are supported by reliable and verifiable evidence, and that the success or failure of individual tactics and arguments are recorded.
(PDF)
PRISMA Checklist for this study.
(PDF)
(PDF)
(PDF)
(PDF)